Horse railroads have been recently introduced in our larger cities, and are now common. In the cases cited below, interesting questions are considered in reference to the authority of municipal governments to permit their use of highways, and the construction of acts exercising this authority. (b) They are undoubtedly

5 B. & Ald. 53; Sleat v. Fagg, id. 342. But see the remarks of Bronson, J., contra, in Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234. So under the Carriers Act, it is held to be the duty of the sender of goods therein enumerated, and exceeding £10 in value, to take the initiative by giving notice to the carrier of their value and nature, in order to charge the latter in respect to their loss; and this whether the goods be delivered at the office of the carrier or not. Baxendale v. Hart, 9 E. L. & E. 506, 6 id. 468, 6 Exch. 769. - But the carrier will be held to very strict proof that the notice was brought to the knowledge of the bailor. Hollister v. Nowlen, 10 Wend. 234; Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218; Bean v. Green 8 Fairf. 422; Riley v. Home, 6 Bing. 217; Clayton v. Hunt, 3 Camp. 27; Cobden v. Bolton, 2 id. 108; Butler v. Heane, id. 415; Kerr v. Willan, 2 Stark. 68 ; Davis v. Willan, id. 279. In Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St 67, where the notice was in the English language, and the passenger was a German, who did not understand English, it was held incumbent on the carrier to prove that the passenger had actual knowledge of the limitation in the notice. But the strongest case to be found upon this point is that of Brown v. Eastern Railroad Co. 11 Cash. 97. This was an action of assumpsit for lost luggage. There was a notice printed on the back of the passage-ticket given to the plain tiff, that the defendants would not be responsible beyond a specified sum; but no other notice was given, nor was her attention called to this. Held, that if a common carrier can limit his responsibility in this way, it must be clearly shown that the other party is fully informed of the terms and effect of the notice; and that the facts in this case did not furnish that certain notice which must be given to exonerate such carrier from his liability. This question is put an end to in England by the Carriers Act, the mere publication in pursuance of the statute being held to be constructive notice to all. Baxendale v. Hart, 9 E. L. & E. 506, 6 id. 468, 6 Exch. 769. -So the notice must be clear and explicit, and if ambiguous, will be construed against the carrier. Beckman v. Shouse, 6 Rawle, 179; Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St 67; Barney v. Prentiss, 4 Har. & J. 817. So if there are two notices, he will be bound by the one least beneficial to him. Cobden v. Bolton, 2 Camp. 108; Munn v. Baker, 2 Stark. 266.

(a) Cheney v. B. & M. R. R. Co. 11 Met. 121.

(b) Musser v. Fairmount & Arch common carriers of passengers, and their rights and obligations, as such, must be much the same with those of the ordinary railroad companies.

1 Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 71 Penn. St 432. Nor can one who has bought a ticket to ride in one direction, ride in a direction the reverse of that indicated by the ticket. Keeley 9. Boston, etc. R. Co. 67 Me. 163. A carrier has a right to require a special check of passengers who stop over, or the payment of full fare from the stopping-over station to his destination; and a passenger expelled for failure to comply with these regulations cannot insist on riding from the place where he was expelled until he has paid the sum previously demanded. Stone v. Chicago, etc R. Co. 47 la. 82. One who purchases a ticket, and has his baggage checked, to a certain point, cannot be compelled to stop short of that place and go on in another train, at least in the absence of a regulation of the company. Hicks v. Hannibal, etc R. Co. 68 Mo. 329. The words "good on passenger trains only," on a ticket, do not constitute an agreement that all passenger trains will stop at the stations designated on the ticket Ohio, etc R. Co. v. Swarthout, 67 Ind. 567.