Ala. (n. s.) 319. In New Hampshire, the right of a sheriff to take possession of partnership property, levied on for the private debt of a partner, has been denied after an elaborate examination of the question. Gibson v. Stevens, 7 N. H. 352, 357. Parker, J.: " The specific property of a partnership cannot be lawfully taken and sold to satisfy the private debt of one of the partners. His creditor can have no greater right than the debtor himself has individually, which is a right to a share of the surplus. This is the necessary result of the doctrine, that the partnership property is a fund in the first place for the payment of the partnership debts, and that the interest of an individual partner is only his share of the surplus. 5 N. H. 192, 193, 250; 9 Conn. 410. There are difficulties in selling the interest of one partner upon an execution. Courts of equity first direct an account, which courts of law cannot do; and if the interest of one partner may be sold upon an execution at law, it must be left to an account afterwards. Gow on Part. 246-254. And a question may arise in such case, whether the sale operates as a dissolution of the partnership before the time limited by the articles of copartnership, or whether the other partners are authorized to carry on the trade, and account at the expiration of the term. If the sheriff can sell only the interest of the partner, and not the goods, he must be liable if he make actual seizure of the specific property, either to the partnership or the other partners. Wilson v. Conine, 2 Johns. 280. Especially if he sell the whole as in this case. 1 Gallis. 370; 15 Mass. 82." Morrison v. Blod-gett, 8 N. H. 238. Parker, J.: "If the sheriff cannot sell an interest in specified portions of the goods of the partnership, there seems to be no reason why he should levy upon those goods, and deliver them to the vendee, or why he should in fact reduce them into possession. If ' in truth the sale does not transfer any part of the joint property so as to entitle him' (the vendee) ' to take it from the other partner' (1 Story, Eq. 626), on what principle is the sheriff authorized to seize and hold, to the exclusion of the other partners, what his vendee after a sale of the interest of the debtor is perfected, cannot take from them? If the sheriff sells 'only the interest of such partner, and not the effects themselves' (1 Wight, 50, cited 2 Johns. Ch. 549), upon what diversity of authority, as shown by our note, and consequent uncertainty, as to this power of the sheriff, the question seems to call for statutory provisions; but in the absence of such provisions, and on general principles, it would seem that the sheriff cannot take or give, by sale, specific possession of the partnership property. He takes and can sell only the right and interest of the indebted partner to and in the whole fund.

Different rules and modes of practice prevail in different parts *of this country. But wherever it can be done, the better and safer way would probably be for the writ to be a trustee process, or in the nature of a foreign attachment, and this should be served on the other partners as alleged trustees, and a return made by the sheriff that he had attached all the right and interest of the partner defendant in the stock and property of the partnership. And the other partners being summoned as trustees would be obliged to disclose in their answer the state of the concern, which will show the interest of the partner defendant.

After sale on execution, the sheriff should convey to the purchaser all the right and interest of the indebted partner in the stock and property of the partnership. And the purchaser would then have the right to demand an account, and a transfer to him of whatever balance or property would, upon such account, grounds shall he seize the effects which he is not to sell? If ' the creditors of the partnership have a preference to he paid their debts out of the partnership funds before the private creditors of either of the partners,' and this ' is worked out through the equity of the partners over the whole funds' (1 Story, Eq. 625), that equity should prevent them from being deprived of the means of payment by reason of such seizure by the sheriff, who can neither sell the goods, nor pay the creditors, and against whom they cannot proceed, so long as he may lawfully hold the goods." ..." In Smith's case, 16 Johns. 106, the court, after saying that the separate creditor takes the share of his debtor in the same manner as the debtor himself had it, and subject to the rights of the other partner, add: ' The sheriff therefore does not seize the partnership effects themselves, for the other partner has a right to retain them for the payment of the partnership debts.' And in Crane v. French, 1 Wend. 313, Chief Justice Savage, after considering the subject, says: 'The sheriff therefore sells the mere right and title to the partnership property, but d06S not deliver possession.' See also 5 N. H. 193;

2 Conn. 516, 517. The conclusion that the sheriff, upon an execution against one partner, is not to deliver to his vendee, and is not to seize the partnership effects, is sustained, therefore, not only by the reason of the thing, after the adoption of the general principle before stated, but by express authority.' The doctrine of these cases is affirmed in Page v. Carpenter, 10 N. H. 77; Dow v. Say ward, 12 id. 271, 14 id. 9. See Taylor v. Fields, 4 Ves. 396; Johnson v. Evans, 7 Man. & G. 240, 249, 250, Tindal,C. J.; Coll. on Part. B. iii. ch. vi. § 10. - In Newman v. Bean, 1 Foster (N. H.), 93, it was held that an action might be maintained against a third person who seizes goods on execution belonging to a partnership, for the debt of an individual partner, and excludes the other partners from the possession of them. See on this subject 26 Am. Jur., art. 3. See also Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio, 142: New hall v. Buckingham, 14 Ill. 405; Hill v. Wiggin, l Foster (N. H.), 292; Vans v. Hussey, 1 Jones, 381; Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. 228; Lucas v. Laws, 27 Pa. 211; Reinheimer v. Hemmingway, 35 Pa, 432.