(fg) Linker v. Long, 64 N. C. 296; Parshall v. Shirts, 54 Barb. 99.

(fh) Abbott v. Alsdorf, 19 Mich. 157. In Fewell v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 195, the deed was executed and acknowledged and left with the justice of the peace for the grantee; and it was held a valid delivery.

(fi) Cabeen v. Breckenridge, 48 Ill. 91.

(fj) Maul v. Rider, 59 Penn. St. 167.

(g) Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463. In this case, by the particulars of sale, lot 13 was described as building ground, and the adjoining lot 12 as a villa, subject to liberty for the purchaser of lot 1 to come on the premises to repair drains, etc, as reserved in lot 7. The reservation in lot 7 referred to a lease, which gave the occu pier of that and the several adjoining lots, written or printed and circulated among the buyers, or conspicuously posted in sight, then they cannot be controlled by verbal declarations * made by the auctioneer at the time of the sale. (h) And even if it be provided in the terms of sale that any error or misstatement in the description shall not avoid the sale, but be allowed for in the price, such provision will not cover any misstatement of a substantial and important charcomposing a row of houses, a carriage-way in common in front of the lots, and a footway at the back, and also a footway over lot 13. The particulars contained plans which disclosed the carriage-way in front, and the footway at the back of the houses, but not the footway over lot 13. But they stated that the lease of lot 7 might be seen at the vendor's office, and would be produced at the sale. The plaintiff having purchased lots 12 and 13, by one contract, in ignorance of the footway over lot 13, it was held, that the misdescription was such as to entitle him to rescind the contract as to both. See also Adams v. Lambert, 2 Jur. 1078; Robinson v. Musgrove, 8 C. & P. 469; Taylor v. Mortindale, 1 Y. & Col. Ch. 658; Symons v. James, id. 490; Martin v. Cotter, 3 Jones L. 506. " If the description be substantially true, and be defective or inaccurate in a slight degree only, the purchaser will be required to perform the contract, if the sale be fair and the title good. Some care and diligence must be exacted of the purchaser. If every nice and critical objection be admissible, and sufficient to defeat the sale, it would greatly impair the efficacy and value of public judicial sales; and therefore, if the purchaser gets substantially the thing for which he bargained, he may generally be held to abide by the purchase, with the allowance of some deduction from the price by way of compensation for any small deficiency in the value, by reason of the variation. 2 Kent, Com. 437; King v. Bardeau, 6 Johns. 38. The estate cannot be too minutely described in the particulars; for although it is impossible that all the particulars relative to the quantity, the situation, etc, should be so specifically laid down as not to call for some allowance when the bargain comes to be executed; yet if a person, however little conversant with the actual situation of his estate, will give a description, he must be bound by that whether conversant of it or not. See Judson v. Wass, 11 Johns. 525, 3 Cranch, 270, 2 Bay, 11 " Dart, Vendors and Purchasers (Am. ed.), p. 51, n 2.

(h) Gunnis v. Erhart, 1 H. Bl. 289;

Bradshaw v. Bennett, 5 C. & P. 48; Cannon v. Mitchell, 2 Desans. S20; Shelton v. Livius, 2 Cr. &J.411; Powell v. Edmunds, 12 East, 6; Ogilvie v. Foljambie, 3 Meriv. 53; Rich v. Jackson, 4 Bro. Ch. 514; Wright v. Deckline, Pet. C. C 199; Rankin v. Matthews, 7 lred. L. 286. And it makes no difference that the question arises on a sub-sale of the same premises by the purchaser. Shelton v. Livius, 2 Cr. & J. 411. The rule applies in favor of the seller as well as the purchaser. Powell v. Edmunds, 12 East, 6. The case of Jones v. Edney, 3 Camp. 285, is not at variance with the rule stated in the text. That was a case of a sale at auction of the lease of a public-house. The house was described in the conditions of sale as " a free public-house;" but the lease under which it was held contained in fact a proviso that the lessee and his assigns should take all their beer from a particular brewery. At the sale, the auctioneer read over the whole lease in the hearing of the bidders, and when he came to the proviso, being asked how the house could be called " a free public-house," he answered." That clause has been done away with. There has been a trial upon it before Lord Ellenborough, who has decided it to be bad. I warrant it as a free public-house, and sell it as such." The plaintiff bid off the house and paid a deposit, but afterwards finding that the clause might still be enforced, he brought this action to recover the deposit back. It was held, that he was entitled to recover. Lord Ellenborough said: "In the conditions of sale this is stated to be a ' free public-house.' Had the auctioneer afterwards verbally contradicted this, I should have paid very little attention to what he said from his pulpit. Men cannot tell what contracts they enter into if the written conditions of sale are to be controlled by the babble of the auction-room. But here the auctioneer at the time of the sab-declared that he warranted and sold this as a free public-house. Under these circumstances a bidder was not bound to attend to the clauses of the lease, or to consider their legal operation." acter; but the purchaser may, on that ground, rescind the sale; (i) as, if an auctioneer sells lot A to one who, in good faith and without fault supposes he is buying lot B, there is no sale, and no contract between the parties for want of agreement of minds. (j) And if the error be wholly unintentional, but such that the amount of compensation to be allowed therefor cannot be exactly calculated, the contract may be rescinded. (7c) Wherever there is any material mistake, and no such provision respecting it, the vendor cannot offer a pro tanto allowance, and enforce the sale against the purchaser. And these principles would hold in the case of a sale not at auction, so far as they were applicable. (I)