(g) Morgan v. Ins. Co. of N. A. 4 Dall. 455; Bradstreet v. Heron, Abbott, Adm. 209. Where the seizure is by customhouse officers, see Gosling v. Higgins, 1 Camp. 451; Spence v. Chodwick, 10 Q. B. 517; Brans v. Hutton, 4 Man. & G. 954 ; Howland v. Greenway, 22 How. 491; Brooks v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 481.

(h) Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259; Stoughton v. Rappalo, 3 S. & R. 559; Scott v. Libby, 2 Johns. 336; Lorillard v. Palmer, 15 Johns. 20. See Sims v, Howard, 40 Maine, 276.

(i) A usage to receive goods at the quarantine ground, is admissible to prove a compliance with an engagement to deliver at the port. Bradstreet v. Heron, Abbott, Adm. 209. Where no port of delivery is mentioned, the general port for the kind of cargo carried is the proper one. Smith v. Davenport, 34 Maine, 520.

(j) Golden v. Manning, 3 Wilson, 429; The Peytona, Ware, 2d ed. 541, 2 Curtis, C. C. 21; Salmon Falls Manuf. Co. v. Bark Tangier, U. S. C. C. Mass. 21 Law Reporter, 6.

(k) Hyde v. Trent Nav. Co. 5 T. R. 389; Vose v. Allen, 3 Blatchf. 289; The Bark Majestic, 10 Legal Observer, 100; Cope v. Cordova, 1 Rawle, 203.

(kk) Vose v. Allen, 3 Blatchf. 289.

(l) Ship Middlesex, U. S. D. C. Mass. 21 Law Rep. 14.

(m) Ship Middlesex, 21 Law Rep. 14.

1 Where a portion of a cargo was lost by an excepted peril, without fault of the master, under a charter-party to load a rail cargo for a lamp sum as freight, payable "after entire discharge and right delivery of the cargo," such freight becomes due in fall after the delivery of the remainder of the cargo. Robinson v. Knights, L. R. 8 C. P. 465; Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage, L. R. 9 Q. B. 99. See Leckie v. Sears, 109 Mass. 424.

2 A contract to deliver freight at a port implies, in the absence of any special provision, and of any custom to discharge into lighters, that the carrier is to bring his vessel to some wharf, or convenient or customary place of discharge. Hodgdon v. New York, etc. R. Co. 46 Conn. 277.

paper is enough if it can be shown that the * consignee read the notice; (n) and the want of notice is excused, if after proper efforts the consignee cannot be found. (o) If the master, by his own fault, omits to sign a bill of lading, ignorance of the names of the consignees is no excuse for the want of notice. (p) But if such omission be the fault of the shipper, notice published in the usual way, in one or more newspapers, is sufficient. (q) If no consignee is named in the bill of lading, or is known to the master, it is the general duty of the master to store the goods, at the expense of their owner, and for his benefit. (r)

The consignee has a reasonable time to inspect the goods on the wharf, and determine whether he will accept them. (s) The delivery must be on a suitable day as to the weather, and on a business day, and at a business hour; (t) for the delivery must be reasonable and proper in time, place, and circumstances; (u) and the liability of the vessel continues until the consignee has had his reasonable time to examine the goods. If a loss occurs because the goods were marked illegibly, this loss falls on either the owner or the shipper, as it was the fault of the one or the other. (v)

As to the question for what damage the owners of the ship are responsible, the cases are numerous. It has been recently determined that the owners of a general ship are liable to a shipper, for damage done to his goods from other goods stored in the hold, without wilful fault or negligence on the part of the shipowner. (w) And even if the goods doing the injury be(n) Kohn v. Packard, 3 La. 224; Northern v. Williams, 6 La. An. 578.

(o) Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio, 45; Mayell v. Potter, 2 Johns. Cas. 371.

(p) The Peytona, Ware, 2d ed. 541, 2 Curtis, C. C. 21.

(q) Medley v. Hughes, 11 La. An. 211.

(r) Galloway v. Hughes, 1 Bailey, 553. So if the consignee refuses to receive the goods, Arthur v. Sen. Cassius, 2 Story, 81; Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371. But he is not bound to give notice to the consignor of the refusal of the consignee to accept, unless such a course is reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and this is a question for the jury. Hudson v. Baxendale, 2 H. & N. 575.

(s) Until he accepts he is not liable for freight Sch. Treasurer, Sprague, 473.

(t) Salmon Falls Co. v. Bark Tanner, 21 Law Rep. 6; Goddard v. Bark Tanner, 21 Law Rep. 12. This case held, that a delivery on Fast Day was not good, but this was reversed by the Supreme Court. Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28.

(u) Price v. Powell, 3 Comst. 322; Sejrura v. Reed, 3 La. An. 695; Northern v. Williams, 6 La. An. 578.

(v) See The Huntress, Daveis, 82.

(w) Gillespie v. Thompson, cited 6 Ellis & B. 477, note, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 227; Brousseau v. Ship Hudson, 11 La. An. 427; Bark Col. Ledyard, Sprague, 530; Baxter v. Leland, Abbott, Adm. 348, 1 Blatchi. C. C. 526.

long to * the shippers of the damaged goods, and were put on board by them in condition to do the injury, the shipowner is responsible, but now only if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury be the misconduct of the master in stowing the injurious goods too near the other goods. (x) But the shippers are answerable to the ship-owners for putting on board dangerous goods, the character of which is not made known to the owners nor easily discoverable by them. (y)

The shipper is not bound to disclose the value of his goods; but the carrier has a right to inquire and have a true answer; if deceived he is not answerable; but if he makes no inquiry, and is not misled by artifice, he is responsible for the full value. (yy) He is also responsible for damage to goods or passengers, arising from unreasonable delay in carrying them, caused by his negligence or fault. (yz)