1 The statute begins to run in favor of a debtor, absent from the State when he becomes liable for a debt, as soon as he returns openly to the State, although his creditor does not know of his return, and he has no property therein which can be attached; and absences from the State on military service are not to be deducted from the time of limitation, if he retains his domicil in the State. Whitton v.Wass, 109 Mass. 40 - K.

In New England, where attachment by mesne process prevailed, it was formerly very generally provided, that if the defendant had left property within the State, this clause did not operate, because the action could be begun and kept alive by attachment And under this provision it was held, that real estate was such property, and prevented the operation of this section, although under attachment for more than its value.(h) Because the action could still be kept alive, and perhaps the first attachment might be defeated. But this clause, respecting property, is now, in some cases, omitted.(i) It is, however, sometimes provided, that if, after the action accrues, the defendant shall be absent from, and reside out of the State, the time of his absence shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. Under this clause the * question has arisen, whether successive absences can be accumulated, and the aggregate deducted from the time elapsed after the accruing of the cause of action, or whether the statute provides only for a single departure and return, after which it continues to run, notwithstanding any subsequent departure. And this question has been decided differently in different States.(j) The question has also arisen, whether this

(e) Benjamin v. De Groot, 1 Denio, 151; Christophers v. Garr, 2 Seld. 61; Davis v. Garr, id. 124; Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686.

(f) Olcott v. The Tioga Railroad Company, 30 N. T. 210 This case was followed in Blossburg, etc R. R. Co. p. Tioga R. R Co 5 Blatchf. 387. The case of Faulkner v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, l Denio, 141, was overruled. The action was against a corporation created by and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania, upon a bill of exchange drawn by it in payment for a locomotive engine, and protested May 21,

1842. The statute of limitations was pleaded, and the referee to whom the action was referred held, that the action was barred by the statute, and nonsuited the plaintiff. The general term of the Supreme Court affirmed this judgment. But, upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the Supreme Court was reversed, and a new trial ordered.

(g) Qnincy v. Hall, 19 Cal 97.

(h) Byrne v. Crowninshield, 1 Pick. 263. See Farnham v. Thomas, 56 Vt. 33

(i) See Mass Pub Stats c. 197, § 11

(j) In New York it has been held clause contemplates temporary absences, or only such as result from a permanent change of residence. And upon this question also learned courts have differed. (k)1 If one sets up to an action the bar by limitation of another State or country, he must show that the cause of action was completely barred before his coming to the State where the action is brought (kk)

It has been recently held in England, that if there be several defendants, and some of them are abroad, and some at home, the statute does not begin to run in regard to any who are at home, until all are within reach of suit. (l) For although, if one of several co-plaintiffs is within seas, the statute runs, because one plaintiff can use the names of the others in his action, it is otherwise as to co-defendants. The plaintiff can sue those only who are within reach; and if compelled to sue them, he may have a judgment against insolvent persons, which satisfies his claim and destroys his remedy against solvent debtors.

The expression "beyond the seas" in the English statute, is repeated in some of the American statutes; and in others, such phrases as "beyond sea," "over the sea," "out of the country," "out of the State," are used in its stead, but for an equivalent purpose. These phrases are generally construed to mean, out of the State or jurisdiction where the case is tried; (m) but our * notes will show that there is much authority for construthat the statute provides for only a single departure and return. Cole v. Jessup, 2 Barb. 309 , Dorr v. Swartwout, 1 Blanchf. C, C. 179. But the contrary has since been decided in New Hampshire. Gil-man v. Cutts, 3 Foster, 376. And see Smith v. The Heirs of Bond, 8 Ala. 386; Chenot v. Lefevre, 3 Gilman, 637.

(k) In the case of Gilman v. Cutts, supra, the Superior Court of New Hampshire held, that every absence from the State, whether temporary or otherwise, if it be such that the creditor cannot, during the time of its continuance, make legal service upon the debtor, must be reckoned. And see Vanlaudingham v. Huston, 4 Gilman, 125. But in Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith, 1, the Court of Common Pleas for the City and County of New York, held that, in order to interrupt the running of the statute, it is not sufficient to prove that the debtor, after the cause of action accrued, from time to time departed and was repeatedly absent from the State; he must be shown to have departed from, and resided out of, the State. Drew v. Drew, 37 Me. 389; Varney v. Grows, id. 306. In Sleeper v. Paige, 15 Gray, 349, it was held, that the statute does not run against a debtor while absent from, or residing out of, the State, if he retains no dwelling-house or boarding place therein, although he intended to return.

(kk) Petchell v. Hopkins, 19 la. 531.

(l) Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B. 811. And see Townes v. Mead, 16 C. B. 123, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 271.

(m) Galusha v. Cobleigh, 13 N. H. 79; Field v. Dickinson, 3 Pike. 409; Wakefield v Smart. 3 Eng. 488; Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125; Pan-coast v. Addison, 1 Harris & J. 350, Forbes v. Foot, 2 McCord, 331; Murray v. Baker, 3 Wheat. 541; Shelby v. Guy, 11 id. 361.

1 The question turns largely on the wording of the statute. See Tomes v. Barney, 35 Fed. Rep 112; Hennequin p. Barney, 24 Fed. Rep. 580; Slocum v. Riley, 145 Mass. 370; People v. McCausey, 65 Mich. 72; Arpin v Burch, 68 Wis. 619.

ing any such phrase as meaning beyond the limits of the United States.(n)

It is held that the absence of the officers of the debtor corporation is not an absence of the corporation, if it had an office within the State, and process could be served upon it. (nn)

There is some uncertainty whether it is a good defence at law against the operation of the statute, when an action is grounded upon a fraud committed more than six years before, that it was not discovered until within six years. There is no exception against fraud in the English statute; nor is such an exception generally made in this country. And although, in equity, this would remove the bar of the statute, almost as a matter of course, (o) there is some difficulty in giving effect to it at law. Nevertheless, the prevailing rule in this country prevents the six years from beginning to run, even at law, until the fraud is discovered by the plaintiff; (p)1 but our notes will show that there is much diversity in the decisions on this subject.

It has been held in Maine, that since married women are authorized by the statute of 1848 to bring and maintain actions at law or in equity, the disability of marriage in the statute of limitations is inoperative as to them.(pp)

(n) thus, in Pennsylvania, the term " beyond the seas " is construed to mean without the limits of the United States. Thurston v. Fisher, 9 S. & R. 288. Also in North Carolina. Whitlock v. Walton, 2 Murphy, 23; Earle v. Dickson, I Dev. 16. And in Missouri. Marvin v. Bates, 13 Mo. 217 • Fackler v. Fackler, 14 id. 431.

(nn) Sherman v. Buffalo Bayou R. R. Co 21 Texas, 349.

(o) Mayne v. Griswold, 3 Sandf. 463; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 122; Stocks v. Van Leonard, 8 Ga. 511; Charter v Trevelyan, 11 Clark & F. 714; Blair v. Bromley, 5 Hare, 542.

(p) Such is the doctrine of Sherwood v Sutton, 5 Mason, 143; Conyers v. Kenans, 4 Ga. 308, Persons v. Jones, 12 id. 371, The First Massachusetts Turnpike Corp. v. Field, 3 Mass 201; Horner v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435, Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts, 401 , Harrell v Kelly, 2 McCord, 426; Matlock v. Todd, 25 Ind. 128. But see contra, Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns; 33; Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30; Allen v. Mille, 17 id. 202; Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vt. 110; Lewis v Houston, 11 Texas, 642; Parham v. McCravy, 6 Rich. Eq. 140; McLure v. Ashby, 7 id. 43a And see the late English case of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. London Gas Light Co. 10 Exch. 39, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 425, and editor's note, and ante, p.*92.

(pp) Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301. But see Atherton v. Hitchings, 12 Gray, 117. And see Ball v. Bullard, 52 Barb. 141.

1 That fraudulent concealment of a cause of action prevents the statute from run-niug, at least if the cause of action could not have been discovered with due diligence, see ante, p. * 92, n. I. War between the states of the debtor and creditor has been held also to prevent the statute from running, and even to interrupt its course, though not specified in the statute, owing to the impossibility. Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 320, 326; Morgan p. Casey, 73 Ala. 222; Traweek p. Kelly. 60 Miss. 652; Hammond v. Johnston, 93 Mo. 198; Bruner v. Threadgill, 88 N. C. 361, Tunstall v. Withers, 86 Va. 892.