All maritime property consists of either the ship and its appurtenances, (d) or of the cargo which the ship carries, (e) or of the freight which the ship earns by carrying the cargo, (f) 1 * or of the profits arising from an increase of the value of the cargo, caused by the transportation. Either or all of these may be and often are insured, and profits are often insured either under that name, or by a valuation of the cargo; (g) but in either case profits may be regarded as only an incident to the cargo.

The property insured should be set forth in the policy with sufficient distinctness. The rules on this subject are not capable of exact definition; but the principle which runs through them is, that the subject-matter of the insurance must be distinctly identified, either by actual description, or by reference to other means of knowledge. And where there is no fraud or concealment on the part of the insured, his interest, which he intended to bring within the terms of the policy, will be brought within it, even by a liberal construction; and a mistake in the description will seldom prevent this construction. (h) 2

(d) Mason v. Franklin Ins. Co. 12 Gill & J. 468; Hood v. Manhattan Ins. Co. 1 Kern. 582. Provisions on board for use of crew are covered by insurance on ship and furniture. Brough v. Whitmore, 4 T. R. 206. The outfits of a whaling voyage are not covered by a policy on the ship. Hoskins v. Pickersgill, 8 Doug. 222; Gale v. Laurie, 5 B. & C. 164. As to boats, see Hoskins v. Pickersgill, supra; Hall v. Ocean Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 472; Blackett v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 2 Cromp. & J. 244.

(e) See infra. (f) Taylor v. Wilson, 15 East, 824; Bell v. Bell. 2 Camp. 475; Barclay v. Stirling, 5 M. & S. 6; Adams v. Warren Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 168; Paradise v. Sun Ins. Co. 6 La. An. 596. Freight may mean the profit derived by the owner of a ship from carrying hit own goods. Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45; Devaux v. I'Anson, 6 Bing. N. C. 519; Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 420. If a shipper of goods pays freight in advance, there is a conflict of authority whether he can insure the risk which he runs, under the term freight Minturn v. Warren Ins. Co. 2 Allen, 86; Kathman v. Gen. Mat Ins. Co. 12 La. An. 35.

(g) Mumford v. Hallett, 1 Johns. 483; Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 8 Pet. 222; Alsop v. Com. Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 451; Halhead v. Young, 6 Ellis & B. 312; Barclay v. Cousins, 2 East, 544; Eyre v. Glover, 16 East, 218.

(h) In Ruan v. Gardner, 1 Wash. C. C. 145, the agent of the insured, by mis1 See Denoon v. Home, etc. Ass. Co. L. B. 7 C. P. 341, for a discussion by Willes, J., of the term "freight," and as to whether it includes "passage money." 2 See Ionides v. Pacific Ins. Co., L R. 6 Q. B. 674; 7 Q. B. 517.

The means of knowledge by which the description may be supplemented, may be the name of the consignee, (i) or the voyage, or the time, (j) or the port of shipment;(k) l and it seems, that if the description may attach equally to different shipments, the insured may attach the policy to either, even after the loss has occurred, if the terms of the policy do not exclude it, and if the declaration is honest and conforms to the intention of the parties. (l) 2 If the policy be in the alternative, and the insured is * interested in both the alternatives, as ship or cargo, and both have been at risk, (m) the policy attaches to both; but if he is interested in only one, he may attach the policy wholly to that. There are many cases illustrative of the effect of the phrases commonly used in the description. (n)

The amount of the interest of the assured, as whether it be onetake, described the goods as marked (D) on board the Brothers. The goods were on board the vessel named, but not marked as described. Held, that the insured was entitled to recover, as the risk undertaken by the underwriters was neither changed nor increased. Policies usually contain the clause, after mentioning the name of the vessel, "or by whatsoever other name or names the said vessel shall be named." Under this clause it is only necessary to prove the identity of the ship. Hall v. Mollineaux, cited 6 East, 386. See also, Le Mesurier v. Vaughan, 6 East, 382; Clapham v. Cologan, 8 Camp. 382; Sea Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 21 Wend. 600.

(i) Ballard v. Merchants Ins. Co. 9 La. 258.

(j) Sorbe v. Merch. Ins. Co. 6 La. 186.

(k) Murray v. Col. Ins. Co. 11 Johns. 302; Rickman v. Carstairs, 6 B. & Ad. 651; Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 868; Grant v. Paxton, 1 Taunt. 468.

(l) Harman v. Kingston, 3 Camp. 160; Craufurd v. Hunter, 8 T. R. 16, note; Henchman v. Offley, 2 H. Bl. 345, n.; Kewley v. Ryan, 2 H. Bl. 343. See New York Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 4 Duer, 141.

(m) Faris v. Newburyport Ins. Co. 8 Mass. 476.

(n) Merchandise, or any equivalent word, does not apply to ornaments or clothing owned by persons on board, and not intended for sale. Ross v. Thwaite, Park, Ins. 26. Bullion on board not intended for the expenses of the master, crew, or passengers, is covered by the words "goods and merchandise: Da Costa v. Firth, 4 Burr. 1966; or "cargo:" Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 429. "Goods and merchandise," will cover specie dollars. Am. Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend. 899. "Cargo" has been held not to cover live stock, or hay, corn, etc, put on board mainly for the use of the stock, although it was expected that a considerable quantity of it would remain unconsumed, and would be sold as cargo at the port of destination. Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co. supra. Live stock is generally insured eo nomine. Lawrence v. Aberdein, 6 B. & Ald. 107; Coit v. Smith, 3 Johns. Cas. 16. But under some circumstances "cargo" would cover live stock. Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co. 2 Gill & J. 136; Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Allegre, 2 Gill & J. 164. For other examples see Hill v. Patten, 8 East, 373; Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227; Rogers v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 1 Story, 603; Pritchet v. Ins. Co. of N. A. 3 Yeates, 458; Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East, 378; Marsh. Ins. 316; Duplanty v. Commercial Ins. Co. Anthon, N. P. 114; Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing. 186.

1 See Joyce v. Realm Ins. Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. 580; Jones v. Neptune Ins. Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. 703.

2 See Ionides v. Pacific Ins. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 674; L. R. 7 Q. B. 517; Stephens v. Australasian Ins. Co. L. R. 8 C. P. 90; Imperial Marine Ins. Co. v. Fire Ins. Corporation, 4 C. P. D. 166, in which last case a fire company had re-insured a marine risk against fire.

half or any other proportion of the property, and its character, as whether he is interested as mortgagor or mortgagee, or as charterer or trustee or bailee, or whether his interest be legal or equitable, need not be specified; an insurance of property or interest generally covering all these. (o)

We have seen, in the chapter on shipping, that public policy disapproves the carrying goods on deck, although the owner and shipper may agree to it, if they choose. For the same reason, a general policy on cargo does not cover goods on deck, without express provision to that effect. (p) But an exceptional usage may, if known and established, affect the policy on this point. There are numerous cases referring to this question. (q) It has been intimated, that a usage to carry such goods on such a vessel and on such a voyage, is not sufficient to bring the goods within the policy, unless there be * also evidence of a usage by in surers of paying for the loss of such goods. (r)