Say him a sum of money therefor; and Sir William Grant, M. R., refused a decree for the payment of the money, on the ground that the court had no means of compelling the plaintiff to perform his part of the agreement, or of putting the defendant in possession of the business. Bozon v. Farlow, 1 Meriv. 459 An agreement having been entered into between A and another, for the purchase by the latter of certain land of which A was only tenant for life, A's son, in whom the title was, filed a bill against the purchaser to compel a completion of the purchase; it was objected that the bill would not lie, because, the plaintiff not being bound by his father's agreement, the remedy was not mutual, and it was so held. Armiger v. Clarke, Bunh. 111. But there was there no contract at all between the plaintiff and defendant The defendant, by an agreement under seal, demised land to the plaintiff without rent or other expressed consideration, and covenanted to make a conveyance to the plaintiff in fee upon payment by him of a certain sum per acre, a decree for a specific performance of the agreement to convey was refused. Boucher v. Van-buskirk, 2 A. K. Marsh. 345. Geiger v. Green, 4 Gill, 472, was the case of an do, and is prevented * from doing the whole by an impossibility, in no way his fault. If he now seeks specific performance from the other * party, it is plain that he is not entitled to the whole on that side in return for the part which he has done. But if we suppose that what the defendant has to do is equally divisible, and that a part of his obligation may be set off justly and accurately, as in proportion to the part done agreement between the owner of certain land and the plaintiff, by which the latter was granted the privilege of getting ore from the land, paying therefor 25 cent* per ton; after some ore had been dug under the agreement, the plaintiff, being interrupted by the defendant, prayed an injunction and a decree for a specific performance; but it was refused. Tyson v. Watts, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 13, was also a mining contract, similar in its general features, but differing in reciting a consideration of one dollar paid by the plaintiff, and obliging him to commence proper explorations on or before a certain day; it was held to want mutuality. On the other hand, Stansbury v. Fringer, 11 Gill & J. 149, strongly supports the distinction which has been suggested. There it was agreed between A and B, that A should hold certain land of B for a term of years, paying taxes, and making certain improvements; and it was further agreed, that A might at any time during the term at his pleasure become the purchaser of the land at a stipulated price; and A, having tendered the price, filed a bill to compel B to make a conveyance; it was objected that the contract was not mutual, because there was no obligation to purchase upon the plaintiff; but the court held, that, by occupying the land, paying taxes, and making the stipulated improvements, he had given the consideration for his privilege of purchasing the land, and a specific performance was decreed. And see Hack-ett v. McNamara, Lloyd & G. temp. Plunket, 283; Ball v. Coggs, 1 Bro. P. C. 296. Compare Boucher v. Vanbuskirk, supra. The owner of a certain parcel of land entered into an agreement under seal with a railroad company, by which he granted them the privilege of running their road through his lands upon payment of a certain compensation for the soil appropriated and the damages occasioned; on a bill filed by the company for a specific performance, it was contended that the contract wanted mutuality, inasmuch as the plaintiffs were under no obligation on their part to take the land or pay the price; but the objection was not sustained. Western Railroad v. Babcock 6 Met. 346. (And see Boston and Maine by the plaintiff, will the court decree so much? Here a question comes up somewhat similar to that of entirety of contract at law. A distinction of this kind has been taken, and seems to rest on sufficient foundation; if the plaintiff is none the worse for what he has done, - or, to use a phrase which has been applied to such a case, is in statu quo, and will not therefore be damaged if nothing be done by the defendant, he can claim nothing of the defendant, because he, the plaintiff, has not done all he was bound to do. But if the plaintiff has in good faith done all that he could do, and if the defendant do nothing of what he undertook, or make no compensation, or repay no money, and something of this kind can be decreed and done, and the defendant will gain and the plaintiff sustain damage if it be not done, in such case the plaintiff would have a decree, (u) The question of compensation we have already considered. (v)

Railroad v. Babcock, 3 Cush. 228; Boston and Maine Railroad v. Bartlett, id. 224.) From a portion of the opinion of Shaw,C. J. (6 Met. 353, &c), it might be inferred that it was held, that a positive agreement on the plaintiff's part to act under the contract is not necessary, where in the event of his acting under it, there will be a certain obligation upon him to pay a consideration; in other words, that the license to act is sufficiently supported by the promise to pay for using the license, in case he does use it; but much consideration was placed upon the character of the plaintiffs, as a public company instituted to make a great public work; and upon the fact, that acting on the agreement with the defendant, they had gone to fix a particular location for their road, and consequently were now compelled to take the defendant's land, whatever price should be exacted. The circumstance that a substantial consideration did not need to be shown at law, the contract being under seal, was also adverted to. The doctrine of the common law, that mutuality is only necessary in a contract where the want of mutuality would leave one party without a valid or available consideration for his promise (Tindal, C. J., Arnold v. Mayor of Poole, 4 Mann & G. 896), seems to express all the mutuality in the agreement of the parties-as distinguished from reciprocity of remedy-that equity requires as a necessary condition to a specific performance. At the same time, it must be borne in mind, that although no legal invalidity infects the contract, the enforcement of it in equity is a matter of judicial discretion; and notwithstanding there is no want of mutuality, the court will not act, if, upon all the circumstances of the case, there is danger that its interposition would not be equitable. See judgment of Knight Bruce, V. C, 2 Younge & C, Ch., 64. There is a class of injunction cases which are not to be used as authorities for a specific performance under like circumstances, - such as Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phillips, 52. See the observation of Lord Cottenham, Ch., in the report in 10 Jur. 601. See also Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.f M. & G. 604.