The law would avoid unnecessary litigation; would make it, where necessary, efficacious and conclusive in its action; and would protect each party against the other, by doing exact justice to both. These are its ends, and as its rules are only means for these, they are of secondary value; but as without *them there would be no certainty in judicial action, and no accurate knowledge of personal rights and obligations, these rules are adhered to, although in one case or in another they work a hardship, until it is found that their general effect is mischievous. In that case they are set aside, or controlled by those more general rules by which the particular rules may be qualified and varied in their operation, and yet leave judicial action systematic and regular. These general remarks have an especial bearing on the subject of damages. Of the ancient rules some have been abrogated, and others greatly qualified. And in modern times, courts seek to apply to each case such rules as will carry out the universal rule, as far as may be, that the actual damage must measure the compensation given for it by the law.

(k) This principle in clearly stated and well illustrated in Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt 592. And see ante, p. * 187, n. (g).

1 As to the measure of damages for breach of a contract by an insurance company with its agent, whose compensation was to be paid by commissions on policies obtained and renewed, see Lewis v. Atlas Mut. Ins. Co. 61 Mo. 534

2 In Burritt v. Belfy, 47 Conn 323, where the action was brought before the expiration of the term of service, but not brought to trial until after its expiration, and the plaintiff was held to be entitled to the same damages as if the action had been commenced after the expiration of the term ; namely, the difference between the compensation fixed by the contract for the service and what the plaintiff had received, together with what he was able to earn after his discharge. For breach of a contract to support for life an action lies as soon as there has been a definite default, and such damages may be recovered at once as will compensate the plaintiff, not only for the past, but for the future. Freeman v. Fogg, 82 Me. 408; Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Tippin v. Ward, 5 Ore. 450.

I In an Action against an Attorney or Agent.

Thus, in an action against an attorney for negligence, it was once said that the jury might find what damages they pleased. (l) But the law would not now relinquish its functions in this way; for, although quite as strongly disposed as ever that an agent should compensate his principal, or a servant his employer, for any wrong done, it would endeavor to measure the injury, and by the injury to measure the compensation, as carefully in this case as in any other. In accordance with this principle, it has been decided that where an agent is directed to sell goods if he can get a certain price, and not to sell for less, but does in fact sell for less, but without fraudulent purpose, the actual value of the goods sold, or the highest value before the action, or even before the trial, and not the price set upon them, must be considered in estimating the damages, (m) * If a factor, having

(l) Russell v Palmer, 2 Wilson, 32S.

(m) Blot v. Boiceau, 3 Comst. 78. overruling s. c. 1 Sandf. Ill; Austill v. Crawford, 7 Ala. 335; Ainsworth v Par-tillo, 13 Ala. 460. In Fruthingham v. Kverton, 12 N. H. 239, the plaintiffs, March 27th, 1837, received of the defendant a consignment of wool, with instructions not to sell it for less than twenty-four cents a pound. The price of wool fell soon after the consignment, and continued to decline until October 5th, 1837, when the plaintiffs, without previous notice to the defendants, sold the wool for fourteen cents per pound, which was then the fair market price, and as high as wool sold at any subsequent time before the suit was brought. An advance was made by the plaintiffs at the time of the consignment, and this action was brought to recover the difference between the amount of that and the proceeds of the wool. It was held, that the plaintiff could recover Parker, C. J., said: " The next question is, to what extent the plaintiffs are accountable to the defendant for this breach of his instructions. If to the amount of the price limited, which would be the result of treating them as purchasers at the price limited, it goes to the whole of the plaintiff's action. But upon what principle are they to be made accountable to that extent? The general principle is, that where one suffers by the negligence or breach of duty of another, the latter is answerable in damages for the amount of the injury. Had these goods been destroyed by the negligence of the plaintiffs, they would have been answerable for the value, and the damages could not have been extended beyond that, merely because the defendant had ordered them to sell at a certain price, and not for less. If, instead of a loss by negligence, the loss be by a disobedience of orders, without fraud, the result must be the same. Had the defendant brought his action against the plaintiffs for wrongfully selling below the limit, he would have been entitled to recover the damages sustained by the wrongful act. If the goods of the principal are negligently lost or tortiously disposed of by the agent, he is made liable for the actual value of the goods, at the time of the loss or conversion. Story on Agency, 215. And if, instead of bringing his action to recover this actual value, the consignor set up the breach of duty, in defence of an action by the factor for moneys advanced upon the goods, the measure of his right must be the same. It cannot be made advances on goods consigned to him for sale at a limited price, do afterwards, in good faith, and with reasonable delay and proper precautions, sell them for less than their limited price, but at a fair market price, he may recover the balance of his advances, if the consignor or principal refuse to pay them, on a proper application, and after a sufficient time, (n) Still, it may be true that if the sale were fraudulent on the part of the agent, then it might be said that the agent had, as it were, taken for his own use the goods of his principal, and must pay for them the price which he knows that the principal had set on them.