(e) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & W. 270; 1 Horn. & Hurl. 292.

1 Caldwell v. Tutt, 10 Lea, 258, decided that a livery-stable keeper did not lose his statutory lien upon a horse for board by permitting the owner to ride the horse occasionally, and that his lien was superior to the lien of an execution levied on the horse while temporarily in the owner's possession. - K.

2 An agreement in writing to pay a certain sum for the service of a stallion if the mare proved with foal, "colt holden for payment," creates a lien on the cult, like a mortgage. Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70 Me. 254. - K.

There is no lien at common law in favor of agisters of cattle, it being considered inconsistent with the necessary enjoyment of the property. (f)1

A farrier's lien is special, and is said to arise from his legal obligation to shoe horses whenever offered, if he have sufficient materials for the purpose, and an adequate payment be offered him. He has also a lien for his services in keeping and curing a horse received by him for that purpose, (g)

(ee) Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Alien, 360; Pollock v. Landis, 36 la. 651. See also Brooks v. Harrison, 41 Conn. 184.

(f) Jackson v. Cummings, 5 Mees. & W. 342; Goodrich v. Willard, 7 Gray, 183; Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 245. This was an action of trover for a number of sheep, and was submitted to the jury on the general issue. The plaintiff produced a written contract, whereby the defendant acknowledged he had received the sheep in question, and was to keep them a certain period, and wash and shear them, and do up the wool, etc, for sixty-seven cents a head. The fleeces were received by the plaintiff, and indorsed on the contract. The plaintiff proved a demand for the sheep, and the defendant's refusal to deliver them unless first paid for the shearing, etc. The county court was requested to instruct the jury, that the defendant had no right to retain the sheep for the keeping, but declined to do so, and a verdict was found for the defendant. The plaintiff brought the case before the Supreme Court upon exceptions, and it was there decided, that the defendant had no lien upon the sheep for the keeping. In delivering the opinion of the court, Hutchinson, C. J., says -"The usual cases in which the law creates a lien, are, where the person performing services would have no other sure remedy; as a blacksmith shoeing a horse for a stranger, or an innkeeper furnishing entertainment for travellers; and where the persons applying for these services are not strangers, the usage of their deal may be such, that the law will create a lien. For instance, the course of their deal may be, that payment for the services is always made before the property is taken away. But where the business is done under a personal contract, the law implies no lien; but the parties may so form their contract as to create a lien, which the law will enforce. Here was a personal contract; and no lien was created by the terms of it. Of course the plaintiff was entitled to the sheep, and the defendant had a right of action to recover pay for keeping them. But the defendant had no lien upon the sheep for his pay for such keeping.

(g) Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Ray. 654; Lord v. Jones, 11 Shep. 439. We doubt whether it has ever been judicially decided in this country, that a farrier is under obligations to render his services upon a proper demand for them. We know of no American authority upon that point. But a farrier's common-law lien is recognized by some of our best legal writers, and in some decisions of the courts. Story, in his Agency (§ 355), classes farriers with innkeepers, common carriers, blacksmiths, tailors, shipwrights, and other artisans, who, as bailees for work on a thing, have a lieu upon it for the amount of their compensation. Kent, in his Commentaries (vol. ii. 634), classes them with common carriers, innkeepers, and other persons concerned in certain trades and occupations, which are necessary for the accommodation of the people. If we regard the classification of Kent as accurate, it would seem as though the same obligation that is incumbent on common carriers and innkeepers, should rest upon farriers; whereas, the classification made by Story would not lead to that conclusion, because tailors, shipwrights, and artisans generally, are not bound to exercise their craft upon demand. In the case before the Supreme Court of Maine, cited above, the question

1 An agister has no lien except by special contract or by statute. Allen v. Ham, 63 Me. 532, Mauney v. Ingram, 78 N. C. 96; McDonald v. Bennett, 45 la. 456. An agister, wintering cattle for a certain sum which was to be paid " before moving the cattle " from his premises, can retain the cattle until the payment of such sum. McCoy v. Hock, 37 la. 436. - K.

* A carrier's lien by common law, is special;1 but he may have, by express contract, or by general usage, a general lien for the balance due him by the owner; but not against third parties who are owners. (h)2 The doctrine is laid down by the English authorities, that a common carrier, being obliged to receive and convey goods for hire, is exempt from any necessity to inquire into the title of parties delivering them, and that he may detain them against the true owner until the particular carriage is paid, though the latter should prove that they were stolen from him by the person who delivered them to be carried, (i) But in this country the doctrine has been somewhat modified; and it has been laid down, that the carrier is bound to receive and carry goods, only when offered by their owner or his authorized agent; and then only upon the payment of the carriage in advance, if it be required, (j) It is also held in Massachusetts and in Michigan, that a common carrier has no lien upon goods for their carriage, against the true owner, although he receive them innocently from one wrongfully in possession thereof. (k)3 of the obligation of the farrier was not raised, and was not directly alluded to by the court. The issue was, whether the defendant, having rendered a farrier's service in the care and cure of a lame horse, could retain the animal from the owner, for the amount of his charge, the horse having been placed with the farrier by a bailee of the owner. The court held, that the farrier's lien attached, and in their opinion, delivered by Shepley,J., expressly recognize the common-law lien of the farmer as sustained by the English authorities, and laid down by Kent and Story. The lien of a blacksmith for shoeing a horse, is also recognized by Hutchinson, C. J., in the judgment delivered by him in Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vt. 245, vide supra.