(x) Demarest v. Winkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cowen, 74; Butler v. Howe, 13 Me. 397; Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill, 138; Scott v. Haddock,

11 Ga. 258.

(y) Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129; Jackson v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 40; Eager v. The Commonwealth, 4 Mass. 182; Dease v. Jones, 23 Miss. 133; Doe d. Caldwell v Thorp, 8 Ala. 253; Mercer v. Selden, 1 How. 37; Bradstreet v. Clarke,

12 Wend. 602; Scott v Haddock, 11 Ga. 258; Natter v. De Rochemont, 46 N. H. 80.

(z) See Gregory v. Hurrill, 5 B. & C. 341; Holl v. Hadley, 2 A. & E. 758.

(a) White v. Bailey, 3 Mass. 271. So the Supreme Court of New York in Fowler v. Hunt, 10 Johns. 464, declared that, " The coming from abroad must not be clandestine, and with an intent to defraud the creditor by setting the statute in operation and then departing. It must be so public, and under such circumstances, as to give the creditor an opportunity, by the use of ordinary diligence and due means, of arresting the debtor." So in Hysinger v. Baltzells, 3 Gill & J. 158, where the cause of action accrued in October, 1822, when the defendant was a resident of another State, and it appeared that the defendant was in Baltimore, where the plaintiff resided, in April, 1823, " purchased other goods from the plaintiff, and remained there for two days," it was held, that the statute did not begin to run, because it did not appear at what time during those two days the defendant made his purchase; nor whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to sue out a writ against him with effect. And Martin, J., said: " It might be true the defendant was in Baltimore for two days, and that he purchased goods from the plaintiffs, yet if their knowledge of his being there arose solely from the purchase made, and that purchase was made immediately before the defendant left the city, that would not afford them an opportunity to sue out a writ with effect. If it had been stated that the defendant was in Baltimore for two days, and that the plaintiffs knew he was there for that space of time, laches might be imputed to them; but this is not stated, and the court could not infer it." And see further State Bank v. Seawell, 18 Ala. 616; Byrne v. Crown-inshield, 1 Pick. 263; Howell v. Burnet, 11 Ga. 303; Alexander v. Burnet, 5 Rich. 189; Dorr v. Swartwout, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 179; Randall v. Wilkins, 4 Denio, 577; Langdon v. Doud, 6 Allen, 423.

A question has been made, whether the exception in the statute in reference to absentees, extends to foreigners, or those who have resided altogether out of the State or country, as well as to citizens who may be absent for a time. And it has been contended that the word "return " required that the exception should be confined to the latter class. But the contrary is well settled both here and in England. (c) And it seems that this exception to the statute of limitations applies to foreigners, even where they have an agent residing in the State where the suit is brought. (d) Where the debtor is a resident of the State or * country at the time the cause of action accrues and until his death, the statute of limitations commences running only from the time of granting letters of administration on his estate. (e) It has recently been held in New York, by the Court of Appeals, that a foreign corporation sued in that State cannot avail itself of the statute of limitations. It is like a natural person within the exceptions to the operation of the statute, by which the time of absence from the State is not to be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of an action against it (f) In California, where a judgment was obtained against an intestate in his lifetime, and no execution levied, it was held, "that the judgment creditor being prevented by the statute from suing after the death of the debtor, the statute ceased to run until presentation of the claim to the administrator." (g)

(b) Little v Blunt, 16 Pick. 359. In Mazozon v. Foot, 1 Aikens, 282, Skinner, C J., said. " It cannot be supposed, nor does the defendant insist, that every coming or return into the State, would set the statute in operation. He admits it must be such, as that by due diligence the creditor might cause an arrest. If the debtor should remove or return to the State publicly, and with a view to dwell and permanently reside within its jurisdiction, although in an extreme part from the place of his former residence, or that of the creditor, this would undoubtedly bring the case, by a correct construction of the statute, within its operation, though the creditor should have no knowledge of his return. So, too, if the debtor, having no intention to reside here, comes or returns into the State, and this is known to the creditor, and he has an opportunity to arrest the body, the case is brought within the statute. In the latter case, it is necessary the creditor should be apprised of his debtor's being within the jurisdiction of the State. And see Hill v. Bellows, 15 Vt 727; Didier v. Davison, 2 Sandf. Ch 61. See also Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 96 But see contra, State Bank v. Seawell, 18 Ala. 616.

(c) Thus, in Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 261, Kent, C. J., said: "Whether the defendant be a resident of this State, and only absent for a time, or whether be resides altogether out of the State, is immaterial He is equally within the proviso. If the cause of action arose out of the State, it is sufficient to save the statute from running in favor of the party to be charged, until he comes within our jurisdiction. This has been the uniform construction of the English statutes, which also speak of the return from beyond seas of the party so absent The word return has never been construed to confine the proviso to Englishmen, who went abroad occasionally. The exception has been considered as general, and extending equally to foreigners who reside always abroad." And see, to the same effect, Strithorst v. Graeme, 3 Wilson, 145, 2 W. Bl. 723; Lafonde v. Ruddock, 13 C B. 839, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 239; King v. Lane, 7 Mo 241; Tagart v. The State of Indiana, 15 id. 209; Alexander v. Burnet, 5 Rich. 189: Estis v. Rawlins, 5 How. Miss. 258; Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203; Dunning v. Chamberlin, 6 Vt. 127; Graves v. Weeks, 19 id. 178, Chomqus v. Mason, 1 Gallis. 342. But see contra, Snoddy v. Cage, 5 Texas, 106; Moore v. Hendrick, 8 id. 253. (d) Wilson v. Apple ton, 17 Mass. 180.