(dd) Ellett v. Tyler, 41 111. 449.

(de) Thorn v. Wilson, 27 Ind. 370.

(df) McDole v. Purdy, 23 la. 277.

(e) Capper v. Spottiswoode, 1 Tam. 21; Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Cox, 90; Bond v. Kent, 2 Vern. 281; Richardson v. Ridge-ly, 8 Gill & J. 87; Young v. Wood, 11

B. Mon. 123.

(f) Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Bro. C.

C. 420, where this opinion is indicated by

1 This rule is presumptive only.and evidence is admissible of circumstances indicating that it was the intention of the parties that there should be a lien though security was taken. Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347; Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172; Gnash v. George, 58 la. 492; Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo 396. And a lien is not waived where worthless security is fraudulently given by the purchaser. Himes v. Langley, 85 Ind. 77; Brown v Byam, 65 la. 374; Thomas v. Bridges, 73 Mo. 530.

The vendee's lien arises in cases where he pays the purchase-money prematurely, and the vendor, from inability or other cause, does not complete the title. In such cases equity gives the purchaser a lien upon the estate, even though he may have taken a specific security for the money so paid, (g)

Where a purchaser of land under an agreement to make certain improvements, expended money for that purpose, and afterwards refused to take the land because of an incumbrance which justified the refusal, it was held that the purchaser had an equitable lien for the money he had expended, (gg)

The application to a court of equity for the enforcement of the vendor's or vendee's lien on land, is like one for the specific * performance of a contract, which the court never grants if it would be violative of the principles of morality and justice, although, according to the technical rules of law, the contract would be valid. (h) This lien is not a mortgage, but has the court. And see remarks of Lord Eldon, in 15 Ves. Jr. 346; also Hughei v. Kerney, 1 Scn. & Lef. 132, supra.

{g) Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Wm. Blk. 123; Lacon v. Mertins, 3 Atk. 1; AEtna Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385; Lowell v. Middlesex Ins. Co. 8 Cush. 127; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452.

(gg) Gibert v. Fetcher, 38 N. T. 165.

(h) Elysville Mauuf. Co. v. Okisko Co. 5 Maryland, 152. This case came before the Court of Appeals, on appeal from the Court of Chancery. The Elysville Company had sold to the Okisko' Company a tract of land for the snm of $25,000, in compliance with an agreement by which the grantor, a chartered corporation, was to be paid by the grantee, another corporation, in stock of the latter to that amount. A deed of the land was dulv executed and delivered by the grantor, in which the consideration expressed was, "twenty-five thousand dollars," paid by the grantee to the grantor, and the president of the grantor corporation subscribed for two hundred and fifty shares at SI00 per share, in the stock of the grantee corporation, and received the certificates of the same for his corporation, in pursuance of the agreement. The Elysville Company, after receiving 250 shares by its president, appeared at the stockholders' meetings of the Okisko Company, and acted with the other stockholders, voting on its shares. Subsequently it filed a bill in chancery, for the purpose of enforcing a vendor's lien upon the land sold, alleging in the complaint, that, by the terms of the deed, the defendant bought the land for $25,000, in current monev, and that the defendant had whoUy failed to pay the complainant the consideration mentioned in the deed. The answer averred payment in compliance with the understanding of the parties, by the 250 shares of stock. The appellant (the Elysville Company) contended, that, by its charter, it had no power to subscribe for the stock of the appellee; and that the subscription was not binding, because at the time of the subscription, ten dollars per share was not paid in cash, as the charter of the Okisko Company required. But the Court of Appeals held, that, as the whole amount of the subscription was paid by the conveyance of the property of the appellant, it was an executed contract, vesting in the appellant a clear title to the stock, with authority to assign, transfer, or otherwise dispose of it; and therefore no question could arise as to the time of the payment. In regard to the appellant's denial of its own authority to subscribe for the stock, the court said: " It is proper to be borne constantly in recollection, that this proceeding is an application to a court of equity, for the exercise of its extraordinary powers by way of injunction, and for the enforcement of a vendor's equitable lien; in the latter particular not unlike the application for the specific performance of a contract, which courts of equity never grant whenever it would be grossly violative of the principles of sound morality and justice, although, according to the technical rules of law, the contract would be valid. Again, there is another principle which is uniformly merely the incidents of one; it consists solely in debt, and must be * subject to all the incidents of debt, and cannot be enforced if the debt cannot be. If the debt be barred by the statute, the remedy to enforce the lien is also barred, (i) It is held to be paramount to the claim of the purchaser's widow, for dower, (j) In a large majority of the States of the Union, this lien is recognized and enforced, as well as in the courts of the United States. The lien by deposit of title-deeds is upheld in equity, upon the ground of an agreement of the borrower to make a mortgage to the lender for the security of the debt. This lien is enforced by equity against the mortgagor, and all persons claiming under him with notice, (n) To render it effective, the deeds must be deposited as a bona fide immediate security; but they may be so deposited with a third person, as well as with the creditor himself, if solely for the security of the creditor, (o) Parol evidence is admissible to prove the purpose of the deposit, (p) This doctrine of creating a lien by a simple deposit of the title-deeds of an estate, has been strongly condemned by many able jurists, as being directly contrary to the statute of frauds, (q) In this country, where the system of registration is universal, it meets with less favor even than in England. It is, however sustained in New York, (r) observed, and that is, whoever invokes the aid of a court of equity in his behalf, must do equity. In view of these principles, how is the appellant predicamented in a court of conscience ? Thus: by its regularly appointed agents it executes and delivers to the appellee a conveyance of the property, and immediately thereafter receives, in payment therefor, a certificate of the capital stock of the appellee." The court then comment on the evidence, as showing clearly that the agents of the appellant must have had authority to receive and hold the certificate of stock, and as being wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable with the averments in the hill, and as positively affirming the truth of the answer of the appellee; and continue as follows: "This being so, how can the appellants, with any show of justice, ask the aid of a court of equity to assist them in avoiding the effect of a contract consummated, and which, so long as there was any prospect of advantage being derived from it to themselves, they not only recognized, but insisted on, and exercised their rights under ? The inquiry suggests the proper response. Under the circumstances we have mentioned, good faith and common honesty forbid the relief asked/' The decree of the Court of Chancery, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill, was affirmed with costs.