The facts being undisputed, the question whether the alleged agent had sufficient authority, is a question of law. (qq) An agent, generally, may be appointed by parol, and so authorized to do anything which does not require him to execute a deed for his principal. (r) The rule of the common law, that an agent cannot affix a seal for his principal, unless his authority to do

(q) Hodge v. Coombs, 1 Black, 192.

(qq) Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vroom, 463.

(V) 2 Kent, Com. 612. Manhattan Ins. Co. v. La Pert, 52 Tex. 504. The receipt of an authorized agent is the receipt of the principal. Mackersy v. Ramsays, 9 Cl. & F. 818, 850 - A tender made to an authorized agent is as if made to his principal. Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307.

Nat. Bank v. Laveille, 52 Mo. 380, Williams v. Wilmington, etc. R. R. Co 93 N C. 42; Erb v. Great Western Ry. Co. 5 Can. Sup. Ct. 179. See also Nichols v. DeWolf, 1 R.I. 277.

But the rule is applicable to many other cases. It can only be on this principle that a bank is held liable to the holder for value of a check certified by its cashier to be good, though in fact the drawer had no funds and the cashier no authority to certify checks under such circumstances. Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604; Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604; Farmers' Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125; Hill v. Nation Trust Co., 108 Pa. 1.

So a corporation has been held liable for certificates of stock improperly issued by officers authorized to issue certificates regularly. New York. etc. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; Allen v. South Boston Railroad, 150 Mass. 200.

In Mussey v. Beecher, stated in the text, it seems that a different decision would have been reached in States where what may be called the New York rule is consistently applied. See Palmer v Cheney, .35 Ia. 281. Likewise in Lowell v. Winchester Bank, 8 Allen, 109, where a town officer duly authorized to borrow a certain sum of money, after having done so, fraudulently borrowed the sum again, representing that he had not done so before, and it was held that the town was not liable this is under seal, is still generally recognized as in force. (rr) He may be authorized by parol to make and sign contracts in writing, and it seems to be now settled that he may be authorized without writing, to make even those contracts which are not binding upon his principal unless in writing signed by him. (s) And even a parol ratification is equivalent to an original authority. (t)

In Montaignac v. Shitta, 15 App. Cas. 357, it was held that where an agent had authority to borrow on exceptional terms under circumstances of emergency, the lender was not bound to inquire whether in the particular case the emergency had arisen See also Solon v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N. Y. 122 , Martin v. Niagara, etc. Co. 122 N. Y. 165, 174.

An authority is presumed or raised by implication of law, on the ground that the principal has justified the belief that he has given such authority, in cases where he has employed a person in his regular employment; (u) 1 as where one sends goods to an auctioneer, or to a common repository room for sale, the bailee has an implied authority to sell. (v) And such presumptions frequently arise in the case of a wife; (w) or of a domestic servant; (x) or of a son who has been permitted for a considerable time to transact a particular business for the father, (y) as to sign bills, etc.; or where one has been repeatedly employed to sign policies of insurance for another. (z) So

(rr) Rowe v. Ware, 30 Ga. 278; Echols v. Cheney, 28 Cal. 157; Elliott v. Stocks, 67 Ala. 336; Watson v. Sherman, 84 Ill. 263; Adams v. Powers, 52 Miss. 828; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69, Harshaw v. McKesson, 65 N. C. 688. And in Ban-orgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, it was held (Sewell, J., dissenting), that a sealed instrument executed in the name of the principal by an agent, not authorized under seal, could not be admitted in evidence in an action of assumpsit against the principal. But see contra, Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. 613, and page infra, notes (m), (o).

(s) Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450; Clinan v Cooke, 1 Sch. & L. 22 , Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 250. - But by an express provision of the Statute of Frauds, an agent, to grant or assign a term for more than three years, or an estate of freehold, must be authorized thereto in writing. 29 Car. II c. 3, § 3.

(t) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

(u) Dows v. Greene, 16 Barb. 72; Lyell v. Sanbourn, 2 Mich. 109, Thompson v Bell, 10 Exch. 10.

(v) Lord Ellenborough, Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38.

(w) Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565, Huckman v Feruie, 3 M. & W. 505, Att'y-Gen. v. Riddle, 2 Cr. & J. 493; Plimmer v. Sells, 3 Nev. & M. 422.- After separation, the wife is still her husband's agent for the procurement of such things as are reasonable and necessary for herself. Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506. So where the person cohabited with is only a mistress, and known to be in fact only a mistress, if she is allowed to pass ostensibly as wife. Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460.

(x) A master is not responsible for a contract entered into by a servant to whom he had always given cash for making purchases. Rushy v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. 75. So with any particular agent who obtains on credit goods which the principal gave him money to purchase. Lord Abinger, C. B., Flemyng v. Hector, 2 M. & W. 181.

(y) Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368; Weaver v. Ogletree, 39 Ga. 586; Thurber v. Anderson, 88 Ill. 167; Matteson v. Blackmer, 46 Mich 393.

(z) Brockelbank v. Sugrue, 5 C. & P the acceptance of the agency by the agent may be inferred from his acting under it; and this has been held even where he Writes to his principal refusing the agency. (zz)

1 But not if the former employment was without the principal's knowledge, Cobb v. Hall, 49 Ia. 366; nor if a mere temporary employment, nearly a year before, Green v. Hinkley, 52 Ia. 633; nor to sell from the fact that a purchasing clerk was employed fifteen months before to make a single sale. Cupples v. Whelan, 61 Mo. 583. See Wilcox v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 24 Minn. 269, Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo. 565; Abrahams v. Weiller, 87 Ill. 179. - K.

It must be remembered, however, that an agent employed for a special purpose, derives from this no general authority from his principal. (a)1 Where the belief of the authority of an agent arises only from previous action on his part as an agent, the persons so treating with him must, on their own responsibility, ascertain the nature and extent of his previous employment. (b) This may be such as to estop the principal from * denying his authority in the particular transaction; but if not, then they have no remedy, unless against the agent himself who misled them. (c)