This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
(d) In Ex parte Dubois, 1 Cox, 310, with the guardian; and some officer of a corporation should present the claim of the corporation, who was so conversant of its business as to be able to testify concerning it So, too, if an assignee proves a debt, his bankrupt should be sworn, (e) The general reason for all this is, that the creditors may have all the assurance they can from the oaths of those actually interested, that the whole amount claimed is due, and that no part has been paid, or allowed for, or in any manner settled or met by a counter-claim which should reduce it The reason of the rule shows * its limit If the party represented can know nothing of this, as an actual infant, or an insane person, his oath is not called for. (f)
In all of these matters, commissioners and courts have considerable discretion. The examination is usually rigorous and searching, if there be any reason to suppose fraud or collusion. And beside the oath of the creditor, which would not be received at common law, and of the bankrupt which would be receivable, all kinds of evidence, admissible at law, may be offered on the one side, or demanded on the other, in order to submit every claim to thorough and effectual investigation. (g) the language of the Lord Chancellor was: "The reason why a trustee was not permitted to prove the debt alone under the commission is, that he most swear to the debt being due to him; now the debt being only due to him in trust for another, it is rather too great a refinement for him to take such an oath; and if he swear the debt is due to him as trustee only, that is not sufficient, for it does not appear with certainty that the debt has not been paid to the cestui que trust. The cestui que trust must therefore join the trustee in swearing that no part of the debt has been paid or secured." And it seems that the same reason will apply to the case of proof by a guardian, provided, of course, that he could nave a knowledge of the existence of his debt. Ex parte Belton, 1 Atk. 251. So, if cestui que trust be a lunatic, his oath will not, as matter of course, be required. Ex parte Malt by, in the matter of Simmons, 1 Rose, 387.
(e) Owen on Bankruptcy, 195; Cooke, 153. It has already appeared, that the right of the assignees to sue on debts due the bankrupt's estate, with or without naming themselves assignees, depends upon the time of accrual of the debt or right of action. In certain cases (see onte) the assignees may treat the debt as due themselves, and make no allegation in their declaration of the fact, that they are assignees of such an insolvent Now, in cases where they may sue, if the debtor against whom they hold the claim is solvent, it seems that it might well be held, in case of the insolvency of the debtor, that they can prove against his estate, without the necessity of the oath of the creditor himself. This is a matter now within their personal knowledge Otherwise when the debt accrued at such a time that they could have no such knowledge In practice, the oath of the creditor himself is usually taken in both classes of cases, and there is certainly nothing objectionable in this mode of procedure. But it is submitted, that the validity of the proceeding, when the oath of the creditor has not been taken, in cases of the class above alluded to, might well be maintained, notwithstanding the omission.
(f) Ex parte Lloyd, in the matter of Lloyd, 1 Rose, 4; Fortescue v. Hennah, 19 Ves. 67; Ex parte Symes, 11 Ves. 521.
(g) And, moreover, as to debts due, and the disposition of the property, the bankrupt may be examined in accord ance with the principles of equity juris-prudence. But the court will guard him against answering any questions which shall tend to render him liable to a criminal prosecution, unless the disclosure is absolutely essential to the interests of the creditors Archbold on Bankruptcy, 277; Ex parte Cossens, in the matter of
* A bankrupt who holds property in a fiduciary capacity, and has a debt or balance from his own assets in favor of the property so held by him in trust, may prove the debt against his own estate. (h)
Some of the most difficult questions which occur in bankruptcy or insolvency arise where partnerships are concerned. It is a very simple thing for a partnership to prove a debt, or to go into bankruptcy, (hh) But the different and clashing rights of the creditors of the firm, and the creditors of the several members of it, of which we have treated in our chapter on Partnership, often create difficulty, (i)1 It is, however, one of fact rather than law. The whole property may pass in the usual way through the hands of one assignee, by one bankruptcy; or of one assignee chosen under distinct applications for bankruptcy, the partnership indebtedness and the several indebtedness being separated; or they may be entirely distinct bankruptcies. Generally, we should say that one bankruptcy, and one set of assignees, could settle all the questions to most advantage.
Worrell, Back, 531. This rule may, however, require some qualification, 'for, in the case above cited, it is said by Lord Chancellor El'don: " I conceive that there is no doubt that it is one of the most sacred principles in the law of this country, that no man can be called on to criminate himself, if he choose to object to it; but 1 have always understood that proposition to admit of a qualification with respect to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy, because a bankrupt cannot refuse to discover his estate and effects, and the particulars relating to them, though, in the course of giving information to his creditors or assignees of what his property constats, that information may tend to show he has property which he has not got according to law, as in the case of smuggling, and the case of a clergyman carrying on a farm, which he could not do according to the act of Parliament, except under the limitation of the late act, and the case of persons having the possession of gunpowder in unlicensed places, whereby they became liable to great penalties, whether the crown takes advantage of the forfeitures or not; in all these cases the parties are bound to tell their assignees, by the examination of the commissioners, what their property is, and where it is, in order that it may be laid hold of for the purposes of the creditors." And in Ex parte Oliver, 1 Rose, 407, seveu yean before the case in Buck was decided, it was held by Lord Eldon, that the court had power to punish a bankrupt for contempt, who refused to answer any questions regarding his estate, even though the answer would criminate himself, s. c. 2 Ves. & B. 244. In Pratt's case, I Glyn & J. 58, and Mont. & B 203, the doctrine was broadly stated, that the bankrupt was hound to disclose all circumstances respecting his property, be the consequences what they might. And see Ex parte Meymot, 1 Atk. 200; Ex parte Nowlan, 11 Ves 514. But in Ex parte Kirby, I Mont. & McA. 229, Lord Lyndhursl was unwilling to admit that the commissioners could dispense with the general rule of law, that no person can be compelled to criminate himself. The rule, however, in view of later cases, which went to a great extent upon the opinion of Lord Eldon, above quoted, we think may be stated as follows: The bankrupt may be compelled to answer any question relating to the disposition of his property, even though the answer may tend to criminate him The principle of the rule is well illustrated in the case put by Erekine, C. J., in 2 Deacon & Ch. 214, In re Heath: "Now with respect to the proposition put by Mr Montague, I agree with him, that you could not ask a man whether he had not robbed another of a sum of money; because if he had so robbed, the money would not be the property of the assignees, but of the party robbed; it would be, in fart, no discovery of the estate of the bankrupt. But I can see no objection to this question (unless it might be regarded as a chain in evidence to convict the party of robbery), namely, ' Had you not on such a day, and at such a place, 100. ? ' And according to the answer you might then interrogate what he had done with it. In the present case the question is,' What have you done with this property ? ' not, ' How did you obtain it? And I think all the cases have been decided in that way of looking at the question." The courts may enforce answers to their questions by committing for contempt Kimball v. Morris, 2 Met. 575; Arch bold, 278.
 
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