By the rules of the common law, a married woman has no power to bind herself by contract, or to acquire to herself and for her exclusive benefit any right, by a contract made with her. And as she can make no valid contract, the husband cannot be bound by any contract which she may attempt to make. He is responsible for her torts of every kind; but if the tort is essentially connected with a contract, as by borrowing money on false and fraudulent pretences, it is held that the husband is not liable for the tort. (w) If she receives money or property by gift to herselt or in payment for her services, and lends it, her husband and not she has the right to recover it; and so if she sell anything, her husband has the right to recover the price. He may claim the earnings of her personal labor, and only where she alone is the meritorious cause of the debt due can she be joined in an action for it. In general, whatever she earns, she earns as his servant, and for him; for in law, her time and her labor, as well as her money, are his property. (x)1 If A enters into a contract with the wife of B, not knowing her marriage, and she having no authority to bind B, and not professing to act for him, the wife is not bound, neither is B liable upon such contract. (y) But whether B, who may certainly repudiate the contract, can elect to adopt it, and enforce it as his own against A, may well be doubted. Upon principle we should say he could not, because there is a total want of reciprocity or mutuality. We may add that such a case would perhaps fall within the rule, that no act is capable of ratification by the principal which was not performed by the agent as agent, and in behalf of the principal. (z)

(q) See cases already cited.

(r) Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. "Wms. 409, Cas. Temp. Talk 17.3; Donnington v. Mitchell, 1 Green, Ch. 243; Ryder v. Hulse, 24 N. Y. .'57 2.

(s) Lockwood v. Salter, 2 Nev. & M. 255

(t) Mallory v. Vanderheyden, cited in 2 Kent, Com. 138, n. (a).

(u) See post, p. * 359.

(v) Brown v. Brown, 23 Barb. 5G5; Lockwood v. Cullen, 4 Rob. 129.

1 And his reservation of a power of revocation or appointment to other uses does not impair the validity of the gift. Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225. A conveyance of real estate by deed from a husband to his wife, intended as a gift in prasenti, though void at law, may be sustained and enforced in equity. Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N Y . 27. - K.

2 As, for instance, against creditors in a gift of extravagant furniture in the common dwelling. In re Pierce, 7 Bissell, 426. - Letters alone from a husband to bis wife, making a gift to his wife, will not effectuate it. Breton v. Woolven, 17 Ch. D. 416. And see Ch. xv. - K.

(w) L. A. L. Assoc, v. Fairhurst, 9 Exch. 422; Woodward v. Barnes, 46 Vt. 332.

(x) See Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99; Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384; Wins-low v. Croker, 17 Me. 29; Hoskins v. Miller, 2 Dev. 3G0; Hyde v. Stone, 9 Cowen, 230; Morgan v. Thames Bank, 14 Conn. 99; Matter of Grant, 2 Story, 312; Hawkins v. Craig, 6 Monr. 257; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394; McDavid v. Adams, 77 Ill. 155; Yopst v. Yopst, 51 Ind. 61. And notwithstanding the husband lives apart from his wife, and in a state of continued adultery, his right to her personal property is still the same, so long as the relation of husband and wife continues. Russell v. Brooke, 7 Pick. 65; Turtle v. Muncy, 2 J. J. Marsh. 82; Vree-land v. Ryno, 11 C. E. Green, 160; including her earnings both before and after marriage. Glover v. Proprietors of Drury Lane, 2 Chitt. 117; Washburn v. Hale, 10 Pick. 42!); Prescott v. Brown, 23 Me. 305. In Messenger v. Clark, 5 Exch. 388, it was held that a husband is entitled to the money which his wife saves out of a weekly allowance given by him for her support, they living separate by agreement. It should be noted, however, that Rolfe, B., puts the case on the ground that the wife had invested her savings in stock (which stock she afterwards sold and pave away the proceeds), and he held that although the money might have been hers to dispose of as she pleased, yet when she bought a specific chattel with a part of it, that chattel became the husband's.

(y) In Smith v. Plomer, 15 East, 607, it was held that a tradesman supplying a married woman living apart from her husband with furniture upon hire, does not thereby divest himself of the present right of property in such goods, inasmuch as the married woman was incapable of acquiring it by any contract; and therefore if the sheriff take such goods in execution, at the suit of the husband's creditor, trover lies by the tradesman. But if the contract had been valid, the goods being let to hire generally, without any time limited, notice to determine the contract given to the sheriff's officer, and not to the other contracting party, would not be sufficient to determine the contract.

1 The proceeds of their joint labor also belong to the husband, Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Shaeffer v. Sheppard, 54 Ala/244; Bowden v. Gray, 49 Miss. 547; including her personal apparel purchased with the same, Hawkins v. Providence, etc. R. Co., 119 Mass. 596. - K.

The wife may be the agent of the husband, and in that * character may make contracts which bind him, and this agency need not be expressed, but is raised by law from a variety of circumstances. Thus, the purpose and comfort of married and domestic life would be defeated or obstructed if the wife had not a general authority to hire servants, or to purchase such articles as are necessary for the use of the family; and the necessity is not to be a strict one, but includes whatever things are unquestionably proper to be used in the family; and suited to the manner of life which the husband authorizes; and this even after her adultery, if they have not separated.(a)1 And therefore the law clothes her with this authority. (b) So, whatever she purchases for herself, the husband is liable for, provided it be