A bill or note must be presented for payment at its maturity, or the indorsers are not held. They guarantee its payment, not by express words, but by operation of law. And for their protection the law annexes to their liability, as a condition, that reasonable efforts shall be made to procure the payment from those bound to pay before them, and also that they shall have reasonable notice of a refusal to pay, that they may have an opportunity to indemnify themselves. The justice of this is obvious. A holder of a note, with a good indorser, might be very indifferent as to the payment by the promisor or an earlier indorser, if he knew that he could certainly collect the amount from the indorser on whom he relied; therefore the very liability of this indorser is made to rest upon the efforts of the holder to obtain the money bills having been drawn on the defendants by their agent, and with their authority, in respect to a mine which they afterwards transferred to A, they requested A to place funds in their hands to meet the bills when due, saying, "it would be unpleasant to have bills drawn on them paid by another party." A placed funds accordingly; but when the bills were left with the defendants for acceptance, no acceptance was written on them. A's agent having complained to one of the defendants on the subject, he said: "What, not accepted? We have had the money, and they ought to be paid, but I do not. interfere in this business, yon should see my partner." And it was held that all this amounted to a parol acceptance of the bills on which the defendants were liable to an indorsee, between whom and A there was no privity, and that the indorsee was not precluded from suing, by having made a protest in ignorance of this acceptance.- In Ward v. Allen, 2 Met. 53, a bill was read to the drawee, who said it was correct and should be paid; and this was treated as a sufficient acceptance. See Parkhurst v. Dickerson, 21 Pick. 307: Pierce v. Kittredge, 115 Mass. 374; Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill (N. V.), 413; Walker v. Lide, 1 Rich. L. 249; Walker v. Bank of State of New Fork, 13 Barb. 636; Lewis V. Kramer, 3 Md. 265; Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill, 350.

(ww) Plummet v. Lyman, 40 Me. 229; Burns v. Rowland, 40 Barb. 368.

(x) In New Fork, Missouri, and California, the acceptance must be in writing; and may be by promise before the bill is drawn. And a drawee holding and refusing to return a bill to a holder for twenty-four hours, is to be held as accepting it.

(y) Owen v. Van Uster, 1 E. L. & E. 396; 9. c. 10 C. B 318.

from the prior parties. Again; each indorser transfers by indorsement a debt due to * himself, and if by the guaranty which springs from his indorsement he has to pay this debt to another, he is entitled to all such prompt knowledge of the failure of the party whom he guarantees, and of his own consequent liability, as will enable him to secure a payment of this debt to himself, if that be possible. The rules, and the exceptions to the rules, in relation to demand of payment and notice of nonpayment, will be found to rest upon these principles.

Generally the question of reasonable time, reasonable diligence, and reasonable notice, is open to the circumstances of every case, and is determined by a reference to them. (z) But in regard to bills and notes the law merchant has denned all of these with great exactness.

The general rule may be said to be, that the drawer and indorsers of a bill and the indorsers of a note are discharged from their liability, unless payment of the bill or note be demanded from the party previously bound to pay it, on the day on which it falls due. (a) And if the holder neglects to make such demand, he not only loses the guaranty of subsequent parties, but all right to recover for the consideration or debt for which the bill or note was given. (b)1

(z) Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me. 112.

(a) Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131; Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241; Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cowen, 397; Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank, 8 Barb. 396; Holbrook v. Allen, 4 Fla. 87; Robinson v. Blen, 20 Me. 109; Magruder v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87; Juniati Bank v. Hale, 16 S. & R. 157. If the bill or note is payable at a time certain, it must be presented on the last day of grace; and a demand either before or after that day is insufficient to charge the indorser. Id.; Howe v. Bradley, 19 Me. 31; Leavitt v. Simes, 3 N. H. 14; Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 7 G. & J. 78; Piatt v. Eads, 1 Blackf. 81; Etting v. Schuylkill Bank, 2 Barr, 355.

(b) Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373. This was an action for the price of goods. It appeared that the same were sold at York on Saturday, December 10th, 1825, and on the same day, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the vendee delivered to the vendor, as, and for a payment of the price, certain promissory notes of the Bank of D. & Co. at Hud-dersfield, payable on demand to bearer. D. & Co. stopped payment on the same day at eleven o'clock in the morning, and never afterwards resumed their payments; but neither of the parties knew of the stoppage, or of the insolvency of D. & Co. The vendor never circulated the notes, or presented them to the bankers for payment; but on Saturday, the 17th, he required the vendee to take back the notes, and to pay him the amount, which the latter refused. Held, under these circumstances, that the vendor of the goods was guilty of laches, and had thereby made the notes his own, and, consequently, that they operated as a satisfaction of the debt. In Hare v. Henty, 100 Eng. C. L. 65, it is held that a banker receiving a check upon another banker, not resident in the same town, is not bound to transmit it for presentment, by the post of the day on which he receives it, but he has until post time of the next day for so doing. See also 2 Pars. Notes & Bills, 72.

1 It was decided in German Nat. Bank v. Foreman, 138 Pa. 474, that the plaintiff bank had discharged the indorser of a note which it held by allowing the maker to withdraw a deposit after the maturity of the note.