(i) See ante, p. * 770, note (p).

In general, concealment is not in law so great an offence as misrepresentation,(k) whatever it may be morally. It is cer(j) Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 195, holds that a vendee is not bound to give information of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the article, although he knows the same to be exclusively within his own knowledge. See ante, vol. i., p. * 578, note (k). See also Blydenburg v. Welsh, 1 Baldw. 331; Barnett v. Stanton, 2 Ala. 181. But see Frazer v. Gervais, Walker (Miss.), 72. See also Hough v. Evans, 4 McCord, 169, as to the duty of a vendor to disclose a latent defect, not known to the buyer. But this may arise from the law peculiar to that State, that a sound price implies a sound article.

(k) Concealment, to be actionable, must of course be of such facts as the party is bound to communicate. Irvine v. Kirkpatrick, House of Lords, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 17. And see Otis v. Raymond, 3 Conn. 413; Van Arsdale v. Howard, 5 Ala. 596; Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 1 Yeates, 307. A purchaser is not bound to disclose his knowledge of a fraud which makes the title of the vendor to the property better than he himself supposes, where the means of knowledge are equally open to both. Kintzing v. McElrath, 5 Penn. St. 467. But see Stevens v. Fuller, 8 N. H. 463. In Railton v. Mathews, 10 Clark & F. 934, a party became surety in a bond for the fidelity of a commission agent to his employers. After some time the employers discovered irregularities in the agent's accounts, and put the bond in suit. The surety then instituted a suit to avoid the bond, on the ground of concealment by the employers of material circumstances affecting the agent's credit prior to the date of the bond, and which, if communicated to the surety, would have prevented him from undertaking the obligation. On the trial of an issue whether the surety was induced to sign the bond by undue concealment or deception on the part of the employers, the presiding judge directed the jury that the concealment, to be undue, must be wilful and intentional, with a view to the advantages the employers were thereby to gain. Held, by the Lords (reversing the judgment of the Court of Session), that the direction was wrong in point of law. Mere noncommunication of circumstances affecting the situation of the parties, material for the surety to be acquainted with, and within the knowledge of the person obtaining a surety bond, is undue concealment, though not wilful or intentional, or with a view to any advantage to himself. See Prentiss v. Russ, 16 Me. 30. If a broker sell property to a person, knowing it to be subject to the lien of a fieri facias, and conceal the fact, and send the party to investigate respecting the incumbrances on the property, in a direction whence he knows correct information cannot be obtained, although his false and fraudulent representations are made by actions rather than words, he is liable to an action on the case for deceit. Chisholm v. Gadsden, 1 Strobh. 220. But where the defendant, in an action for deceit in the sale of a slave, had been told that he was unsound, but did not believe it, it was held, that he was not bound to disclose it. Hamrick v. Hogg, 1 Dev. 351. As to evidence of fraudulent concealment, see Fleming v. Slocum, 18 Johns. 403. In George v.

tain, * however, that the doctrine of fraud extends to the suppression of the truth in many cases, as well as the expression of what is false. For although one may have a right to be silent under ordinary circumstances, there are many cases in which the very propositions of a party imply that certain things, if not told, do not exist. (l) This is peculiarly the case in contracts of insurance; where the insured is bound to state all facts within his knowledge which would have an influence upon the terms of the contract, and are not known, or may be supposed by him not to be known, to the insurer. (m) In these cases, and * in others which come within this principle, the suppressio veri has the same effect in law as the expressio falsi.

The next rule of which we would speak is one which is frequently of very difficult application. It is the rule which discriminates between the mere expression of opinion and the statement of a fact. (n) 1 This is often a question for the jury; but, so far

Johnson, 6 Humph. 36, it was held, that where a party, during a negotiation for the sale of property, stated that the other contracting party must take the property at his own risk, such statement, though negativing a warranty, would not exonerate the party from a liability for a suppression of the truth or the suggestion of falsehood.

(l) Kidney v. Stoddard, 7 Met 252, furnishes an excellent illustration of such a concealment as is actionable. There a father by letter recommended his minor son as worthy of credit, etc. He did not state that he was a minor. A saw the letter, and on the strength of it trusted the minor for goods for trade to a large amount The jury were told, that if the father concealed the fact of the minority of the son, with the view of giving him a credit, knowing or believing, that if that fact had been stated he would not have obtained the credit, he was liable in law for the damage A sustained, and this ruling was affirmed by the whole court. And see Jackson v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. 344. So, where it was agreed between the vendors and vendee of goods, that the latter should pay 10s. per ton beyond the market price, which sum was to be applied in liquidation of an old debt due to one of the vendors; and the payment of the goods was guaranteed by a third person, but the bargain between the parties was not communicated to the surety; it was held, that that was a fraud on the surety, and rendered the guaranty void. Pidcock v. Bishop, 3 B. & C. 605.

(m) Lindeneau v. Desborough, 8 B. & C. 586; Bufe v. Turner, 6 Taunt. 338, an excellent case on the subject of concealment. See further Clark v. Man. Ins. Co. 8 How. 235; Fletcher v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 18 Pick. 419; Walden v. Louisiana Ins. Co. 12 La. 134; Lyon v. Commercial Ins. Co. 2 Rob. (La.) 266; New York Bowery Ins. Co. v. New York Ins. Co. 17 Wend. 359.