As agency may be presumed from repeated acts of the agent, adopted and confirmed by the principal previously to the contract in which the question is raised. (d) so agency may be confirmed

21; Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 88, where it was held sufficient proof of an agent's authority to subscribe a policy of insurance for an insurer, that the insurer was in the habit of paying losses upon policies so subscribed by him, without producing the power of attorney under which the agent testified that he acted. - An authority to draw is not an authority to indorse; Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455; yet the fact that a confidential clerk had been accustomed to draw, taken in connection with the fact that his master had in one instance authorized him to indorse, and on two other occasions had received money obtained by his indorsement, is evidence from which a jury may infer a general authority to indorse. Prescott v. Flynn, 9 Bing. 19. As to what will amount to proof of an implied authority to a clerk in a mercantile house to sign shipping papers in the names of his principals, see Dows v. Greene, 32 Barb 490.

(zz) George v. Sandel, 18 La. An. 535.

(a) Reynell v. Lewis. 15 M. & W, 517; Dawson v. Morrison, 16 L. J. C.. P. 240; Cox v. Midland Railway Co. 3 Exch. 268; Busby v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. 75; Burnes v. Pennel, 2 H. L. (as. 519; Kaye v. Brett, 5 Exch. 269; Thatcher v. Bank of New York, 5 Sandf. 121.

(b) Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Let. 264; Parsons v. Armor, 3 id. 413; Rhine v. Proudfit, 3 Call, 207; Kilgour v. F'inly-son, 1 H. Bl. 155.

(c) Pourie v. Fraser, 2 Bay, 269.

(d) Townsend v. Inglis, Holt, 278; Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 88; Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60. There the apparent acceptor of a bill of exchange, setting up as a defence that his signature had been forged, it was held a good answer that the defendant had paid other bills of the drawer under similar circumstances. And see Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 147.

1 Thus a horse-car conductor cannot agree to give a free passage, Wakefield v. So Boston R. Co. 117 Mass 544; nor an engineer contract for a railroad, Gardner v. Boston, etc. R. Co. 70 Me. 181; nor a passenger agent make freight contract-. Taylor v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 74 Ill. 86. See Reed v. Ashburuham R. Co. 120 Mass. 43. - K and established by a subsequent ratification; the common law having adopted the civil-law maxim, "omnis ratihabitio retro-trahitur et mandato aequiparatur." (e) The rule may be stated thus: where any one contracts as agent, - but not unless he contracts as agent, (f) - without naming a principal, his acts enure to the benefit of the party, although at the time uncertain or unknown, for whom it shall turn out that he intended to act, provided the party thus entitled to be principal ratify the contract. (g) And, on the other * hand, if the principal

(e) 18 Vin. Abr. Ratihabitio; Lueena v. Craufurd, 1 Taunt. 325; Clark's Executors v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 158; Fleckner v. United States Bank, 8 Wheat. 363; Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. 81; Hooe v. Oxley, 1 Wash. (Va.) 19; Moss v. Ros-sie Lead Mining Co. 5 Hill (N. Y.), 137; Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218; Marsh v. Keating, 1 Bing. N. C. 198; Bigelow v. Dennison, 23 Vt. 565. - If any stranger, in the name of the mortgagor or his heir (without his consent or privity), tender the money, and the mortgagee accepteth it [which, however, he is not bound to do], this is a good satisfaction, and the mortgagor or his heir, agreeing thereunto, may re-enter into the land. Co. Lit. 206 b.

(f) Collins v. Suau, 7 Rob. 623.

(g) Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 242. "Ratum quis habere non potest quod ipsius nomine non est gestum." See also Saunderson v. Griffiths, 5 B. & C. 909; and Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274; Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226; Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Br. & B. 282; Williams v. North China Ins. Co. 1 C. P. D. 757; Francis v. Kerker, 85 Ill. 190. This doctrine has frequent application in cases of marine insurance. See Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M. & Sel. 485; Finney v. Fairhaven Ins. Co. 5 Met. 192. - A notice to quit, given by an unauthorized agent, cannot be made good by an adoption of it by the principal after the proper time for giving it, the agent having acted in his own name in giving the notice, nor it seems, if he acted in the name of the principal. Doe v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143; Right v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491. - In Bird v. Brown, .4 Exch. 786, a very important distinction was taken by the Court of Exchequer. A a merchant at Liverpool, sent orders to B, at New York, to purchase certain goods, which were shipped accordingly in rive ships and consigned to A, who, after the receipt of the goods by one of them, stopped payment on the 7th of April, 1846. B, pursuant to directions from A, had drawn bills for the goods partly on A, and partly on C, with whom A had dealings. D, a merchant at Liverpool, and who also had a house of business at New York, purchased there several of the bills, which were drawn at sixty days' sight, and dated some on the 28th, and others on the 30th of March, 1846. On the 8th of May, a fiat in bankruptcy issued against A, and his assignees were appointed. The other four vessels arrived respectively on the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 10th of that month, and immediately on the arrival of each, and while the transitus of the goods on board continued, D, on behalf of B, but not being his agent, and without any authority from him, gave notice to the masters and consignees, claiming to stop the goods in transitu. On the 11th of May the assignees made a formal demand of the goods still on board and undelivered, from the master and consignees of each of the four ships, at the same time tendering the freight; but they refused to deliver them, and on the same day delivered the whole to D. On the next day the assignees made a formal demand of the goods from him, but he refused to deliver them up. On the 28th of April, B heard at New York that A had stopped payment, and on the next day he executed a power of attorney to E, of Liverpool, authorizing him to stop the goods in transitu. This was received by E on the 13th of May, who on that day adopted and confirmed the previous stoppage by D. B afterwards adopted and ratified all which had been done both by E and D. Held, that the title of A to the goods was not devested by the above stoppages in transitu, and consequently that trover for them was maintainable by the assignees against B. Pollock, C. B., delivering the judgment, said "The doctrine 'omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato aequiparatur,' is one intelligible in principle, and easy in its application when applied to cases of contract. If A. B , unauthorized by me, makes a contract on my behalf with J. S., which I afterwards recognize and adopt, there is no difficulty in dealing with it as having been originally made by my authority. J. S. entered into the conaccept, receive, and hold the proceeds or beneficial results of such a contract, he will be estopped from * denying an original authority, or a ratification. (h)1 And if a party tract on the understanding that he was dealing with me, and when I afterwards agree to admit that such was the case, J. S. is precisely in the condition in which he meant to be; and if he did not believe A. B. to be acting for me, his condition is not altered by my adoption of the agency, for he may sue A. B. as principal at his option, and has the same equities against me if I sue, that he would have had against A. B. In cases of tort there is more difficulty. If A. B., professing to act by my authority, does that which prima facie amounts to a trespass, and I afterwards assent to and adopt his act, there he is treated as having from the beginning acted by my authority, and I become a trespasser, unless I can justify the act which is to be deemed as having been done by my previous sanction. So far there is no difficulty in applying the doctrine of ratification even in cases of tort - the party ratifying becomes as it were a trespasser by estoppel - he cannot complain that he is deemed to have authorized that which he admits himself to have authorized. The authorities, however, go much further, and show that in some cases where an act, which if unauthorized would amount to a trespass, has been done in the name and on behalf of another, and without previous authority, there a subsequent ratification may enable the party on whose behalf the act was done, to take advantage of it, and to treat it as having been done by his direction. But this doctrine must be taken with the qualification that the act of ratification must take place at a time, and under circumstances, when the ratifying party might have himself lawfully (lone the act which he ratifies. Thus in Lord Audley's case, a fine with proclamations was levied of certain land, and a stranger within five years afterwards, in the name of him who had right, entered to avoid the fine; after the five years, and not before, the party who had the right to the land ratified and confirmed the act of the stranger; this was held to be inoperative, though such ratification within the five years would probably have been good. Now the principle of this case, which is reported in many books, Cro. E. 561; Moore, 457, pl.