The law may not be yet entirely settled, as to what shall constitute the new promise which removes the bar of the statute. In England, by the statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, it was provided that a new promise or acknowledgment would not suffice to take a case out of the statute of limitations, unless it was in writing, and was signed by the party chargeable thereby. This statute was introduced by Lord Tenterden, and is commonly known by his name. A similar requirement is now made by statute in most of our States.1 But, without now taking into consideration Lord Tenterden's act, we think we may draw from the multitudinous decisions on the subject, the following conclusions, as established law:The first and most general of these is, that there must be either an express promise, or an acknowledgment expressed in such words, and attended by such circumstances, as give to it * the meaning, and therefore the force and effect, of a new promise.(l)1 Such, we think, is the rule, although it must he admitted that it has been sometimes applied, even of late, with great laxity.

1 A new promise will not revive any cause of action except in assumpsit or contract. Banning on the Statute of Limitations, p. 40. But it was held in Armstrong v Levan, 109 Pa. 177, that where a tort-feasor had lulled the plaintiff into a feeling of security, before the limitation of the statute had barred the original cause of action, by promising to pay damages, he was estopped afterwards to plead the statute.

Whether an acknowledgment is thus equivalent" to a new promise, or is sufficient to remove the bar of the statute, is a question which must be determined either by the court or the jury; and it does not seem to be quite settled within which province it lies. We should say, however, in general, that where this question is one of intention, and is to be gathered from the words spoken, and from the circumstances of the case to be considered in connection with the words, there it is for the jury, under the instruction of the court as to the principles applicable to the question, to determine whether the acknowledgment be sufficient or not But where the question is one of the meaning of words only, and especially where the words relied upon are written, and the question becomes, in effect, one of the construction of a written document, there it is the duty of the court to make, and of the jury to receive, a distinct direction, (m)

(l) See upon this point the leading case of Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 60S, cited in the preceding note. "According to the recent cases," says Parke, B., in Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. ft W. 405, " the document, in order to take the case out of the statute, must either contain a promise to pay the debt on request, or an acknowledgment from which such promise is to be inferred." In Hart v. rren-dergast, 14 M. & W. 746, Rolfe, B., said: "The principle is said to be, that the document must contain either a promise to pay the debt, or an acknowledgment from which such, a promise is to be inferred. Perhaps it would be more correct to say, that it must, in all cases, contain a promise to pay, but that, from a simple acknowledgment, the law implies a promise; but there must, in all cases, be a promise, in order to support the declaration." Again, in Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 362, Mr. Justice Story says: " If the bar is sought to be removed by the proof of a new promise, that promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved, in a clear and explicit manner, and be in its terms unequivocal and determinate; and if any conditions are annexed, they ought to be shown to be performed. If there be no express promise, but a promise is to be raised by implication of law from the acknowledgment of the party, such acknowledgment ought to contain an unqualified: and direct admission of a previous, subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there be accompanying circumstances, which repel the presumption of a promise or intention to pay; if the expressions be equivocal, vague, and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inferences, which may affect different minds in different ways, - we think they ought not to go to a jury as evidence of a new promise to revive the cause of action. Any other course would open all the mischiefs against which the statute was intended to guard innocent persons, and expose them to the dangers of being entrapped in careless conversations, and betrayed by perjuries." See further the English and American cases cited in the preceding note, and Sweet v. Franklin, 7 R. I. 355; Creuse v Defiga-niere, 10 Bosw. 122; Wolfenberger v. Young, 47 Pa. 333; Cocrill v. Sparkes, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 699.

(m) In Lloyd v. Maund, 2 T. R. 760, the acknowledgment was contained in a

1 In Wisconsin, to revive a debt barred by the statute, there must not only be an acknowledgment of it, but an unqualified promise to pay it, as the statute does not establish a mere presumption of payment, but extinguishes the contract itself. Carpenter v. State, 41 Wis. 36. - K.

* It is not necessary that the acknowledgment should be of any precise amount; (n) but if there be an admission of any debt, and of legal liability to pay it, evidence may be connected with this admission to show the amount; (o) and even if the parties differ as to the amount, an admission of the debt may remove the bar of the statute, (p) But the acknowledgment must not be of a mere general indebtedness, (q) It must be, on the one hand, broad enough to include the specific debt in question; (r) and, on the other, sufficiently precise and definite in its terms to show that this debt was the subject-matter of the acknowledgment (s) So, a general direction to pay debts, or a general provision for their payment, does not operate as a new promise by the testator; (t) and an acknowledgment, to revive a debt, should in fact amount to or imply a promise to pay it (u)l letter, and yet the question whether the acknowledgment was sufficient was submitted to the jury. The same coarse was pursued in Frost v. Bengough, 1 Bing. 266; and in Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883; where the like course was pursued, and a new trial was moved for, on that among other grounds, Tindal, C. J., said •• The first objection taken for the defendant is, that it was left to the jury to say what was the effect of the letter, but by a chain of cases, from Lloyd v. Maund to Frost v. Bengough, and others, it appears that such has been the constant coarse." But the authority of these cases was much shaken, if not entirely overthrown, by the case of Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402. See ante, vol. ii. p. *492. And see Clark v. Dutcher, 9 Co wen, 674; Chapen v. Warden, 15 Vt. 560; Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21; Love v. Hackett, id. 486; Watkins o. Stevens, 4 Barb. 168.