Such a purchaser has the right to use the article as he pleases, or neglect to use it. But he cannot copy it and make another; not even if he loses the one he bought, by accident, as by fire. (b) He may certainly repair it; but to what extent? The answer must be, so long and so far as he only repairs it. (c) In ss this way, he may keep it in being and in * use long after it would, if unrepaired, become useless, or fall in pieces. We should say, that, if by honest repair, or replacement of parts worn out, he went on step by step, until every part of the original machine had gone, and all the parts and pieces of the existing machine were new, he might raise the metaphysical question whether the present machine were the same that he bought; but he would own the present machine, provided that every new part had been added as it was called for by way of repair, and only so. The line may be an obscure one, but it must be drawn somewhere; and only where the purchaser passed beyond it, and, under pretence of repair, made for himself a new machine, would he be in the wrong.

This question also has arisen. A party buys and sells the product of a patented machine, knowing that the maker from whom he purchases, infringes upon the patent of the patentee.

(aa) Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 00.

(b) Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 123.

(e) Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co. 22 How. 223; Bicknell v. Todd, 6 McLean, 288; Wilson v. Simpson, 0 How. 123. In this respect there is a marked difference between the rights conferred by a grant to make and use a machine, and those arising from a sale of the machine itself. In the former case, the purchaser buys a portion of the franchise, and is therefore not confined to the use of a particular machine, but may build another if the first is worn out or destroyed. Woodworth v. Curtis, 2 Wood. & M. 526; Wilson v. Stolley, 4 McLean, 227. In the latter case, he has purchased only the right to use the specific machine, and when that is destroyed his right is gone with it. But where a knitting machine and the needles used in it were covered by separate patents, it was held, that when the needles were worn out the purchaser had no right to manufacture others to replace them, although the needles were essential to the operation of the machine. Aikin v. Manchester Print Works, 2 Clif. 436.

1 See also Harlow v. Putnam, 124 Mast. 553.

Is he himself an infringer? The statute gives the patentee an exclusive right "to make, use, and vend the said invention." It is, however, held that this is limited to the machine itself, and does not extend to the product of the machine. (d) Hence one who knows that a patent for a machine is infringed, may buy of one who makes and uses the infringing machine, the products of that machine, and may use what he buys, or sell it to be used, without being himself an infringer. It is obvious that this might open the door to fraud. An irresponsible party might be set up as the actual maker and user of the machine, and so as the only infringer; while others, actually intended, only bought and sold what he made. But this would be an interest in the making and using of the infringing machine, which would undoubtedly make the party holding the interest himself an infringer. (e) When the * purchaser of a patented article buys it without tt restriction, the article or product is no longer under the protection of the statute; and he may use or sell it in another territory for which another person has taken an assignment of or a right under the same patent. (f) The statute provides that one who purchases an article of the inventor, or makes it with his consent before the inventor applies for a patent, may use, or sell to others to be used, the article so made, without liability therefor. (g) A license to use an invention only at the licensee's "own establishment" does not extend to one owned by himself and others. (gi)

(d) Boyd v. Brown, 8 McLean, 296; Boyd v. McAlpine, id 429; Simpson v. Wilson, 4 How. 711; Booth v. Garelly, 1 Blatchf. 260; Blanchard Gun Stock Turning Co. v. Jacobs, 2 Blatchf. 70.

(e) Thus, where A and B agreed with C to purchase of the latter all the lead pipe he should make, A and B to furnish the lead and to pay C a certain price for manufacturing, and C used a machine which infringed the plaintiff's patent, it was held, that "if the agreement was only colorable, and entered into for the purpose of securing the profits of the business without assuming the responsibility for the use of the invention, and for the purpose of throwing the responsibility upon C, who was insolvent, then they would be as responsible as he was. Tatham v. Le Roy, C. C. U. S. Dist of N. Y. Nelson, J., cited and approved in case on appeal. Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 161. See also Keplinger v. De Young, 10 Wheat. 864.

(f) See cases cited in note (d), supra. Also, Adams v. Burks, C. C. U. S. Shep-leyt J., Mass. Dist. 1871. Bloomer v. Mil-linger, 1 Wall. 367; Aikin v. Manchester Print Works, 2 Clif. 435; Chaffee v. Boston Belt Co. 22 How. 217. And the purchaser from a licensee may apply the article to any purpose he pleases, notwithstanding any agreements between the licensee and the patentee. See Metropolitan Wash. Mach. Co. v. Earle, 2 Fish.

(g) Act 1870, § 37. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 208. But a purchaser from a wrong-doer without the inventor's knowledge or consent, or one who has surreptitiously acquired and used the invention, has no right to use the invention after the patent has been obtained. Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 330; Pierson v. Eagle 8crew Co. 3 Story, 406; Hovey v. Stevens, 1 Wood. & M. 301. (gi) Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall

788.