This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
1 Thus if he purposely refrains from making inquiries because he suspects something may be wrong, he is not protected. Daniel, Negot. Inst. § 795 b.
2 The numerous cases on this point, showing that the law is now uniformly as stated in the text in England and in this country except in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Vermont, are collected in Daniel, Negot. Inst. §§ 771-775.
Ark. 20 (statutory). - And this burden ' is not discharged by proof that the note was transferred and delivered to the plaintiff before it was dishonored, but was not indorsed until afterwards. Ranger v. Carey, 1 Met. 369. - Suspicious circumstances, however, may rebut this presumption. Snyder v. Riley, 6 Barr, 165; Tams v. Way, 13 Penn. St. 222.
(p) Southard v. Porter, 43 N. H. 239.
(q) Burrough v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558; Whitehead v. Walker, 10 M. & W. 696; Carruthers v. West, 11 Q. B. 143; Hughes v. Large, 2 Barr, 103; Cumberland Bank v. Hann, 3 Harrison, 223; Chandler v. Drew, 6 N. H. 469; Robinson v. Lyman, 10 Conn. 31; Britton v. Bishop, 11 Vt. 70; Robertson v. Breedlove, 7 Port. (Ala.) 541; Tuscumbia R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 8 Ala. 206; Tinsley v. Beall, 2 Ga. 134; Hankins v. Shoup, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 342; McAlpin v. Wingard, 2 Rich. L. 547; Oulds v. Harrison, 28 E. L. & E. 524, 10 Exch. 572; Arnot v. Woodburn, 35 Mo. 99; Simpson v. Hall, 47 Conn. 418; Elliott v. Deason, 64 Ga. 63; Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 96; Barnes v. McMullin, 78 Mo. 260; Trafford v. Hall, 7 R. I. 104; Woods v.
Viozca, 26 La. An. 716; Noyes v. Landon, 59 Vt. 569; Davis v. Miller, 14 Gratt, 8.
In [some States, however] all set-offs between the original parties existing at the time of the transfer of the title are allowed. Sargent v. Southgate, 5 Pick. 312; Nixon v. English, 3 McCord, 549; Perry v. Mays, 2 Bailey, 354; Cain v. Spann, 1 McMull, 258; Burnham v. Tucker, 18 Me. 179; Wood v. Warren, 19 id. 23; Denning v. Gibson, 53 Ia. 517; Tuttle v. Wilson, 33 Minn. 423; Edney v. Willis, 23 Neb. 56. And see Ordiorne v. Woodman, 39 N. H. 544; Cross v. Brown, 51 N. H. 486. In New York, the point was considered doubtful in Miner v. Hoyt, 4 Hill, 193, 197. - Of these States, in Massachusetts, at least, equities arising between the original parties after the transfer of title, but before notice to the maker, cannot be set off as against the indorsee. Ranger v. Carey. 1 Met. 369; Baxter v. Little, 6 id. 7. [But in Iowa and Minnesota all set-offs arising before notice of the transfer may be set up by the maker, Denning v. Gibson, Tuttle v. Wilson, supra.]
1 If a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed in blank is stolen or lost and is not transferred before maturity to a bona fide purchaser for value, the original owner may assert his title against any subsequent transferee, the instrument becoming after maturity like an ordinary chattel, to which a thief or finder cannot give a good title. Down v. Hailing, 4 B. & C. 330; Vermilye v. Adams Express Co. 21 Wall. 138; (But see Nat. Bank v. Texas, 20 Wall. 72, 88;) Gilbough v. Norfolk. etc R. R. Co. 1 Hughes C. C. 410; Von Hoffman v. United States, 18 Ct. of Claims, 386; Greenwell v. Haydon, 78 Ky. 332; First Nat. Bank v. County Commissioners, 14 Minn. 77; Wylie v. Speyer, 62 How. Pr. 107; Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 2'21; Northampton Nat. Bank. v. Niles, 109 N. Y. 628; Texas Banking and Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 61 Tex. 365; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 750. And as between the original owner and a holder after maturity, the burden is on the latter to show that the thief or finder transferred the instrument before maturity to him or some bona fide purchaser for value without notice, under whom he claims. Hinckley v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 131 Mass. 147; Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y.221.
It has been held that the same principle is applicable to a transfer after maturity by an agent in excess of his authority. Goggerly v. Cuthbert, 2 B. & P. N. It". 170; Foley v. Smith, 6 Wall. 492: Chase v. Whitmore, 68 Cal 545; Thomas v. Kinsey, 8 Ga. 421; McCormick v. Williams, 54 Ia. 50; Wood v. McKean, 64 Ia. 16; Towner v. McClelland, 110 Ill. 542; Bird v. Cockrem, 28 La. An. 70; Stern v. Germania Nat. Bank, 34 La. An. 1119; McKim v. King, 58 Md. 502; Church
Although paper negotiated when overdue is subject to equitable defences, yet a demand must be made on the acceptor or maker within reasonable time, and reasonable notice must be given to an indorser, or he will be discharged. (r)
As between the original parties to negotiable paper the considv. Clapp, 47 Mich. 257; Emerson v. Crocker, 5 N. H. 159; Farrington v. Park Bank,
(r) McKinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 351; Dwight v. Emerson, 2 N. H. 159, Patterson v. Todd, 18 Penn. St. 426; Levy v. Drew, 14 Ark. 334; Thayer v.
Brackett, 12 Mass. 465; Field v. Nicker-son, 13 Mass. 138; Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 121.
39 Barb. 645; Osborn v. McClelland, 43 Ohio St. 284; Walker v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 185. But in a few cases it has been held, and it would seem with good reason, that the original owner having entrusted his agent with apparent title to negotiable paper cannot assert his own title against one who has purchased in good faith from the agent, and the ground for estoppel is stronger if the paper was already overdue when entrusted to the agent. Connell v. Bliss, 52 Me. 476; Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95; Lee v. Turner, 89 Mo. 489; Neuhoff v. O'Reilly, 93 Mo. 164.
Whether equities (as distinguished from defects in the legal title) in favor of prior holders, or of persons who have never been holders of or parties to the instrument, which exist at or arise after maturity, affect the title of subsequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice is not wholly settled. It was decided in the affirmative in In re European Bank, L. R. 5 Ch. 358; Turner v. Hoyle, 95 Mo. 337; Kernohan v. Durham, 48 Ohio St. 1. And see Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co. 128 U. S. 416. But the legal title to negotiable paper should pass after maturity, subject only to such equities as might reasonably be suspected from the fact that the paper was overdue. This fact would give rise to suspicion that the obligors have some reason for resisting payment, and the transferee should therefore take subject to equitable defences of those parties; but there is no reason to suspect that the title of a holder of overdue paper is subject to a secret trust, express or constructive, and it was held that such equities do not follow negotiable paper after maturity in Crosby ». Tanner, eration may always be inquired into; and so it may as between indorser and indorsee. (s) But an action by an indorsee against the maker cannot be defeated by showing that no consideration passed to the maker from the payee and indorser, (t) or between any remote parties.
 
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