* Both in England and America, it is generally held, that profits are not to be included in the injury for which compensation * is to be made. Yet these would seem to be precisely those consequences which the owner of merchandise did expect, and the loss of them would be that which one who interfered with the owner, as by unlawful capture, must have contemplated as certain. But the answer is, that profits are excluded, not because they are in themselves remote, but because * they depend wholly upon contingencies, which are so many, so various, and so uncertain, - as the arrival of goods, the time, place, and condition of arrival, the state of the market at that moment, and the like, - that it.would be impossible to arrive at any definite determination of the actual loss, by any trustworthy method. And the future profits of a business the warranty is general, an accidental damage, even in the vendee's own affairs, is not regarded." See also Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. 4 W. 519, 4 id. 337. In an action by a lessee against his lessor, for refusing to allow the lessee to enter upon the demised premises, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the damage sustained by him in his removal to the premises. Drjgsp v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71; Giles v. OToole, 4 Barb. 261, Johnson v. Arnold, 2 Cush. 46, Lawrence r. Wardwell, 6 Barb. 423. Although the injury may have been inflicted by the immediate agency of a third person, the wrong-doer will be liable if his wrongful act naturally led to the injury; as where the defendant descended in a balloon into the plaintiff's garden, and drew to his assistance a crowd, who trod down the vegetables and flowers, the defendant was held liable for these injuries. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl 892 , Vanderburgh v. Trau x, 4 Denio, 464. So also, if caused by the act of a horse. Gilbert-son v Richardson, 5 C. B. 502. See also Lynch v. Nirden, I Q. B. 29. A lapse of time may intervene between the wrongful act and the injury. Dickinson v. Boyle, 17 Pick. 78. In Tarleton v. Mc-Gawley, Peake, 205, the defendant was held liable for firing cannon at the natives on the coast of Africa, to prevent their trading with the plaintiff. Firing near the plaintiff's decoy pond, to frighten away the wild fowl, was held actionable in Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East, 574, note. In Watson v. A N. & B Railway, 15 Jur. 448, 3 Eng. L. & Eq 497, the plaintiff sent a plan and model to a committee who had offered a prize for the best one of the kind By the negligence of the common carrier it did not arrive in season to be presented It was held, that the chance of obtaining the prize could not be considered in assessing the damages. Where the plaintiffs horses escaped into the defendant's field, in consequence of a defect in his fence, and were there killed by the falling of a haystack, which it was alleged was kept in an improper and dangerous manner the defendant was held liable for the loss of the horses. Powell v. Salisbury. 2 Younge & J. 391. The expense of searching for property wrongfully taken has been held recoverable as special damage, in an action on the case for the taking of the property. Bennett v. Lock wood, 20 Wend. 223.

(ww) Mullett v. Mason, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 559.

(wx) Gray v. Waterman, 40 111. 522. (wy) Marsh v. Webber, 13 Minn. 109.

which has been interrupted by the defendant, are open also to the objection of remoteness as well as uncertainty, (x)1 But

(x) The probable profits of a voyage have not been allowed as damages, when it has been broken up by the illegal capture of the vessel. The Schooner Lively, 1 Gallis 315; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, 560; La Amistad de Rues', 5 Wheat. 385. Or by a collision occasioned by the default of the defendant. Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492, 514; Cummins p. Spruance, 4 Harring. 315; Steamboat Co. p. Whillden, 4 id. 233; Finch v. Brown, 13 Wend. 601. Or by legal attachment of the ship. Boyd v. Brown, 17 Pick. 453. In Smith v. Condrv, 1 How. 28, 35, Tune if, C. J, said: " It has been repeatedly decided, in cases of insurance, that. the insured cannot recover for the loss of probable profits at the port of destination, and that the value of the goods at the place of shipment is the measure of compensation. There can be no good reason lor establishing a different rule in cases of loss by collision. It is the actual damage sustained by the party, at the time and place of the injury, that is the measure of damages " But see Wilson v. Y. K. 4 B. R. R. Co. at Nisi Pnus, cited 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 557, note. And in The Narra-gansett, I Blatchf. C. C. 211 (a case in admiralty), the value of the services of the vessel, while undergoing necessary repairs for injuries received by collision, was allowed as a part of the damages sustained by her owners. See also Wil liamson c. Barrett, 13 How. 101; and 1 Parsons on Maritime Law, 204 It was held, in an action by the builder of a steamboat, for its price, that the owner could not recoup the amount of profits which would probably have arisen from trips, which were prevented by defects in the construction of the boat. Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342. See Taylor v. Maguire, 13 Mo. 517; Davis v. Talcott, 2 Kern 184. In an action against a lessor, for refusing to allow the lessee to enter upon the demised premises, the profits which the lessee might have made in his business, had he occupied the premises, cannot be recovered as damages. Giles v. OToole, 4 Barb. 261. In an action for the breach of a contract to make and deliver certain machinery within a certain time, the profits which might have accrued from the manufacture of an article with the machinery, had the contract not been broken, cannot*be considered in estimating the profits. Freeman v. Clnte, 3 Barb. 424. So in Had ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 398. A common carrier contracted with a miller to carry for hire two pieces of iron, forming the broken shaft of a mill, and deliver the same to an artificer, to serve as a model for a new one. A shaft being indispensable to the working of the mill, and the miller not having another, the mill necessarily remained idle until the new-shaft could be supplied, but of this the carrier was not aware. He did not, however, deliver the iron to the artificer within a reasonable time, and, a delay having consequently arisen in the delivery of the new shaft, he was sued by the where * profits are not liable to either of these objections, there they should be admitted, as giving a right to compensation in damages. This admission seems, however, in general, to be limited to cases in which the profits are the immediate fruit of the contract, and are independent of any collateral engagement or enterprise entered into in expectation of the performance of the principal contract (y)l Hence, in an action for a breach of miller for a breach of his agreement. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover as damages the lorn of profits incurred by the stoppage of the mill. And Aider-ton, B., said: " We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this-Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect to such breach of contract should be, either such as may, fairly and reasonably, be considered arising naturally, that is, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now if the special circumstances, under which the contract was actually' made, were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be, the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under those special cricumstances, so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if those special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he at the most could only be supposed to have had In his contemplation the amount of injuries which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract For had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have especially provided for the breach of contract, by special terms as to the damages in that case, and of this advantage it would be very adjust to deprive them." Bat in Waters v. Towers, 8 Exch. 401, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 410, where the action was for the non-fnlfilment of a contract to furnish machinery in a reasonable time, it was held, that the jury might assess damages for loss of profits to be derived from contracts with third parties, if the jury believed that such profits would nave been obtained. But the loss of profits was set forth in the declaration. A ven- . dee of property cannot recover against the vendor, in an action for a breach of the contract to sell, damages on account of an advantageous contract of resale, made by the vendee with a third person. Lawrence v. Ward well, 6 Barb. 423. In Wilbert v. The New York and Erie Railroad Co. 19 Barb 36, it was held, that in an action against the defendants for negligence in not conveying a quantity of butter to market within a reasonable time, the plaintiffs cannot recover, as damages, the difference between the price of butter at the time it should have been delivered and its price at the time when the butter in question was in fact delivered. But evidence of the amount of probable profits has sometimes been admitted, not as a measure of damages, but to aid the jury in estimating the loss. O'Neill v. Reid, 9 Bing. 68; Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing N C. 212, Donnell v. Jones, 17 Ala. 689. See also Haven v. Wakefield, 39 111. 509.