The effect of an assignment in Bankruptcy and Insolvency is considered in the chapter on these subjects in the Third Volume.

* Whether a creditor of the husband can acquire by attachment in a suit against the husband, the wife's choses in action, has been much disputed. The adjudications of this country seem to be in favor of his right to do so; (h) not however without high authority and strong reasons for the doctrine, that the husband's right to reduce these choses to possession is strictly marital, which he may perhaps himself transfer, but which cannot be taken from him in invitum. (i)

(g) Schuyler v. Hoyle, 5 Johns. Ch. 196'; Cartaret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 197; Jewson v. Moulton, 2 Atk. 417; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87; Kenny v. Udall, 5 Johns. Ch. 464; Lowry v. Thornton, 3 How. (Miss.) 394. That the assignment must be for value, see Saddington v. Kinsman, 1 Bro. Ch. 44; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jac. & W. 472; Hartman v. Dowdel, 1 Rawle, 279.

(h) Dold v. Geiger, 2 Gratt. 98, holds that a husband cannot protect these choses in action from his creditors by settling them on his wife. Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400. qualifies, if it does not deny this. Wheeler v. Bowen, 20 Pick. 563; Hayward v. Hayward, id. 528, and Strong v. Smith, 1 Met. 476, assert that creditors have this power. Vance v. McLaughlin, 8 Gratt. 289, admits the validity of the attachment, but holds that it is avoided by the death of the husband while the suit is pending.

Skinner's Appeal, 5 Penn. St. 262, holds that a general assignment by the husband of all his property for his creditors does not pass to them his wile's interest in a legacy not yet received. See. however, Swoyer's Appeal, id. 377. A note given to the wife 'luring coverture is only a chose in action to which these rules apply, as it does not become the husband's unless he reduces it to possession. Gates V.

Madely, 6 M. & W. 423; Hart v. Stephens, 6 Q. B. 937; Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q. B. 875.

It seems now to be settled, that any court having equity powers, when an assignee of a wife's chose in action requires the aid of those powers to reduce them to his possession, will compel an adequate provision out of them, for the wife; reference being had not merely to this chose, but to all the property of the wife which passes to the husband.

But the court will not interfere where the assignee may acquire complete possession without its aid. (j) Whether, in this country, a court of law possessing equity powers, would use them for the protection of the wife, if an assignee of her choses in action sought its aid to reduce them to possession by an action at law, is not positively settled by adjudication. On general principles we should hope that it would do so.

Generally, in all cases where the right of action would survive to the wife, the husband and wife must join in an action therefor. (k) As all her beneficial contracts made before marriage inure to * the benefit of the husband, so, on the other hand, if she is liable for any debts when he marries her, this liability is cast on him jointly with her, by the marriage; (l) even if he were an infant at the time of marriage. (m) And this is true also, although the debts did not mature and become payable until after the marriage, (n) and although he received nothing with her. This, however, is only his personal liability, and does not survive him. If, therefore, he dies before a debt is paid, his estate is not liable for it, unless the debt was put in suit and reduced to a judgment in his lifetime, (o) even if that estate contains or consists wholly of what has been her personal property. But her separate liability revives by his death, (p) although her marriage may have taken from her and given to him or his representatives all her means. So if she dies before the debt is paid or reduced to judgment, his liability also ceases. (q) But if she leaves choses in action unreduced to possession by the husband, and after her death he or his representative as her administrator, reduces them to possession, as above stated, the proceeds of these choses in action must be applied, in the first place, to any unpaid debts of hers, and only the balance can be held by the husband or his estate. (/•)

(i) Wheeler v. Moore, 13 N. H. 478; Poor v. Hazleton, 15 N. H. 564. See also Gallego v. Gallego, 2 Brock. 287, and Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280; Mell-inger's Adm. v. Bailsman's Trustee, 45 Pa. 522, 528; Perry v. Wheelock, 49 Vt. 63, 67.

(j) Duvall v. Farmers' Bank, 4 G. & J. 282; Whitesides v. Dorris, 7 Dana, 101; Perryclear v. Jacobs, 2 Hill (S. C), Ch. 504; Like v. Beresford, 3 Ves. 506; Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562.

(k) Morse v. Earl, 13 Wend. 271; Ramsey v. George, 1 M. & Sel. 176; Hoy v. Rogers, 4 Monr. 225; Milner v. Milnes, 3 T. R. 631.

(l) Morris v. Norfolk, 1 Taunt. 212; Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384; Petkin v. Thompson, 13 Pick. 64; Haines v. Corliss, 4 Mass. 659; Dodgson v. Bell, 3 E. L. & E. 542; s. c. 5 Exch. 967; Alexander v. Morgan, 31 Ohio St. 546.

(m) Butler v. Breck, 7 Met. 164; Roach v. Quick, 9 Wend. 238.

(n) Heard v. Stamford, Cas. Temp. Talb. 173; 8. c. 3 P. Wms. 409; Tho-mond v. Earl of Suffolk, 1 P. Wms. 469.

(o) Roll. Abr. 351; Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. Wms. 409; Witherspoon v. Dubose, 1 Bailey, Eq. 166; Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384; Chapline v. Moore, 7 Monr. 179; Buckner v. Smyth, 4 Desaus. 371; Mentz v. Reuter, 1 Watts, 229.

(p) Woodman v Chapman, 1 Camp. 189.

A discharge of the husband in insolvency or bankruptcy bars a suit against husband and wife for her debt. And it has been held that such discharge extinguished her debt; (s) in which case it could not revive at her husband's death. But in equity a satisfaction of the debt would still be decreed from any separate estate held by her. (t)

Although a husband cannot contract with his wife, (u) he * may make her a valid gift of a chattel or of a chose in action.1 But a delivery of the chattel, or of the evidence of the chose in action, is indispensable. (v)2