In some of our States there are statutory provisions permitting negotiable paper to be under seal.l

In Virginia every promissory note or check payable at a particular bank or banking-office, and every inland bill payable in the State, is negotiable by statute. In Kentucky the words that this form of note, probably introduced long after the statute of Anne, and for what good reason no one can tell, has become of late years exceedingly common; and it is obvious that, until they are indorsed, they must always remain in the hands of the maker himself, and so he can never be liable upon them." Shortly after the decision in this case, the same question came up in the Common Bench, in the case of Brown v. De Winton and Gay v. Lander, 6 C. B. 336. In Brown v. De Winton the question came up in the same shape as in Wood v. Mytton, and Coltman, J., in giving the judgment of the court, delivered a very able and elaborate opinion, in which he agreed entirely with the view taken by the Court of Exchequer. In Gay v. Lander, the question was presented in a little different light. It is a familiar principle in the law of negotiable paper, that when a note is made payable to A or his order, the words "his order" impart to the note a permanently assignable quality into whose hands soever it may come; so that, though A indorse the note to B specially, without using the words "or his order," yet B may indorse it in turn to whomsoever he pleases. The point raised in Gay v. Lander was, whether the indorsement should receive the same construction in the case of a note payable to the order of the maker and by him indorsed, and the court held that it should. Coltman, J., in delivering the opinion, said: " We think that the principle on which the case of Brown v. De Winton was decided, will extend to this case. The principle on which that case was decided is, that the note, before it was indorsed, was in the nature of a promise to pay to the person to whom the maker should afterwards, by indorsement, order the amount to be paid; and that, after the note is indorsed and circulated, it must be taken as against the party so making and indorsing the note, that he intended that his indorsement should have the same effect as the indorsement by the payee of a note payable to the order of a person other than the maker would have had. Now, it is well established that, if a note be made payable to J. S. or order, and J. S., in such case, indorses the note specially to Smith & Co., without adding 'or order,' Smith & Co. may convey a good title to any other person by indorsement." It might, perhaps, be inferred from what fell from Baron Parke in Hooper v. Williams, that he entertained a different opinion on this last point, but the point did not arise in that case, and probably his intention was not particularly directed to it. In Absolon v. Marks, 11 Q. B. 19, the defendant and four others made a joint and several note payable to their own order, and all indorsed it in blank; and upon an action in which the declaration stated that the defendant made his promissory note payable to his own order, and indorsed the same to the plaintiff and promised to pay him the same according to its tenor and effect, Lord Denman decided that the note having been indorsed was thereby made certain and a good promissory note under the statute. See also Edie v. East India Co. 2 Burr. 1216; Woods v. Ridley, 11 Humph. 194; Wardens, etc. of St. James Church v. Moore, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 289.

(z) 1 N. Y. R. S. 768, § 5. For a case illustrative of this rule, see Central Bank of Brooklyn v. Lang, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 202.

1 Colorado, Dakota, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee. In general, however, a bill or note under seal is not negotiable. See Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England, L. R. 8 Q. B. 374. Muse v. Dantzler, 85 Ala. 359; Conine v. Junction, etc. R. Co. 3 Houst. 288; Rawson v. Davidson, 49 Mich. 607; Osborne v. Hubbard, 20 Ore. 318; Clegg v. Le Messurier, 15 Gratt. 108; Laidley's Adm. v. Bright's Adm. 17 W. Va. 779. But it was held otherwise in regard to the notes of a corporation in Stevens v. Phila. Ball Club, 142 Fa. 52.

*"or order" are not necessary. (a) In Ohio a power of attorney to confess judgment may be inserted in a negotiable note.(b)1 And a certificate of deposit in a hank has been held negotiable by our highest authority.(c) The word " negotiable," however, has been held not to make a note negotiable, though it may show an intention that it should be so.(d)

It is sufficient in law if the maker's name appears in the note; as, "I, A., promise," etc. But signature at the bottom is so usual, that the want of it would taint the note with suspicion. (e) Signature of a note, as of other instruments, is often made by a mark, which is properly attested. But it is held that a signature by a mark not attested is valid, and evidence may establish it as a signature. (ee) 2

(a) Maxwell v. Goodrum, 10 B. Mon. 286.

(b) Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio, 130; Clement v. Hull, 35 Ohio St. 141. See also Nat. Bank v. Gary, 18 S. C. n. s. 282, 285; Cross v. Moffatt, 11 Col. 210. But see contra Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 218; Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 346; Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Pa. 134.

(c) Miller v. Austen, 13 How. 218.

See also Poorman v. Mills, 35 Cal. 118. And for many other cases see 2 Daniel Negot. Inst. §1703.

(d) Carruth v. Walker, 8 Cal. 252.

(e) Taylor v. Dobbins, 1 Stra. 399; Elliot v. Cooper, 2 Ld. Raym. 1376; 3 Kent, Com. 78.

(ee) Willoughhy v. Moulton, 47 N. H. 205.

1 A stipulation for the payment of expenses of collection and attorney's fees by the maker in case the note is not paid at maturity is also frequently added to notes. It is held that such a stipulation is valid and the note negotiable in Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553; Nickerson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill. 372; Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543; Sperry v. Horr, 32 Ia. 184; Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433; Dietrich v. Bayhi, 23 La. An. 767; Meacham v. Pinson, 60 Miss. 226; Hamilton etc. Co. v. Sinker, 74 Tex 52.