(l) Carr v. Hinchliff, 4 B. & C. 547; Stracey v. Deey, 7T.R 361, note; Pur*

1 A debt is not the subject of a set-off that was contracted by the plaintiff during infancy, and not ratified by him in writing after full age, and hence not actionable. Rawley v. Rawley, 1 Q. B. D. 460.

2 And although the agent agreed with the principal not to sell in his own name. Ex parte Dixon, 4 Ch. D. 188. So where the principal consented to a sale in the agent's name. Borries v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 88. But not if the action is for unliquidated damages for not accepting goods "to arrive." Turner v. Thomas, L. R. 6 C. P. 610. It is not necessary for the buyer to aver that he had "no means of knowing" that the goods did not belong to the agent. Borries v. Imperial Ottoman Bank L. R. 9 C. P. 38. But a buyer acting under a misapprehension, not brought about by the principal, that the agent owned the goods, cannot set off a claim against the agent Brown v. Morris, 88 N. C. 251. If an agent is known to act as such and as principal and the buyer neglects, in the particular transaction, to find out in what character he made the sale, the buyer will have no right of set-off, where he purchased merely to avail himself of such right as against a solvent principal. Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396 See Stewart v. Woodward, 50 Vt. 78.

cipal, if the factor has a lien on the goods, even if the principal be mentioned at the sale. (m) And if, before they are delivered, or any payment made, the buyer is notified that they belong to a third person, he cannot set off against an action by that person, a debt due to him from the factor. (n) A broker, being one to whom goods are not intrusted, and who usually and properly sells in the name of his principal, and who is understood to be only an agent, whether he sells in his own name or not, stands only on the footing of an agent. (o) And if an action be brought by an agent in his own name, for a debt due to his principal, the defendant may set off a debt due from such principal. (p) In general, chell v. Salter, 1 Q. B. 197. And see George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359; Rabone v. Williams, id. 360, note; Pigeon v. Osborn, 12 A. & E. 715; Parker v. Donaldson, 2 Watts & S. 9; Gardner v. Allen, 6 Ala. 187; Sims v. Bond, 6 B. & Ad. 331); Waring v. Favenck, 1 Camp. 85; Westwood v. Bell, Holt, N. P. 124.

(m) Hudson v. Granger, 6 B. & Ald. 27; Drink water v. Goodwin, Cowp. 261. But if the factor has parted with the goods and lost his lien, the purchaser may set off his debt against the principal. Coppin v. Craig, 7 Taunt. 243; Coppin v. Walker, id. 287.

(n) 1 Harrison & Edwards, N. P. 866; Barbour on Set-off, 136; Rabone v. Williams, 8 T. R. 360, n.

(o) Wilson v. Codman, 3 Cranch, 193; Atkinson v. Teasdale, 1 Bay, 299; Godfrey v. Forrest, id. 800.

(p) Royce v. Barnes, 11 Met 276. This doctrine, however, is repudiated by the late English case of Isberg v. Bowden, 8 Exch. 852, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 661. That was an action for freight due under a charter-party. Plea, that the plaintiff entered into the charter-party as master of the ship, and for, and on behalf of, and as agent for M. the owner; that the plaintiff never had any beneficial interest in the charter, or any lien on the freight, and that he brought the action solely as agent and trustee for M., and that M. was indebted to the defendant in a certain amount, which the defendant offered to set off. Held, on demurrer, that the statute of set-off did not apply. Martin, B., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "It was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, in support of the demurrer, that the plea was bad at common law, and could only be supported by virtue of the statute of set-off; and that inasmuch as the plaintiff in the action was not the debtor to the defendant, the case was not within the statute. It was admitted, on the other hand, that the plea was bad at common law; but contended that the statute had received a construction, in several cases which were cited, and to which we shall presently refer, and that upon such construction the plea could be maintained. The statute enacts, 'that where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and the defendant, one debt may be set against the other.' This is the whole enactment as applicable to the present case, and upon its true construction the question depends. If the words of the statute had been, that where there were 'mutual debts the one might be set against the other,' the argument for the defendant would have had more weight; but these are not the only words, for the debts are to be mutual debts between the plaintiff and the defendant, and there is no debt here due from the plaintiff at all; and except the words 'between the plaintiff and the defendant' can be excluded, the plea cannot be maintained. In support of his view, the defendant's counsel cited the case of Coppin v. Craig, where a plea, in substance the same as the present, was pleaded. The plea was not demurred to, and its validity or non-validity in point of law seems never to have been considered at all, and the matter decided by the court was quite collateral to the present question; so also a case of Jarvis v. Chappie, where a similar plea was pleaded, was also relied on. This was an action by an auctioneer, for goods sold and delivered, and the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff sold as agent for one Tappinger, who was indebted to the defendant, which debt was pleaded as a set-off. The plaintiff replied, that the goods were not the goods of Tappinger, and were not sold by the plaintiff as his agent, upon which issue was joined. The plaintiff was nonsuited at the trial.

if an agent be permitted by his * principal to act as if he were the principal and not an agent, one dealing with him, and supposing him to be a principal, * acquires the same rights, and among these the right of set-off, which he would have if the agent were a principal; nor can he be subsequently deprived of these rights by the coming in of a third party who was a stranger to him in the original transaction.