The guarantor cannot be held to any greater extent than the original debtor, either in point of amount or of time. (h) 2 Nor can this liability be extended or enlarged by operation of law or by statute (hh) without his consent. This would appear to be a plain and certain principle of law, although there are some cases which seem to oppose it. (i) If one becomes bound for the fidelity of an officer in a corporation created by a statute for a limited period, and after that expires the charter is renewed, but no new bond given, and no confirmation of the old one, it has •been held in New Hampshire that the surety is still bound. (j) But this question has been decided differently, and more in accordance with the principles of the law of contracts, in Maryland. (k) There the surety was held to be discharged, on

(e) In New York, in the case of Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35, the court say: "Unless there is something in the nature of the contract or terms of the writing, creating or implying the necessity or acceptance or notice as a condition of liability, neither are deemed requisite." And in Union Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 Comst. 212, the court referring to Douglass v. Howland and Smith v. Dann, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 543, say: "We must hold the law to be settled in this State, that where the guaranty is absolute no notice of acceptance is necessary." And see Bright v. McKnight, 1 Sneed, 158; Maynard v. Morse, 36 Vt. 617; Cooke v. Orne, 37 Ill. 186; Dickerson v. Direckson, 39 Ill. 574; Sanders v. Etcherson, 36 Ga. 404.

(f) It is immaterial how the notice is given to the guarantor, whether by the party accepting the guaranty, or him in whose favor it is given. Reasonable knowledge on the part of the guarantor that his guaranty is accepted is sufficient. Oakes v. Weller, 16 Vt. 63; s. c. 13 Vt. 106; Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. An. 385. An acknowledgment by the guarantor of his liability, and a promise to pay, supersedes the necessity of proving notice. Peck v.

Barney, 13 Vt. 93. But see Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Pet. 497.

(a) What is a reasonable time, the facts not being in dispute, seems to be entirely a question of law, and not proper to be submitted to the jury. Craft v. Isham, 13 Conn. 28; Howe v. Nickles, 22 Me. 175; Lowry v. Adams, 22 Vt. 160.

(A) Walsh v. Bailie, 10 Johns. 180; Tunison v. Cramer, 2 Southard, 498; Clark v. Bush, 3 Cowen, 151; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; Fisher v. Salmon, 1 Cal. 413. The liability of the guarantor will be deemed coextensive with that of the principal, unless it be expressly limited. Curling v. Chalklen, 3 M. & Sel. 502. A guarantor is not bound beyond the fair import of the actual terms of his engagement. Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 680, 720; Wardens of St. Saviour's v. Bostock, 5 B. & P. 175; Borden v. Houston, 2 Tex. 594. One bound for a clerk appointed for a year was held not to be liable for the wrong-doing of the clerk after that year, and while he continued in office. Kitson v. Julian, 4 E. & B. 854; Kingst. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 33 Barb. 196.

(hh) Fielden v. Lahens, 6 Blatch. 524.

1 See Central Bank v. Shine, 48 Mo. 456; Montgomery v. Kellogg, 43 Miss. 486. • 2 Grant v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 93. A release of A. from his debt by a composition deed, "in like manner as if A. had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy," discharges a surety on A.'s bond for the debt. Cragoe v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex. 81. A statutory increase of duties not germane to the office discharges the sureties on an official bond, as when a sheriff was also made a tax-collector. White v. East Saginaw, 43 Mich. 567.

(i) Thus, in Reed v. Fullum, 2 Pick. 158, where a surety became bound for a poor debtor, "that he would not depart without the exterior bounds of the debtor's liberties," and at the time the bond was given the "debtor's liberties" extended through the whole county, but they were subsequently reduced to much more narrow limits, it was held, that the surety was liable for the escape of the debtor, beyond the last mentioned limits, although he had not passed beyond the liberties as they existed when the bond was given.

(j) Exeter Bank v. Rogers, 7 N. H. 21. The facts were that the Exeter Bank was incorporated by an act of the legislature, in the year 1803, to continue for the term of twenty years from January 1, 1804. In 1822 an additional act of the legislature was passed, which provided that the first act should remain and continue in force for a further term of twenty years from January 1, 1824; that there should be no division of the capital stock without the consent of the legislature, and that the bank should not have in circulation at any time bills exceeding in amount the capital stock actually paid; any cashier or other officer violating these provisions to forfeit not less than $1,000, nor more than $10,000. R. was appointed cashier of the bank in 1809, gave a bond with sureties for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office, and continued cashier until 1880. It was held, that the bond covered all the time which R. remained in office, and that the sureties were not discharged by any of the provisions in the additional act of the legislature. And Richardson, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court,observed: "The true rules of law to be deduced from all the cases on this subject, are these: when the term of office is limited to a particular period, as a year or five years, and the person appointed cannot continue in office for a longer period without a new appointment, then the official bond, if nothing appear to the contrary, is presumed to be intended to be confined to the particular term; and if the officer be reappointed there must be a new bond. But when an office is held at the will of those who make the appointment, and is not limited to any certain term, then the bond is presumed to be intended, if nothing appear to the contrary, to cover all the time the person appointed shall continue in office under the appointment. Thus a sheriff is ap~ pointed in this State to hold his office during the term of five years, and cannot hold it beyond that term without a new appointment. The bond he gives does not therefore extend beyond the term for which he is appointed. But the deputies of the sheriff hold their offices at the will of the sheriff, and their bonds may extend to any period during which they are continued in office, notwithstanding the sheriff may in the mean time be reappointed and be compelled to give new bonds himself. These rules are rounded in sound reason and good sense. The presumption which the law makes as to the intention of the parties to the bond is the natural presumption in both cases. Now we are of opinion that the terms of the condition in this case are broad enough to embrace the whole term during which Rogers was cashier, and that there is nothing in the form of the appointment, the nature of the office, the words of the condition, or the conduct of the parties, that gives the slightest indication of any intention in any party that the bond should be limited to the period mentioned in the original charter as the termination of the corporation."