1 That a renewal is not such "other insurance" if notice was given with the original insurance, unless the renewal is in a new name, by reason of a change of interest, see Pitney v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. 65 N. T. 6.

2 But before different policies can be held to contribute to the same loss, it must appear that the insurances were upon the same interest in the same property or some part thereof, and as between a party to a policy and a stranger evidence may be given to show that a policy was not intended to cover all the property it assumed to cover. Lowell Manufact. Co. v. Safeguard F. Ins. Co. 83 N. Y. 591.

It has been held, that where there was an insurance of a certain amount upon goods, the whole amount divided specifically on different portions of the property, and the policy contained

(j) Stark Co. Ins. Co. v. Hard, 19 Ohio, 149.

(k) AEtna, Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385; Burbank v. Rockingham Ins. Co. 4 Foster, 550.

(l) Pendar v. Am. Ins. Co. 19 Cush. 469; Conway Tool Co. v. Hudson River Ins. Co. id. 144.

(m) See Hale v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 169.

(n) Mellen v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 5 Duer, 101, 17 N. Y. 609. And whether the policy so provides or not, the notice should he given as soon as possible. Kimball v. Howard Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 33.

(o) Jackson v. Mass. Ins. Co. 23 Pick. 418; Hardy v. Union Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 217; Stacey v. Franklin Ins. Co. 2 Watts & S. 506; Clark v. New England Ins. Co. 6 Cush. 342. See contra, Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co. 16 Pet. 495; Bigler v. N. Y. Ins. Co. 22 N. Y. 402.

(p) See Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co. 4 How. 185.

1 See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Michigan, etc. R. Co. 28 Ohio St. 69.

2 8ome policies, however, provide for the forfeiture, if other insurance be procured, "whether valid or not." Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Verdier, 35 Mich. 395. See Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co. 93 U. S. 527; Sturm v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 63 N. Y. 77; Gee v. Cheshire Ins. Co. 55 N. H. 65; Hough v. People's Ins. Co. 36 Md. 398; Hubbard v. Hartford Ins. Co. 33 la. 325. Where a policy was conditioned on there being no other insurance, a prior insurance was held to invalidate it, although the prior insurance was to be void if the premises remained vacant or neighboring buildings were erected, both of which circumstances had happened. Landers v. Watertown Ins. Co. 86 N. Y. 414.

such a condition as above stated, the policy was void if any part of the above goods was afterwards insured without notice. (q) But where the policy required that notice should be given, and the assent of the company indorsed upon the policy, "or otherwise acknowledged and approved in writing," it was a sufficient compliance * with this requirement, both as to notice and assent, that the secretary of the company said in a letter to the insured, "I have received your notice of additional insurance." (r) And in another case, parol evidence that the secretary knew of and advised the second insurance, was held to be sufficient. (s)

It has been held in Massachusetts, that a substantial compliance with a by-law requiring notice of previous insurance, is sufficient. (t) The main difficulty is in determining what is a substantial compliance; for in the same State, in a case where a policy provided that it should be void if there were any previous insurance on the property insured, and the policy did not express this previous insurance when it was issued, this policy was held to be void, even in the hands of an assignee; because a previous insurance existed and was not expressed therein, although the insurers knew of the previous insurance, and of the intention of the insured that it should remain in force, and prepared the policy and delivered it to the assured, he supposing it to be made in conformity with his intention, and not knowing that the prior insurance was not therein expressed, and the amount insured by both policies did not exceed the value of the property insured. (u) It is to be remarked, however, that the decision was made by the court sitting as a court of law, and that in the decision itself some intimations are thrown out, that a court of equity might have given relief.

It would seem to be clear, that the insured is not bound to give any details of a previous insurance, unless they are specially called for. (v)

That is a double insurance, where both policies cover the same insurable interest against the same risks. It is also a general rule, that they must be in the name of the same assured. But it may be a double insurance, at least within the provisions * above spoken of, if all or any part of the insurable inter est is insured in the name of another party, but in some way for the benefit of the original insured. Hence insurance made by a mortgagee, at the expense of the mortgagor, the latter having been insured, was held to be a subsequent insurance. (w) 1

(q) Associated Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Assam, 5 Md. 165.

(r) Potter v. Ontario Ins. Co. 5 Hill, 147. See also Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Ins. Co. 9 Barb. 191; Wilson v. Genesee Ins. Co. 16 id. 511; McEwen v. Montgomery Ins. Co. 5 Hill, 101; Kimball v. Howard Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 33; Conway Tool Co. v. Hudson River Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 144.

(s) Goodall v. New England Ins. Co. 5 Foster, 169.

(t) Liscom v. Boston Ins. Co. 9 Met 206.

(u) Barrett v. Union Ins. Co. 7 Cosh. 175. See also Pendar v. Am. Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 469.

(v) McMahon v. Portsmouth Ins. Co. 3 Foster, 15.

Where to an action on a policy the defence relied upon is a subsequent insurance, contrary to the terms of the first policy, the burden of proving that the two policies covered the same property is on the defendants. (x)