*Let us look at the exceptions to this rule requiring such presentment of a bill or note. Bankruptcy or insolvency, however certain or however manifested, is not one. (c) Though the bank or shop be shut, presentment there or to the parties personally must still be made. (d) Nor will the death of the party prevent the necessity of demanding payment of his personal representatives, if he have any, (e) and if not, at his house; nor will the death of the party who should give notice; for if no executor or administrator is appointed before the note falls due, the executor or administrator may make sufficient demand and give notice within a reasonable time after the appointment. (/)

Delay or omission to demand payment does not, however, discharge the drawer of a bill, if the drawee had in his hands no effects of the drawer, at any time between the drawing of the bill and its maturity, and had no right on other ground to expect the payment of the bill, (g) for the drawer had then no right to draw the bill, and therefore no right to demand or notice, because he could not profit by it to get payment to himself of the debt from the drawee, there being no such debt. So also if the transaction between the drawer and the drawee was * illegal. (h) * 271

(c) Russell v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 515; Ex parte Johnston, 3 Deac. & C. 433; Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30; Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16; Ireland v. Kip, Anthon, 142; Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Groten v. Dalheim, 6 Greenl. 476; Holland v. Turner, 10 Conn. 308; Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill, 350; Smith v. Miller, 52 N. Y. 545; Farwell v. St. Paul Trust Co. 45 Minn. 495. And although the indorsers, at the time of indorsement, had reason to believe, and did believe, that the maker would not pay, this does not dispense with the necessity of due notice to them of such maker's default. Denny v. Palmer, 5 Ired. L. 610; Oliver v. Munday, 2 Penning. 982; Allwood v. Haseldon, 2 Bailey, 457.

(d) Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30, reversing the decision of the King's Bench in the same case, 16 East, 112. And see Camidge v. Allenby, 6 13. & C. 373. If the maker is absent on a voyage at sea, having a domicile within the State, payment must be demanded there. Whittier v. Groffam, 3 Greenl. 82; Dennie v. Walker, 7 N. H. 199. See Ogden v. Cowley, 2 Johns. 274; Galpin v. Hard, 3 Mc-Cord, 394; Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 294.

(e) Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16; Landry v. Stansbury, 10 La. 484.

(f) White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray, 258.

(g) De Berdt v. Atkinson, 2 H. Bl 336'; Terry v. Parker, 6 A. & E. 502; Kinsley v. Robinson, 21 Pick. 327; Foard v. Womack, 2 Ala. 368; Wollenweber v. Ketterlinus, 17 Peon. St. 389: Allen v. Smith's Adm'r, 4 Barring. (Del.) 234 , Oliver v. Bank of Tenn. 11 Humph. 74; Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill, 350. See also Fitch v. Redding, 4 Sandf. 130; Allen v. King, 4 McLean, 128; Durrani v. Hen-drick, 4 Tex. 492; Bowring v. Andrews, 3 McLean, 576 , Gillett v. Averill, 5 Denio, 85; Mobley v. Clark, 28 Barb. 390; Culver v. Marks, 122 Ind. 554. But where a note is signed by one person as a principal, and others as sureties, it is not a sufficient ex cuse to show that the sureties bad do funds in the place of payment; for if was the duty of the maker, and not of the sureties, to provide for the payment Fort v. Cortes, 14 La. 180.

(A) Copp v. McDugall, 9 Mass. 1. Where the indorsee of a negotiable promissory note failed to recover against the promisor, because the original contract was usurious, the indorser, who was the original payee, was held liable, without notice, for the amount due by the note, bat not for the costs of the indorsee's action against the promisor.

But such presentment should still be made in all cases to hold the subsequent parties. (i) And it is held that an accommodation drawer is entitled to demand and notice of dishonor, although he had no funds in the hands of the drawee. (ii) The discharge from liability arising from such delay or omission may be waived, by an express promise to pay made after such discharge, or by a payment in part, from which the law infers an acknowledgment of liability; but not by a mere promise to pay made before such delay or omission. (j) If the party who should pay the note has absconded, or has no domicile or regular place of business, and cannot be found by reasonable endeavors, payment need not be demanded of him, because it would be of no utility to a subsequent party; (k) still, notice of these facts

(0 Wilkes v. Jacks, Peake Cas. 202; Leach v. Hewitt, 4 Taunt. 730; Ramdu-lollday v. Darieux, 4 Wash. C. C. 61; Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 743.

(ii) Merchants' Bank v. Easley, 44 Mo. 286.

(j) That payment of part is a waiver of non-demand on the maker, see Vaughan v. Fuller, Stra. 1246; Taylor v. Jones, 2 Camp. 106; Lundie v. Robertson, 7 East, 231; Haddock v. Bury, id. 236, n.; Hodge v. Fillis, 3 Camp. 464; Hopley v. Dufresue, 15 East, 275; Ryram v. Hunter, 36 Me. 217; Low v. Howard, 11 Cush. 268; Dorsey v. Watson, 14 Mo. 59; Harvey v. Troupe, 23 Miss. 538.- That a new promise to pay, after notice of the neglect to demand of the maker, is a waiver, see Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487; Seeley v. Bisbee, 2 Vt. 105; Ladd v. Kenney, 2 N. H. 340; Sogers v. Hackett, 1 Foster (N. H.), 100; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; Jones v. O'Brien, 26 E. L. & E. 283; Peto v. Reynolds, id. 404. See also p. * 434, note, post. - It has been decided that it must be shown affirmatively, however, that the in-dorser, when he made the promise, knew that no demand had been made on the maker. Otis v. Hussey, 3 N. H. 346; New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Mills, 2 La. An. 824; Robinson v. Day, 7 La. An. 201. But it is said in Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163, that where there is an express promise, demand and notice will be presumed unless the contrary be shown. - So if an indorser take full security from the maker to secure him against his liability to pay the note, this excuses a demand on the maker, and notice thereof to the indorser. Durham v. Price, 5 Yerg. 300; Duvall v. Farmers' Bank, 2 G. & J. 31; Mead v. Small, 2 Greenl. 207; Marshall v. Mitchell, 34 Me. 227; Marshall v. Mitchell, 35 Me. 223; Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 Conn. 175;