(h) Manby v. Scott, l Sid. 122: Bac Abr. Baron & Feme (H.); Etherington v. Parrot, 2 Ld. Raym. L006, 1 Salk. 118;

Bolton v. Prentice, Stra. 1214; Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680.

(i) Lord Hale, in Man by v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109.

(j) In Read v. Legard, 6 Exch. 636, the husband was a lunatic, confined in an asylum as dangerous, and the plaintiff had supplied the wife with necessaries. Hill, of counsel, says, arguendo "Not only has it never been decided judicially that by the mere fact of marriage a man confers on his wife an irrevocable authority to bind his credit, but everything tends to show that her right so to do is derived from some act, real or supposed, of the husband, done after the marriage, and which he must be in a condition to persist in or revoke." Pollock, C. B., said: "This rule must be discharged. The question raised by it is, whether an action can be maintained against a defendant, who has been a lunatic, for things supplied for the necessary support of his wife during the lunacy. It appears to me that the defendant is liable in such an action. The action is founded on this, that the defendant has taken on him a duty, - having contracted marriage with the person sustained by the plaintiff, he has thereby become in point of law liable for her maintenance, and if he fails to provide for that maintenance, except under certain circumstances which justify him in withholding it, she has authority to pledge his credit to procure it. It may be true, as stated by Mr. Hill, that no case has yet arisen in which this precise point was brought before any court; but, on the other hand, nunc of the dicta that occur in any of the cases cited furnish a clew to decide the present one adversely to the plaintiff." Alderson, B., in the course of the trial, had said: " It is a monstrous proposition, that a man who drives a woman out of doors, who hates, who abominates her, actually gives her authority to make contracts for him " He and Platt, and Martin, BB., agreed with Pollock, C. B. Martin, B., said: " My brother Alderson has stated the real truth respecting the obligation of the defendant and the principle of his liability; namely, that by contracting the relation of marriage, a husband takes on him the duty of supplying his wife with necessaries; and if he does not perform that duty, either through his own fault, or in consequence of a misfortune of this kind, the wife has in consequence of that relation a right to provide herself with them, and the husband is responsible for them. And although in the declaration the debt sued on is alleged to be the debt of the defendant contracted at his request, the truth is that it is the wife who contracts the debt, while the husband is responsible for it." See also Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631, and Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28. (In these very interesting cases on the liability of the husband for goods furnished to the wife, Mr. Smith, in his work on Contracts, p. 286, says the name of the defendant is fictitious, and borrowed from Shakspeare's Much Ado about Nothing, the defendant being actually " a highly respectable professional gentleman," whose name is not given.) A similar doctrine was laid down in Shaw v Thompson, 16 Pick. 198 (1834). Shaw, C. J., in that case says-" By law a husband is entitled to all the personal property of the wife, to all her earnings and acquisitions, and to the income of her real estate; it also throws on him the obligation to support and maintain her." And in Sykes v. Halstead, 1 Sandf. 483, it was held, that where a husband turns his wife away, or compels her to go by ill-treatment, and refuses to provide for her, he gives her a credit with the whole community, although it be expressly forbidden by him; and she has a right to be supported by him. But in an action for goods supplied to the wife on her order alone, the question is (in the absence of such evidence of necessity as may show an agency in law) whether there was any agency, or authority in fact, and not whether the goods were necessary. Bead v. Teakle, 24 E. L. & E. 332; s. c. 8 Exch. 680. See also Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351.

1 Thus a notice by the husband not to supply his wife with goods on his credit, does not prevent him from being liable for necessaries furnished her unless he has himself supplied her sufficiently. McGrath v. Donnelly, 13] Pa. 549.

2 A wife's services, and the comfort of her society, are due in return for the hus band's support, Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; and any contract by her for a compensation to care for her husband is void, Grant v. Green, 41 [a. 88.- A husband who offers to support his wife and children in his father's house, having no house or means of his own, and she refuses because of the father's intemperance and abuse, is not liable for neglecting to support her People v. Pettit, 74 N. Y. 320 - K.

.".75

*If a married woman carries on trade, and her husband lives with her and receives the profits, or they are applied to the maintenance of the family, the law presumes that she was his agent in this trade, and had his authority to make the necessary purchases. (k) So an authority may be presumed from habitual *acts of agency, or from confirmation, which may be express or implied; as where a wife was in the habit of drawing, indorsing, accepting, or paying bills and notes for her husband, and this he knew and sanctioned, his authority to her will be presumed. (l) Or if such bills and notes are usually a part of a certain business which is intrusted to the wife by the husband, he would undoubtedly be held liable for them.

(k) Petty v. Anderson, 2 C. & P. 38; Clifford v. Burton, 1 Bing. 199; Oxnard v. Swanton, 39 Me. 125; Boas v. Malone, 140

Pa. 572. But in Smallpiece v. Dawes, 7 C. & P. 40, where A, who kept a fruit shop in London, became a bankrupt in 1824, but did not surrender to his commission, and from that time to 1833 the business was carried on by his wife, to whom fruit was supplied, between 1828 and 1832, to an amount exceeding £266, and evidence was given to show that A was seen in London a few times between 1824 and 1833, and was arrested at the shop in 1833, and that he attended the marriage of his two daughters at Mary-le-bone church; it was held that proof of these facts was not sufficient to go to the jury to show that A's wife acted as his agent, so as to charge him with the price of the fruit.