There are some general presumptions of law which may be considered as affecting the construction of contracts. Thus it payment, or on some day previous, the covenants to pay the instalments falling due before the day appointed for conveying by deed, are independent of the covenant to convey, and an action may be maintained for such instalments, without showing any conveyance or offer to convey; but the conveyance or offer to convey, is a condition precedent to the right to insist upon the payment of an instalment falling due either on or after the day of conveyance. Grant v. Johnson, 1 Seld. 247, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the same case, in 6 Barb. 387. In this case the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant a piece of land, and covenanted to give possession of the land on the first of November, 1846, and to convey by deed on the first of May, 1840. And the defendant covenanted to pay $960, as follows, namely: $200 on the first of April, 1846, $200 on the first of April, 1847, $276 on the first of April, 1848, and $276 on the first of April, 1840. The plaintiff gave the defendant possession of the premises, and the defendant paid the first instalment according to the terms of the agreement. The present action was brought to recover the second instalment; and the court held, that the conveyance by deed was a condition precedent to the payment of any instalment after the first; and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover without averring a performance or tender of performance of such condition. So in Bean v. Atwater, 4 Conn. 8, A and B, on the 6th of August, 1816, entered into articles of agreement, whereby A, in consideration of the covenants to be performed and payments to be made by B, granted and sold to B certain tracts of land, and covenanted to confirm them to him by deed in fee-simple on the first of June, 1817; and B covenanted to pay therefor the sum of 4,000 dollars, of which 600 dollars were to be paid immediately, 600 dollars on the first of January, 1817, 600 dollars on the first of June, 1817, 600 dollars on the first of January, 1818,

1,000 dollars on the first of January, 1810, and the residue on the first of January, 1820. For the performance of these stipulations the parties bound themselves respectively, in the penalty of 8,000 dollars. In an action brought by A against B for the money, it was heldt that the covenant of the defendant, so far as it related to the two first instalments, was independent, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum due thereon, without averring or proving performance of the covenant on his part; but that, so far as it related to the instalment payable on the first of June, 1817, and the subsequent instalments, performance by the plaintiff was a condition precedent to his right of recovery. And see to the same effect Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172; Kane v. Hood, 18 Pick. 281. But see Weaver v. Childress, 8 Stew. 361. - 2. " When a day is appointed for the payment of money, etc, and the day is to happen after the thing which is the consideration of the money, etc., is to be performed, no action can be maintained for the money, etc., before performance." Thorp v. Thorp, 12 Mod. 460, 1 Salk. 171; Bean v. Atwater, 4 Conn. 0; Dey v. Dox, 9 Wend. 129; Morris v. Silter, 1 Denio, 69; Rider v. Pond, 18 Barb. 179. - 3. "Where a covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both sides, and a breach of such covenant may be paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant, and an action may be maintained for a breach of the covenant on the part of the defendant, without averring performance in the declaration." The leading case upon this point is Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, note (a). The plaintiff, in that case, conveyed to the defendant the equity of redemption of a plantation in the West Indies, together with the stock of negroes upon it, in consideration of £600, and an annuity of £160 per annum for life; and covenanted that he had good title to the plantation, was lawfully possessed of the negroes, and that the defendant should quietly enjoy. The defendant covenanted, that the plainis a presumption of law that parties to a simple contract intended to bind not only themselves, but their personal tiff well and truly performing all and everything on his part to be performed, he, the defendant, would pay the annuity. The action was brought for the non-payment of the annuity. Plea, that the plaintiff was not at the time of making the deed legally possessed of the negroes, and so had not a good title to convey. General demurrer to the plea. Lord Mansfield: "The distinction is very clear, where mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other. But where they go only to a part, where a breach may be paid for in damages, there the defendant has a remedy on his covenant, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent If this plea be allowed, any one negro, not being the property of the plaintiff, would bar the action." Upon this case Serjeant Williams remarks as follows: "The whole consideration of the covenant on the part of B the purchaser to pay the money was the conveyance by A the seller to him of the amity of redemption of the plantation, and also the stock of negroes upon it. The excuse for non-payment of the money was, that A had broke his covenant as to part of the consideration, namely, the stock of negroes. But, as it appeared that A had conveyed the equity of redemption to B, and so had in part executed his covenant, it would be unreasonable that B should keep the plantation, and yet refuse payment, because A had not a good title to the negroes. Per Ashhurst, J., 6 T. R. 673. Besides, the damages sustained by the parties would be unequal, if A's covenant were held to be a condition precedent. Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, 1 H. Bl. 179. For A on the one side would lose the consideration-money of the sale, but B's damage on the other might consist perhaps in the loss only of a few negroes. So where it was agreed between C and D, that in consideration of £500 C should teach D the art of bleaching materials for making paper, and permit him, during the continuance of a patent which C had obtained for that purpose, to bleach such materials according to the specification; and C, in consideration of the sum of £260 paid, and on the further sum of £260 to be paid by D to him, covenanted that he would with all possible expedition teach D the method of bleaching such materials, and D covenanted that he would on or before the 24th of February,