As damages are compensation for some actual injury sustained, it might seem that where a wrong was done, but no actual in* dissenting), that the note in this case was payable alone in pig metal, and could not be discharged by paying the sum mentioned in money. But there are authorities, of perhaps equal weight, which hold, that a note promising to pay a certain sum, in specific articles at a {given price, may be discharged by the delivery of the articles, or by the payment of the sum stated, at the debtor s election; but, after the time fixed for delivery has elapsed, they become obligations for the payment of that sum. Pinney v. Gleason, 5 Wend. 393, 5 Cowen, 152,411; Brooks v. Hubbard, 3 Conn. 58; Perry v. Smith, 22 Vt. 301. In Pinuey v. Gleason, 5 Wend. 397, the note was in this form: " For value received, I promise to pay A. B. $79 50 on, Ac., in salt, at fourteen shillings per barrel/' Per Walworth, Ch.: -Pother savs, these agreements for paying anything else in lieu of what is due, are always presumed to be made in favor of the debtor, and therefore he has always a right to pay the thing which is actually due, and the creditor cannot demand anything else: and he puts the case of a lease of a vineyard at a fixed rent, expressed in the usual terms of commercial currency, but payable in wine. In such a case, lie says, the lessee is not obliged to deliver wine, hut may pay the rent in money. 2 Ev. Poth. 347. N. 497. Chipman, in his valuable treatise on the law of contracts for the delivery of specific articles, puts the case of a note for $100, payable in wheat, at 75 cents per bushel, and concludes that it comes within the principle referred to by Pothier, and that the debtor may pay the SI 00 in money, or in wheat at the price specified. He says, the nature of the contract is this: The creditor agreed to receive wheat instead of money, and as the parties concluded the price of wheat at the time of payment would be 75 cents per bushel, to avoid disputes about the price they fixed it at 75 cents in the contract. If, at the time fixed for payment, wheat be at 50 cents a bushel, the debtor may pay it in wheat at the rate of 75 cents. That, if the parties had intended the risk in the rise and tall of the wheat should be equal with both, the contract would have been simply for the payment of a certain number of bushels. Chip, on Con. 35. This construction of the contract appears to be rational, and is probably in accordance with the practice of those parts of the country where these contracts are most frequently made. The language is certainly not the best which could be used to express such an intent, and probably, if the contract were drawn by a lawyer he would pat it in the alternative, giving the debtor the option, in express terms, to pay the debt in money, or in wheat, at the fixed rate per bushel. But certainly if the intention of the parties was, that a certain number of bushels of wheat should be absolutely delivered in payment, a lawyer would draw the note for so many bushels of wheat in direct terms." Where notes are given for a specified sum, payable in bank-notes or other chases in action, the measure of damages has been Held to be the value of such paper at the time the notes become due. Smith v. Dunlap. 12 III. 184; Clay v. Huston, 1 Bibb, 461; Anderson v. £wing, 3 Litt. 245; Phelps v. Riley, 3 Coun. 266; Coldren v. Miller, 1 Blackf. 296, Van Vleet v. Adair, 1 id. 346; Gordon r. Parker, 2 Smedes & M. 485; Hixon v. Hixon, 7 Humph. 33; Robinson v. Noble, 8 Pet. 181.

(c) Brooks v. Hubbard, 3 Conn. 60, per Hosmer, C. J.; Mettler v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 342.

(d) Barbin v. Police Jury, 15 La. An. 544.

(e) 19 Hen. V1 44; Waterer v. Freeman, Hob. 267 a, per Hobart, C. J: Ashbv v White, 2 Ld Raym. 938, 1 Smith, Ld. Cas. 105, per Curiam, Lord Holt dissenting.

(f) Ash by v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955, 1 Salk 19, I Smiths Ld. Cases, 105, per Lord Hut; Williams v. Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145, 153, per Parke, B. j Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Wms. Saund. 347 a, note 2, Foster v. Elliott. 33 la. 216. In Webb v Portland Mannf. Co. 3 Snmner, 189,192, Story, J., said » " I can very well understand that no action lies in a case where there is damnum absque injuria, that is, where there i* a damage done without any wrong or violation of any right of the plaintiff. Bnt I am not able to understand how it can be correctly said, in a legal cense, that an action will not lie, even in a case of wrong or violation of aright, unless it is lollowed by gome perceptible damage, which can be established as a matter of fact; in other words, that injuria sine damno is not actionable. On the contrary, from my earliest reading, I have considered it laid up among the very elements of the common law, tnat wherever there is a wrong there is a remedy to redress it; and that every injury imports damage in the nature of it, and if no other damage is established, the party injured is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages. ... So long ago as the great case of Ashbv v. White (2 Ld. Raym. 938; 6 Mod. 45, Holt, 524), the objection was put forth by some of the judges, and was answered by Lord Holt, with his usual ability and clear learning: and his judgment was supported by the House of Lords, and that of his brethren overturned." By the favor of an eminent judge, Lord Holt s opinion, apparently' copied from his own manuscript, has been recently printed. [London, Saunders and Benning, 1837 ] In this last printed opinion (p. 14), Ld. Holt, says: "It is impossible to imagine any such thing as injuria sine damno. Every injury imports damage, in the nature of it.

For this purpose any verdict and judgment for the smallest sum is as effectual in law as if for a larger. And it is now the established practice in England and in this country to give a plaintiff damages if he succeeds in proving that the defendant has broken his contract with him, or has trespassed upon his property, or in any way invaded his rights. But if no actual injury has been sustained beyond that which the. verdict and judgment will themselves correct, and the case does not call for exemplary damages, the jury would then be directed to give nominal damages; that is, a sum of insignificant value, but called damages, (g)1 Thus, it has been held in Illinois, that where an action is brought by an administrator against a railroad company, for damages for the death of the intestate by the fault of the company, if it appears that his next of kin were in no degree dependent upon himforsupport, only nominal damages can be given, (gg) In Wisconsin, in such an action for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's daughter, ten years old, evidence was received as to the probability of the parents needing help from her after she was of full age, and of her character and disposition, as to the probability of her rendering such aid. (gh)