1 Where a mortgage for $600 was assigned to and, as the jury found, held by the defendant for $300, a tender of $300 and interest by the mortgagor discharged the mortgage. Stewart v. Brown, 48 Mich. 383.

* not bound to receive a part of his debt. But this does not mean the whole that the debtor owes to the creditor; for he may owe him many distinct debts; and if they are perfectly separable as so many notes, or sums of money otherwise distinct, the debtor has a right to elect such as he is willing to acknowledge and pay, and make a tender of them. And if the tender be for more than the whole debt, it is valid; (c) unless * it be accompanied with a demand of the balance, and the creditor objects for that reason. If the obligation be in the alternative, might afterwards have commenced and maintained an action to recover the balance then due. That the law will not regard trifles, is, when properly applied, a correct maxim. But to this point it is not applicable. In calculating interest there may and probably must arise fractions not to be expressed in the legal money of account; these fractions are trifles, and may be rejected. In making payments it is sometimes not possible, from the value and divisions of the current coin, to make the exact sum; - if the payment be made as nearly as it can conveniently be made, the fractional part of a small coin may be neglected; it is a trifle. But the present case is not one of these trifles. A man may sue and recover on a note given for forty cents; also, on a larger note where forty cents remain unpaid. It is therefore our opinion that the jury ought to have been directed to calculate the interest on the second note, and deducting the payments, if a balance remained unpaid, to find that balance for the plaintiff. If any sum large enough to be discharged in the current coin of the country is a trifle, which, although due, the jury are not obliged by law to award to the plaintiff, the creditor; it will be difficult to draw a line and say how large a sum must be, not to be a trifle. The law gives us no rule." But a tender of the sum justly due by the condition of a bond, is good, although less than the penalty. Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659.

(c) Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Stra. 916; Wade's case, 5 Rep. 115; Dean v. James, 4 B. & Ad. 546; Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T. R. 683; Black v. Smith, Peake, 88; Cadman v. Lubbock, 5 D. & R. 289; Bevans v. Rees, 5 M. & W. 306. In this last case, the defendant, who owed the plaintiff £108 for principal and interest on two promissory notes, in consequence of an application from the plaintiff's attorney for the amount, sent a person to the attorney, who told him he came to settle the amount due on the notes, and desired to be informed what was due, and laid down 150 sovereigns, out of which he desired the attorney to take the principal and interest, but the attorney refused to do so, unless a shop account, due from the plaintiff to the defendant, were fixed at a certain amount. Held, that this was a good tender of the £108, the fixing of the shop account being a collateral matter, which the attorney had no right to require. And Lord Abinger said: " I am not disposed to lay down general propositions, unless where it is necessary to the decision of the case; but I am prepared to say, that if the creditor knows the amount due to him, and is offered a larger sum, and, without any objection on the ground of want of change, makes quite a collateral objection, that will be a good tender." But the tender of a £5 bank-note in payment of a debt of £3 10s., and requesting the creditor to make the change, and return the balance, has been held a bad tender. Betterbee v. Davis, 3 Camp. 70. And see Robinson v. Cook, 6 Taunt. 336; Blow v. Russell, 1 C. & P. 365. If however the creditor does not object to the request for change, but claims that more is due than the whole amount tendered, and therefore refuses to receive the tender, the tender is good. Black v. Smith, Peake, 88; Cadman v. Lubbock, 5 D. & R. 289; Saunders v. Graham, Gow, 121. And so if he refuses the tender merely on the ground that the debtor will not pay, with the surplus, another and distinct debt, or unless the debtor will fix his own counter claim against the creditor at a certain sum. Bevans v. Rees, 5 M. & W. 306. If a creditor has separate claims against divers persons for different amounts, a tender of one gross sum for the debts of all, will not support a plea of tender, stating that a certain portion of the whole sum was tendered for the debt of one. Strong v. Harvey, 3 Bing. 304. But a tender of one gross sum upon several demands from the same debtor, without designating the amount tendered upon each, is good. Thetford v. Hubbard, 22 Vt. 440.

A tender must be made at common law, on the very day the money is due, if that day be made certain by the contract. (e) But the statutes and usages of our States, (f) generally permit the tender to be made after that day, but before the action is brought ;• and in some it may be made after the action is brought. It has been said that a tender cannot be made before the debt is due, as the creditor is not then obliged to accept it, even if it does not draw interest. But we should be inclined to believe, that the courts of this country would, generally, hold a tender valid that was made before the debt was due, provided the debt did not draw interest, or if, when the debt did draw interest, the tender included interest to the maturity of the debt. (g)l

To make a tender of money valid, the money must be actually produced and proffered, (h) unless the creditor expressly

(d) Fordley's case, 1 Leon. 68.

(e) City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414; Dewey v. Humphrey, 5 Pick. 187 ; Maynard v. Hunt, id. 240; Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend. 562; Day v. Lafferty, 4 Pike, 450; and see ante, p. * 637, n. (n). Perhaps on a contract for the payment of money, simply, when interest would be the only damages to be recovered, a tender of the principal and interest, to the day of tender, might be sufficient, if made before action brought. But see ante, p. *637, n. (n).