(z) It might be a different question, whether his children by all his wives, who were equally his wires, were all, or were any of them legitimate. In Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, the court say: "A parallel case to a Turkish or other marriage in an infidel country, will probably be found among all our savage tribes; but can it be possible that the children must be illegitimate if born of the second or other succeeding wife? "

And in reference to the case put in the text, Ruffin, C. J., says, in Williams v. Oates, 5 Ired. 535, 541, cited ante, p. • 594, n. (v): "If a Turk with two wives were to come here, we would administer to them the justice due to the relations contracted by them at home."

(a) See ante, p. *693, n. (v).

(b) Brook v. Brook, before Stuart, V. C, and Cresswell, J., 27 Law J. Ch. 400, 22 Law Reporter, 216.

1 The text is confirmed in Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, where a marriage in Connecticut by one divorced in New Fork for adultery, and therefore forbidden to marry again, was upheld, although the parties went to Connecticut expressly to evade the New York law, this law not prohibiting in terms marriages outside of New York; and further, Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, decided that it is no defence to a libel for divorce in New York that the marriage sought to be annulled was so contracted.

It is also the general rule, both in England and in this country, that the incidents of marriage, and contracts in relation to marriage, as settlements of property and the like, are to be construed by the law of the place where these were made; for any different construction cannot be supposed to carry into effect the intentions and agreements of the parties, or to deal with them justly. (g) This being the reason of the rule, it cannot apply to the construction of settlements and the like, where the parties are married while accidentally or transiently absent from their homes, without actual or intended change of domicil, and make their settlements or arrangements there, at the time of marriage; for in such cases the law of the domicil should govern, and the marriage, although actually foreign, should be regarded as constructively and virtually domestic. For, as a general rule, the rights of the parties, as springing from the relation of marriage, must be determined by the place where they then supposed themselves, and intended to be, domiciled. (h) l

(c) Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 167.

(d) M'Culloch v. M'Culloch, Ferg. Divorce Cases, 257; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 54; Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 861; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 805.

(e) Ruding v. Smith, 2 Hagg. Consist R. 371; Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361; The King v. Brampton, 10 East, 282; Newbury v. Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151. In Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 480, Sir George Hay says: "Will anybody say, that before the act, a marriage solemnized by persons going over to Calais, or happening to be there, was void in this country, because such a marriage might be void by the laws of France, as perhaps it was, if solemnized by a Protestant priest, whom they do not acknowledge, or if in any way clandestine, or without consent; and that, therefore, it should be set aside by a court in England, upon account of its being void by the law of France? No." And on p. 432, he says: "And here I must observe, that I do not mean that every domicil is to give a jurisdiction to a foreign country, so that the laws of that country are necessarily to obtain and attach upon a marriage solemnized there; for what would become of our factories abroad, in Leghorn or elsewhere, where the marriage is only by the law of England, and might be void by the law of that country? Nothing will be admitted in this court to affect such marriages so celebrated, even where the parties are domiciled."

(f) Loring v. Thorndike, 6 Allen, 257. The circumstances of this case are not only very peculiar, but too complicated and intricate to admit of a brief abstract or analysis. The law as to foreign marriages decided by this case is clearly stated in the head note, as follows : The civil act of the free city of Frankfort-on-the-Main, requiring marriages to be solemnized in a particular form, does not apply to foreigners temporarily residing there; and a marriage in that city before the United States consul, between a citizen of Massachusetts and a woman not domiciled there, is valid.

(ff) Hyde v. Hyde, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 180.

In respect to the capacity of the wife to contract with a third party, we are inclined to hold that the law of the place of the contract determines this, as well as other questions of capacity, * at least in respect to personal contracts; although, in the absence of sufficiently direct adjudication, and in the conflict of opinion to be found in text writers, it is difficult to ascertain what the law is on this point. 2 And it must depend much on the circumstances. If an American wife, for instance, being only on a brief visit in some country where she may contract, does so on some accidental occasion, it might be more doubtful whether the contract, though valid where made, would have any force on her return to this country. But if husband and wife go abroad, and visit a country for business purposes, and there enter into business contracts obligatory on both by the law of that place, although it might be difficult to enforce the contract against the wife in America, while the husband lived, we should think the contract would be valid, and enforceable here after her husband's death, and perhaps against a second husband. (i) 1

(g) Feaubert v. Turst, Prec in Ch. 207, 1 Bro. P. C. 38, Robertson's App. Cas. 3; Anstruther v. Adair, 2 Mylne & K. 618 ; Freemoult v. Dedire, I P. Wms. 429; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190; Crosby v. Berger, 3 Edw. Ch. 638; De Barante v. Gott, 6 Barb. 492.

(h) Le Breton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart. (La.) 60; Ford v. Ford, 14 id. 574; Allen v. Allen, 6 Rob. (La.) 104; Doe v. Vardill, 6 B. & C. 438. It seems that parties cannot, by a contract made in Louisiana, provide effectually that the rights of the parties shall be determined by the provisions of a specified foreign law. Bourcier v. Lanusse, 8 Mart (La.) 681. But though the contract be made in one country, and it refer to the law of another, it will be valid and effectual if both parties have agreed upon making that other country their place of residence, and do actually settle there. For, even without a contract, the rights of the husband to the wife's property are determined in such case by the law of the intended and actual subsequent domicil. Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, 261; Kneeland v. Ensley, Meigs, 620; Lyon v. Knott, 2 Am. Law. Reg. 604.