Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581; Perron v. Monmouthshire Railway Co. C. B. (1853), 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 258. And see Lloyd v. Walkey, 9 C. i P. 771. On the other hand, if a declaration in tort is general, as in trover for a number of articles, payment into court would admit a liability on some cause of action, but not any particular article mentioned in the declaration. Schreger v. Carden, 11 C. B. 581, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 513; Cook v. Hartle, 8C.&P. 568; Story v. Finnis, 6 Exch. 123, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 548.

(t) Dixon v. Clark, 5 C. B. 365; Waistell v. Atkinson, 3 Bing. 290; Law v. Jackson, 9 Cowen, 641; Coit v. Houston, 3 Johns. Cas. 243; Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 389; Raymond v. Bearnard, 12 Johns. 274; Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14. A tender may be sufficient to stop the running of interest, although not a technical tender so as to give costs. Goff v. Rehoboth, 2 Cush. 475; Suffolk Bank v. Worcester Bank, 5 Pick. 106.

(u) Cropp v. Hambleton, Cro. Eliz. 48; 1 Rol. Abr. 421 (K.), pi. 2. A tender may be made by an inhabitant of a school district, on behalf of such district, without any express authority; and this, if ratified by the district, is a good tender. Kincaid v. Brunswick, 2 Fairf. 188.

{v) Per Best, C. J., in Harding v. Davies, 2 C. & P. 78. And see Kincaid v. Brunswick, 2 Fairf. 188; Read v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86.

(w).Co. Litt. 206 b; Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle, 408.

(x) Read v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86.

(y) Kirton v. Braithwaite, 1M.&W. 313; Goodland v. Blewith, 1 Camp. 477.

1 A tender, however, to an attorney's clerk, in his office, who, saying that his master is out and that he had "no instructions," refuses the money, is good. Finch v. Boning, 4 C P. D. 143.

money be due to several jointly, it may be tendered to either, but must be pleaded as made to all. (z) It perhaps is good if made to one appointed executor, if he afterwards prove the will. (a) The whole sum due must be tendered, (b)l as the creditor is

Tender to a merchant's clerk, at the store, for goods previously bought there, is good, although the claim had then been lodged with an attorney for collection. Hoyt v. Byrnes, 2 Fairf. 475; Mclneffe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray, 600. And this although the clerk had been forbidden to receive the money, if tendered. Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307. Tender to the attorney of a creditor who has the claim left for collection, is good. Watson v. Hetherington, 1 Car. & K. 36; Crozer v. Pilling, 4B.&C. 28,6 Dowl. & R. 132. And tender to such attorney's clerk, at his office, the principal being absent, may be good. Kirton v. Braithwaite, supra. And Wilmot v. Smith, 3 C. A P. 453; Barrett v. Deere, Moody & M. 200. See Bingham v. Allport, 1 Nev. & M. 398. The debtor is not obliged to tender for such attorney's letter. Kirton v. Braithwaite, supra.

(z) Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T. R. 683. So a tender of a deed to one of two joint purchasers is sufficient. Dawson v. Ewing, 16 S. & R. 371.

(a) 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 319. But see Todd v. Parker, Coxe, 45.

(b) Dixon v. Clark, 5 C. B. 365. In this case a declaration in debt on simple contract contained two counts, in each of which £26 were demanded. The defendants pleaded as to the causes of action, as to £5, parcel, etc., a tender. The plaintiff replied, that before and at the time of the tender, and of the request and refusal after mentioned, and until and at the commencement of the action, a larger sum than £5, namely, £13 15s., part of the money in the declaration demanded, was due from the defendants to the plaintiff as one entire sum, and on one entire contract and liability, and inclusive of, and not separate or divisible from, the said sum of £5, and the same being a contract and liability by which the defendants were liable to pay to the plaintiff the whole of the said larger sum, in one entire sum upon request; and that, after the last-mentioned and larger sum had become so due, and while the same remained unpaid, the plaintiff requested of the defendants payment of the last-mentioned and larger sum, of which the said £5 in the plea mentioned was then such indivisible parcel as aforesaid, yet that the defendants refused to pay the said larger sum; wherefore the plaintiff refused the said £5. Held, on special demurrer, that the replication was a good answer to the plea, and that, if there was any set-off or other just cause for not paying the larger sum, it should have come by way of rejoinder. So in Boyden v. Moore, 5 Mass. 365, where the defendant had brought into court what she supposed justly due on the action, and the costs up to the time, but upon the trial it appeared that she had brought in too little by forty-one cents, and the judge directed the jury that they might still find a verdict for the defendant, if the balance appeared to them a mere trifle, and they found accordingly, a new trial was granted for the misdirection of the judge. And Parsons, C. J., said: "It is a well-known rule that the defendant must take care, at his peril, to tender enough, and if he does not, and if the plaintiff replies that there is more due than is tendered, which is traversed, the issue will be against the defendant, and it will be the duty of the jury to assess for the plaintiff the sum due on the promise; and if it be not covered by the money tendered, he will have judgment for the balance. If the present direction of the judge had been in the trial of such an issue arising on a plea of tender, we cannot think the direction to be right. The defendant cannot lawfully withhold from the plaintiff any money due to him, however small the sum, and if the defendant intended to tender as much money as the plaintiff could claim, but made a mistake in her calculation, she must suffer for her own mistake, and not the plaintiff; although the injury to him may be very small, and such as most men would disregard. From the calculation made by the judge in the hurry of the trial the deficiency was about fourteen cents, but, on a more correct calculation, it amounts to about forty-one cents. And if at the time the money was brought in, no action had been pending, and the plaintiff had then received and indorsed the payment, he one thing or another as the creditor may choose, the tender should be of both, that he may make his choice. (d)