Where the vendor receives a note for goods, and retains them on storage for the vendee, and subsequently agrees, verbally, at the request of the vendee, to take the goods back and give up the note, he has no lien upon the goods for the amount of the note, as against the assignees of the vendee, upon the failure of the latter before the exchange is made, (u)

As a general proposition, there can be no lien where credit is given; it is wholly inconsistent with a dealing on credit, and can only subsist, unless by provision of statute, where payment is to be made in ready money, or a bargain is entered into that other security shall be given, (v) The lien is then a security that the payment shall be made or the other security given, and payment agent of the defendant had sold to the plaintiff's vendor. A promissory note was given by this vendor tor the price of the bay, which the agent of the defendant got discounted at the bank of the plaintiffs, the proceeds being paused to the credit of the agent in reduction of a balance owed by him to the bank. The agent subsequently became bankrupt, and the note was dishonored at maturity by the promisor. Before the note became due, the first purchaser of the hay had cut and taken away about six tons, when he was forbidden by the defendant to take any more, it appearing that the agent of the defendant had not accounted with him for the price of the hay sold. The purchaser made no further attempt to remove the hay, but sold the remainder of it standing, to "the plaintiffs , receiving from them, in part payment, the discounted note which he had given for the hay, and the balance in money. The plaintiffs, having thus purchased the hay, demanded its delivery, which the defendant refused, and this action was brought The point upon which the case went up to the Court of King's Bench, was, whether the lien of the vendor could revive after the expiration of the term of credit, the note being outstanding in the hands of the plaintiffs as indorsees, and the agent of the purchaser having had value for it. The court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, in the course of which, Den-man, C. J., remarks as follows; "It was argued upon this rule, that the agent of the vendor, having taken the promissory note of the vendee and negotiated it, the lien of the vendor did not revive upon the dishonor of the note, which was outstand ing in the hands of an indorsee. We are of opinion that this argument was right. We think that the defendant is not to be con sidered as an unpaid vendor, and that he had no right to retain. . . . Under all the circumstances, we think that the defendant must be considered as bound to deliver up the hay to the plaintiffs/' And see Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B & C. 373.

(s) Lord Eldon, in Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. Jr. 279.

(t) Birley v. Gladstone, 3 Maule & S. 205.

(u) Chapman v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38.

(v) Lord Ellenborough, in Raitt v, Mitchell, 4 Camp 146.

in the one case, and the delivery of the stipulated security in the other, will equally put an end to the lien. Where a tradesman's lien for work commenced under an implied contract, takes effect, it will be lost if the work be afterwards continued under a special contract as to the mode of payment; for in the nature of things the one contract destroys the other, (w)

* It is held, however, that one may sell a thing on credit or for a future payment, and make it a part of the bargain, that the thing sold shall remain in the possession of the seller, until the credit expires and the payment is made, (x)

(w) Lord El don, in Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. Jr. 275; Stoddard Woollen Mannf. v. Huntlev, 8 N. H. 441. The defendant, a clothier, entered into a special agreement with the plaintiffs' agent, on the 11th June, 1835, to dress what flannels they should make that year, to hale them on the agent's finding twine, paper and sacking, - the flannels to be finished as fast as they were manufactured, and the agent to pay for finishing once in three months. Under this agreement flannels had been dressed by the defendant and received by the plaintiffs. Prior to the 11th of December, 1835, the defendant had dressed and finished two bales which remained with him, and between the 25th and 30th of the month, the agent demanded possession of the two bales, but the defendant declined to deliver them until he received his pay for dressing, which it was admitted had not been paid. The plaintiffs brought trover for the conversion of the two bales by the defendant, on the 30th of December, 1835. The case was by agreement of parties submitted to three referees, who found the above facts, and believing the law to be with the plaintiffs, made a report in their favor. The question of law was heard by the full court, and judgment given for the plaintiffs. Per Parker, J. "The operation of a lien is to place the property in pledge for the payment or the debt; and where the party agrees to give time for payment, or agrees to receive payment in a particular mode, inconsistent with the existence of such a pledge, it is evidence, if nothing appears to the contrary, that he did not intend to rely upon the pledge of the goods, in relation to which the debt arose, to secure the payment. In this case the defendant contracted to dress the flannels, and to receive his pay quarterly; but the flannels, as fast as they were dressed, were to be delivered to the plaintiffs, whenever they called. This was the legal effect of the contract, and the mode pursued by the parties. As to all the flannels, then, which were demanded by the plaintiffs within each quarter, no lien could attach, because the plaintiffs had a right to receive them as soon as dressed, while the price of the defendant's labor upon them would not be due until the expiration of the quarter. Had these flannels been demanded prior to the 11th of December, the defendant could have had no claim to retain them as a pledge for the payment, for there would have been a present duty to deliver, while the time of payment had not arrived. If, then, the defendant can sustain a defence, it must be because the flannels now in question were not demanded before the expiration of the quarter, and remained in his hands until payment became due. But we think this circumstance cannot alter the case. There is nothing in the contract itself to show that the parties contemplated any conditional lien, nor anything in the case to support a lien dependent upon the accidental circumstance of goods remaining in the possession of a party when the time of payment arrives, where a credit has once been given." Fielding v. Mills, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 489.

(x) Martindale v. Booth, 8 B. & Ad. 498; Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 374; Water-ston v. Getchell, 5 Greenl. 435; Lunt v. Whitaker, I Fairf 310.