A principal is affected by notice to his agent, respecting any matter distinctly within the scope of his agency, when the notice is given before the transaction begins, or before it is so far * completed as to render the notice nugatory. (m) * 75

(l) Willes v. Glover, 4 B. & P. 14; Ash-hurst, J., Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. R. 16; Franklin v. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497; National Exchange Co. v. Drew, 2 Macq. 103; Carpenter v. Amer. Ins. Co., 1 Story, 57. And it seems the purchaser, without rescinding the contract, may maintain case for deceit against the principal. Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. 58.

(//) Calais Co. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black, 372.

(lm) Green v. Gonzales, 2 Daly, 412.

(m) Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 451; Owens v. Roberts, 36 Wis. 258; Farmer v. Willard, 71 N. C. 284. And see Hinton v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 63 Ala. 488; Sooy v. State, 12 Vroom, 394; Houseman v. Girard Ass. 81 Penn.

St. 256; Day v. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mb. 290. Notice to one of several joint purchasers, whatever be the nature of the estate they take, is not in general notice to the rest, unless he who receives the notice be their agent; and where notice was given to a husband, at the time of taking a conveyance of lands to himself and wife, of a prior unregistered mortgage, it was held not to operate as notice to the wife, BO as to give the mortgage a preference in respect to her title; especially as she had paid the consideration for the conveyance out of her separate estate. Snyder v. Sponable, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 567; s. c. affirmed in error, 7 Hill, 427. It seems a principal is chargeable with notice of what is known ciples laid down in the cases cited above, and to be open to criticism. Since the agent had authority to answer such questions he was acting within the scope of his authority. What his motive was in committing a tort while exercising his authority or who benefited by the tort seem immaterial. See Bishop v. Balkis, Consolidated Company, 25 Q. B. D. 77, 84; City Nat. Bank v. Dun, 51 Fed. Rep. 160; Western etc. P. R. Co. v. Franklin Bank, 60 Md. 36; Reynolds v. White, 13 S. C. 5.

Instead of suing for the tort, one defrauded by the false and fraudulent representations of an agent may tender back what he has received by the bargain and rescind it. Marsh v. Buchan, 46 N. J. Eq. 595; McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82,

If the principal fraudulently conceals from the agent material facts in order that the latter may innocently make representations which the principal knows to be false, the principal is liable in deceit to one defrauded by such representations. Ludgater v. Love, 44 L. T. Rep. (n. s.) 694. And see Blackburn v. Haslam, 21 Q. B. D. 144.

A more difficult question arises where both parties are innocent of any fraud, but the agent makes representations in good faith which the principal could not have made without fraud. See ante pp. * 61, note (u), * 73, note (A).

The notice to the agent may be implied as well as express. Knowledge obtained by the agent in the course of that very transaction is notice;l and it has been said, that knowledge obtained in another transaction, but so short a time previous that the agent must be presumed to recollect it, is also notice affecting the principal; (n) but this is questionable. (o)2 This to a sub-agent, how many degrees soever removed, such sub-agent being appointed by his authority. See Boyd v. Vander-kemp, 1 Barb. Ch. 287. As to the time when notice may be given, see Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wms. 307; Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; More v. May hew, matter has been most discussed in cases where, in consequence of the employment of solicitors or counsel in the purchase of real estate, the question has arisen how far the clients are affected with notice of incumbrances, or defects of title, which, by a more or less strong presumption, must be taken to have come to the knowledge of their agents. Two propositions seem to be well settled: the first, that the notice to the solicitor, to bind the client, must be notice in the same transaction in which the client employs him, or at least, during the time of the solicitor's employment in that transaction; (p) the other, that

1 Chanc. Cas. 34; Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384.

(n) Lord Langdale, M. R., Hargreaves v. Rothwell, 1 Keen, 159. And see Mount-ford v. Scott, 3 Madd. 34.

(o) N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Co. 20 Barb. 468.

1 Knowledge of a managing tenant in common affects his co-tenants, Ward v. Warren, 82 N. Y. 265; and of an attorney of the intention of an insolvent to commit a fraud under the bankrupt law is imputable to his client, Rogers v. Palmer, 102 U. S. 263; but a wife is not affected by her husband's knowledge of incumbrances on land purchased by her, Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449. So a buyer's intention, known to a seller's agent, to evade a liquor law, affects the seller, Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; but contra, Stanley v. Chamberlin, 10 Vroom, 565, affirmed in 11 Vroom, 379, to the effect that a principal, without actual knowledge of the proposed illegal use of property, could disown the agent's act and recover for such use. See further, Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308; Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583; Farrington v. Woodward, 82 Penn. St. 259; Tagg v. Tennessee Bank, 9 Heiskell, 479. - K.

2 There is great conflict of authority as to whether the principal is chargeable with the knowledge of his agent acquired before the agency or while the agent is not acting as such. In the following cases he is held not to be: Mountford v. Scott, 3 Madd. 34; 1 Turn. & Russ. 274; Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. Jr. 114; Pepper v. George, 51 Ala. 190; Rentpn v. Monnier, 77 Cal. 449; Platt v. Birmingham Axle Co. 41 Conn. 255; Campbell v. Benjamin, 69 Ill. 244; Sooy v. State, 41 N. J. L. 394; Weisser v. Denison," 10 N. Y. 68; Houseman v. Girard, etc. Assoc. 81 Pa. 256; Barbour v. Wiehle, 116 Pa. 308; Wells v. American Express Co. 44 Wis. 342.