If an estate be sold in separate lots, and one person buy many lots, there is, by the later adjudications and the better reasons, a distinct contract for each lot. (m) But where the contract is written and signed for the purchase of several lots at one aggregate price, it is one contract; and this is so where this contract was subsequent to a sale of the same lots severally and at several prices to the same purchaser. (n) And if a vendor sell an estate as one lot, and has title to a part, but not to the whole, he cannot enforce the sale; (o) but if he sells in several wholly independent lots, it would seem reasonable that he should enforce it as to those to which he could make title, as held by Lord

(i) Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy, 1 Camp. 337; Stewart v. Alliston, 1 Meriv. 26; Robinson v. Musgrove, 2 Mood. & R. 92; Leach v. Mullett, 3 C. & P. 115.

(j) Sheldon v. Capron, 3 R. I. 171.

(k) Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. 355. This was a sale of a leasehold interest of lands, described in the particulars as held for a term of twenty-three years, at a rent of £55, and as comprising a yard. One of the conditions was, that if any mistake should be made in the description of the property, or any other error whatever should appear in the particulars of the estate, such mistake or error should not annul or vitiate the sale, but a compensation should be made, to be settled by arbitration. The yard was not, in fact, comprehended in the property held for the term of £55, but was held by the vendor from year to year, at an additional rent. It was essential to the enjoyment of the property leased for the twenty-three years. It did not appear that the vendor knew of the defect. The court held that this defect avoided the sale, and was not a mistake to be compensated for under the above condition; although after the day named in the conditions for completing the purchase, and before action brought by the vendee, the vendor procured a lease of the yard for the term to the vendee, and offered it to him. See also Mills v. Oddy, 2 C. M. &R. 103.

(l) Hibbert v. Shee, 1 Camp. 113; Robinson v. Musgrove, 2 Mo. & Rob. 92.

(m) This was expressly held in Emerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38. See also James v. Shore, 1 Stark. 426. The contracts are separate, both in law and fact, Id.; Roots v. Lord Dormer, 4 B. & Ad. 77; Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 44, Best, J.; Seaton v. Booth, 4 A. & E. 528; Gibson v. Spurrier, Peake, Ad. Cas. 49; Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463. But see Van Eps v. Schenectady, 12 Johns. 436; Stod-dart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355; Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. 450.

(n) Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463. See Chambers v. Griffiths, 1 Esp. 150; Drewe v. Hanson, 6 Ves. 675; Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 262; Osborne v. Bremar, 1 Desaus. 486; Cassamajor v. Strode, 2 Myl. & K. 706; Lewin v. Guest, 1 Russ. 325; Harwood v. Bland, Flan. & K. 540.

(o) 2 Story, Eq. § 778; Reed v. Noe, 9 Yerg. 283; Dalby v. Pullen, 3 Sim. 29; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 300; Johnson must be often difficult, however, to draw the line between an honest procedure of this sort and a fraudulent design. It is certain, that any unfair conduct on the part of the purchaser in regard to his purchase, prevents his acquiring any title to the goods. (s)1 But an agreement among many, that one should bid for all, will not necessarily avoid the sale. (t)

Brougham; (p) but we should not consider the lots as wholly independent, if in point of fact the buying of them all was, for any reason, apart of the inducement or motive of the buyer for making the purchase.

There has been much question whether a sale at auction might be avoided by the purchaser, because by-bidders or puffers were employed by the owner or auctioneer. The proper * way is undoubtedly to give notice of such a thing at the sale; but the weight of authority in this country, as well as that of some cases in England, seems to be in favor of permitting an owner, without notice, to employ a person to bid for him, if he does this with no other purpose than to prevent a sacrifice of the property under a given price. (q) In a recent interesting English case, it was held, that a sale at auction " without reserve " means, that there shall be no bid by or for the vendor at the auction, and that the property shall be sold to the highest bidder, whether the sum offered be equivalent to its value or not. And that the highest bond fide bidder may sue the auctioneer if he knocks down the hammer at a subsequent and higher bidding of or for the owner; and this whether the auctioneer was or was not privy to such bid. (r) It might be inferred from the language by some of the judges in this case, that by-bidding was not unlawful in cases of ordinary sale by auction, but would be made so if such phrases in the advertisement as "without reserve," " to the highest bidder," or any equivalent phrases, were used. It v. Johnson, 3 B. & P. 162; Parham v. Randolph, 4 How. (Miss.) 435. But if the part to which the seller has title was the purchaser's principal object, or equally his object with the other part, and is itself an independent subject, and not likely to be injured by being separated from the other part, equity will compel the purchaser to take it at a proportionate price. See McQuin v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467; Bowyer v. Bright, 13 Price, 698; Buck v. McCaughtry, 5 Monr. 230; Simpson v. Hawkins, 1 Dana, 305; Collard v. Groom, 2 J. J. Marsh. 488.

(p) Cassamajor v. Strode, 2 Myl. & K. 706.

(q) This right, provided there exists no actual intention to defraud, is recognized by many recent authorities. See Latham v. Morrow, 6 B. Mon. 630; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis, 11 Paige, 431; Bowles v. Round, 5 Ves. Jr. 508, n. (b) (Sumner's ed.); Crowder v. Austin, 3 Bing. 368; Veazie v. Williams, 3 Story, 622; Thor-nett v. Haines, 15 M. & W. 371; Wheeler v. Collier, Mood. & M. 123; Mortimer v.

Bell, L. R. 1 Ch. 10; Dart, Vendors and Purchasers, p. 89. Contra, Towle v. Leav-itt, 3 Foster (N. H.), 360; Pennock's Appeal, 14 Pa. St. 446; Staines v. Shore, 16 Pa. St. 200; Darst v. Thomas, 87 Ill. 222; Peck v. List, 23 W. Va. 338. In Veazie v. Williams, in 8 How. 134, the Supreme Court seems to hold, that if the bids were intended to enhance the price, and did so, the buyer should have relief in equity. See, as to bids by puffers, at auction, McDowell v. Simms, 6 Ired Eq. 278, and Tomlinson v. Savage, id, 130: also, Doolubdass v. Ramloll, 3 E. L.& E. 39, and Flint v. Woodin, 13 E. L. & E. 278; s. c. 9 Hare, 618. Where property was advertised for sale " to the highest bidder," a written proposal of "five hundred dollars more than the highest bid," without naming any sum, was not considered valid. Webster v. French, 11 Ill. 154. See Davis v. Petway, 3 Head. 667. (r) Warlow v. Harrison 1 E. & E. 295. But see Mainprice v. Weetley, 6 B. & S. 420.