(i) In Baker v. Keen, 2 Stark. 501 (1819), Abbott, C. J., said: "A father would not be bound by the contract of his son, unless either an actual authority were liability is nevertheless * admitted in many English cases, but is now put on the ground of agency; and the proved, or circumstances appeared from which such an authority might be implied. Were it otherwise, a father, who had an imprudent son, might be prejudiced to an indefinite extent; it was therefore necessary that some proof should he given that the order of the son was made by the authority of his father. The question, therefore, for the consideration of the jury, was, whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, there was sufficient to convince them that the defendant had invested his son with such authoritv."- This was soon followed by Fluck v. Tollemache, 1 C. & P. 5 (182:?), before Burrough, Justice of the King's Bench. The defendant's son was a cadet at Woolwich, the father living at Oxbridge. Upon being written to to pay the plaintiff's hill, which was the first knowledge the defendant had of the transaction, he said he had ordered no goods of the plaintiff, and would not pay for any supplied to his son. The latter was fifteen years old. Burrough, J., told the jury, that "an action can only he maintained against a person for clothes supplied to his son, either when he has ordered such clothes, and contracted to pay for them, or when they have been at first furnished without his knowledge, and he has adopted the contract afterwards; such adoption may be inferred from his seeing his son wear the clothes, and not returning them, or making, at or soon after the time when he knows of their being supplied, some objection. Here the only knowledge that it-appeared the defendant had of the transaction was being asked for the money; he then repudiated the contract altogether It would be rather too much that parents should be compellable to pay for goods that any tradesman may, without their knowledge, improvidently trust their sons with." - In Blackburn v. Mackey, 1 C. & P. 1 (1823), before Abbott, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, the defendant's son was a minor living away from his father, as a clerk in London, receiving a guinea a week as wages. The father did not, supply the son with any clothes, and it was proved that he was, at the time of the supply by the plaintiff, in great want of them. The defendant did not know the plaintiff, and when informed of the supply of clothes to his son, he repudiated the contract altogether. Abbott, <'. J., told the jury, that a father was not bound to pay for articles ordered by his son, unless he had given some authority, express or implied. - In Rolfe v Abbott, 6 C. & P.

286 (1833), the defendant's son, a young man of nineteen years of age, and having a situation worth £90 a year, went with a friend who introduced him to the plaintiff, a tailor, and the latter supplied him with clothes, and soon after sent his hill, debiting them to the son, and not to the father. The friend of the minor had no authority from the father to introduce his BOD to the plaintiff, and there was no evidence that the father knew of the transaction. In summing up to the jury, Gurney, B , said: "The question in this case is whether these clothes were supplied to the son of the defendant by the assent of the defendant. For, to charge him, it is essential that the goods should have been supplied with his assent or by his author ity Indeed, if the law were not so, any one of you who had an imprudent son might have bills to a large amount at the tailor's, the hatter's, the shoemaker's, and the hosier's, and you know nothing at all about it." - Clements v. Williams, 8 C. & P. 58 (1837), was an action by a schoolmaster against a guardian for clothes supplied to his ward who had been placed in the plaintiff's school, but who had not been provided by his guardian with clothes for upwards of a year. These schoolmaster supplied his wants, and charged them to the guardian, with his bill for tuition. Williams, J., told the jury that he was not aware of any authority which a schoolmaster had to cause his pupil to be supplied with articles of wearing 'apparel without the sanction, express or implied, of the parent or guardian; and that it was the duty of the schoolmaster, if he observed his pupil to be in want of such articles, to communicate that fact to the hoy's friends. and not to furnish him with such tilings without their authority. - Seaborne v. Maddy, 9 C. & P. 497 (1840), is also a very strong case against the parent's liability. This was an action of assumpsit for the hoard and lodging of the defendant's illegitimate child. The child had been placed with the plaintiff by the defendant in the year 1831, at '2s. a week, and the amount had been paid down to the month of April, 1838 The child remained with the plaintiff down to April, 1839, and evidence was given of a conversation in the month of May following, in which it was alleged that the defend ant had promised payment of the amount claimed. The defendant gave evidence, that, at the time of Settlement in 1838, he said the plaintiff was to give up the child either to Mr. Parkes or the Union, for he would pay no longer. Evidence was also authority of the infant to bind the father by * contracts for necessaries is inferred, both in England and in this country, from very slight evidence. (j) If we take the case * of given, that on several occasions when asked for payment the defendant refused to pay anything, and there was also contradictory evidence as to the conversation in May, 1839. Parke, B., said: " No one is bound to pay another for maintaining his children, either legitimate or illegitimate, except he has entered into some contract to do so. Every man is to maintain his own children as he himself shall think proper, and it requires a contract to enable another person to do so, and charge him for it in an action. In the present case there had been a contract in 1831, which was put an end to in 1838. However, on the part of the plaintiff, it is contended that a new contract is to be inferred from the conversation with the defendant in the year 1839. This is for you to consider. But you must also bear in mind that the defendant has on several occasions distinctly refused to pay anything, and that as to one of the conversations, the evidence is contradictory." The case of Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482 (1840), seems to be decisive on this point. Lord Abmger, C. B., said: " I am clearly of opinion that there was no evidence for the jury in this case, and that the plaintiff ought to have been nonsuited. The learned judge was anxious, as judges have always been in modern times, not to withdraw any scintilla of evidence from the jury; but he now agrees with the rest of the court that there ought to have been a nonsuit. In the present instance I am the more desirous to make the rule absolute to that extent, in order that there may be no uncertainty as to the law upon this subject. In point of law, a father who gives no authority, and enters into no contract, is no more liable for goods supplied to his son than a brother, or an uncle, or a mere stranger would be. From the moral obligation a parent is under to provide for his children, a jury are, not unnaturally, disposed to infer against him an admission of a liability in respect of claims upon his son, on grounds which warrant no such inference in point of law . . . With regard to the case in the Court of King's Bench, of Law v Wilkin, if the decision is to be taken as it is reported, I can only say that I am sorry for it, and cannot assent to it. It may have been influenced by facts which do not appear in the report; but, as the case stands, it appears to sanction the idea that a father, as regards his liability for debts incurred by his son, is in a different situation from any other relative; which is a doctrine I must altogether dissent from.