To determine who is a common carrier, we adopt the definition of Mr. Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts. "He is one who undertakes, for hire, to transport the goods of such as choose to employ him, from place to place." (c) 1 And we regard this as a true definition, although in some of the States it has been held, that a wagoner who carried goods on a special request, although such carrying was not his general business, but only * occa sional and incidental, was still a common carrier. (d) It

(b) Morse v. Sloe, 1 Vent 190,288.

(c) Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 60, 68. A similar definition is given in Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana, 430; Elkins v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co. 8 Foster (N. H.), 275; Mershon v. Hobensack, 2 N. J. 373. So in Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 240, it was resolved, that "any man undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently is a common carrier."

(d) Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1W.&S. 285. In this case the defendant, being a farmer, applied at the store of the plain-tiff, for the hauling of goods from Lewis-town to Bellefonte, upon his return from the former place, where he was going with a load of iron. He received an order and loaded the goods. On the way, the head came out of a hogshead of molasses, and it was wholly lost; and this action was brought to recover the price of it. The defendant contended that he was not subject to the responsibilities of a common carrier, but only answerable for negligence, inasmuch as he was only employed occasionally to carry for hire. But the learned judge before whom the case was tried instructed the jury that he was liable as a common carrier. And the Supreme business, and, consequently, on the usual conditions. His agency was not sought in consequence of a special confidence reposed in him - there was nothing special in the case - on the contrary, the employment was sought by himself, and there is nothing to show that it was given on terms of diminished responsibility." It will be seen, that the learned Chief Justice places considerable reliance upon the fact, that the defendant applied to the plaintiff to get the goods to carry; and it is by no means certain that the decision would have been the same, if the application had come from the plaintiff. But we are not aware of any other case in which such a distinction is taken. The decision receives support, however, independently of this distinction, from the case of McClure v. Richardson, Rice. 216. In that case the defendant was the owner of a boat, in which he was accustomed to carry his own cotton to Charleston; and occasionally, when he had not a load of his own, to take for his neighbors, they paying freight for the same. One Howzer was the master or patroon of the boat, and the general habit was, for those who wished to send their cotton by the defendant's boat to apply to the defendant himself. On this occasion the patroon had been told to take Col. Goodwin's and Mr. Dallas's cotton, which he had done, when the plaintiff applied to How-zer, in the absence of the defendant, to take on board ten bales of his cotton, asking him if it was necessary to apply to the defendant himself, to which Howzer replied that he thought not, and received the cotton; it was held, that, under the circumstances, the defendant was bound by the act of Howzer, as being within the general scope of the authority conferred upon him, by placing him in the situation of master of the boat, and that the defendant was consequently chargeable as a common carrier for any loss of, or damage to, the plaintiff's cotton. - So, too, it has been laid down in general terms, in several cases, that all persons carrying goods for hire come under the denomination of common carriers. See Moses v. Norris, 4 N. H. 804; Turney v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 840; Craig v. Childress, Peck, 270; McClures v. Hammond, 1 Bay, 99. But it would seem to be an insuperable objection to all these cases, that they exclude from the common carrier one of his most important characteristics, namely, his duty to carry for all who may wish to employ him; for it is conceded in several of them that the individual whom they hold liable as a common carrier, was under no obligation to undertake the carrying in question, unless he had chosen so to do. The case of Chevaillier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 115, may be thought to favor views similar to those declared in the cases already cited, but we think it does not. It appeared in that case that the defendant's principal business was farming, but that at a certain period of the year, known as the hauling season, he engaged in the forwarding business, and ran his wagon whenever he met with an opportunity. Under these circumstances, he was held liable as a common carrier. And the court said: "From a comparison of the various authorities, to which we have referred for the distinguishing characteristics of both common and private carriers, it may be laid down as a rule, that all persons who transport goods from place to place, for hire, for such persons as see fit to employ them, whether usually or occasionally, whether as a principal or an incidental and subordinate occupation, are common carriers and incur all their responsibilities. There are no grounds in reason why the occasional carrier, who periodically in every recurring year, abandons his other pursuits, and assumes that of transporting goods for the public, should be exempted from any of the risks incurred by those who make the carrying business their constant or principal occupation. For the time being he shares all the advantages arising from the business; and as the extraordinary responsibilities of a common carrier are imposed by the policy and not the justice of the law, this policy should be uniform in its operation - imparting equal benefits, and inflicting the like burdens, upon all who assume the capacity of public carriers, whether temporarily or permanently, periodically or continuously." It will be seen, therefore, that the only question with the court in this case was, whether it was necessary to constitute one a common carrier that he should hold himself out as such continuously, or whether it was sufficient if he held himself out as such during a certain period of the year. And there would certainly seem to be no reason why one who holds himself out to the public as a common carrier, for a certain season in the year, should not be liable as such. We think it is obvious,