A principal is liable for the fraud or misconduct of his agent, so far, that, on the one hand, he cannot take any benefit from any misrepresentation fraudulently made by his agent, although the principal was ignorant and innocent of the fraud; (g) and on the other hand, if the party dealing with the agent suffer from such fraud, the principal is bound to make him compensation for the injury so sustained; (h) and this although the

(fh) Johnson v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182.

(q) Attorney-General v. Ansted, 12 M. & W. 520; Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. R. 12; Seaman v. Fouereau, 2 Stra. 1183; Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129. "I have no doubt that if an agent of a party, say of Mr. Attwood in this ease, without his knowledge, made a wilfully false representation to the British Iron Company, upon which representation they acted ' adhibentes fidem,' and on that confidence had formed a contract, - I have no hesitation whatever in saying, that against that contract, equity would relieve just as much as if there was the scienter of the principal proved; because it is not a question of criminal responsibility which is here raised by the facts. The agent could not commit the principal to any criminal purpose, if the principal did not know it, and had not either given him an authority or adopted his act when he did know it. But as to the civil effect of vitiating the contract made upon that false representation, I have no doubt whatever that it would vacate it jus) as much, with the ignorance of the principal, as if he were charged with knowing it, and as if the agent had been an agent for this purpose." Lord Brougham in Attwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & F. 448. ' See also Taylor v. Green, 8 C. & P. 316; Olmsted v. Hot-ailing, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 317; Veazie v, Williams. 8 How. 134, s. c. 3 Story, 611; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79.

(h) Holt, C. J., in Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289, and Ellenborough, C. J., in Crockford v. Winter, 1 Camp. 124, lay down the broad doctrine that a principal is answerable civiliter, though not cnmi-naliter, for the fraud of his agent. Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend, 518, illustrates the general doctrine. There the defendants had been in partnership with one power of substitution, revokes the authority of a substitute. Lehigh Coal Co. v. Mohr, 83 Pa. 228. See Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee, 9 Heisk. 296. Put in case of the agent's death, as in case of the principal's, if the power was coupled with an interest it will survive and pass to the agent's representatives. Lewis v. Wells, 50 Ala. 198; Merlin v. Lewis, 90 Ill. 505; Harnickell v. Orndorff, 35 Md. 341. Insanity of the agent likewise terminates an agency. Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206; Salisbury v. Kris-bane, 61 N. Y. 617. Or his bankruptcy. Hudson v. Granger, 5 B. & Ald. 27; Audenried v. Betteley, 8 Allen, 302. Or severance of the interest of two joint principals. Howe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206. War between the Slate where the principal is domiciled and that where the agent is domiciled terminates an agency. Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425; Howell v. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302; Blackwell v. Willard, 65 N. C. 555. See contra, Sands v. New York Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626; Darling v. Lewis, 11 Heisk. 125. See also Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614.

principal be innocent, (i) provided the agent acted in the matter as his agent, and distinctly within the line of the business intrusted to him. (k) And though there be no actual fraud on the part of the agent, yet if he makes a false representation as to matter peculiarly within his own knowledge, or that of his principal, and thereby gets a better bargain for his principal, such principal, although innocent, cannot take the benefit of the transaction.1 But the third party may rescind the contract, and

Hunt, for speculation in sheep, they contributing funds, and he time and services. Hunt purchased some sheep diseased with the scab, knowing the fact, and mixed them with a larger number belonging to the partnership. Subsequently Hunt assigned his interest to defendants, who employed S. to sell the sheep. The flock was purchased from S. by the plaintiff, and mixed with the sheep he before owned. The scab broke out among them and destroyed many sheep, of his old stock as well as of those purchased from S.; and considerable expense was incurred in the attempt to arrest the disease. S. was aware of the infected condition of the flock, but no actual knowledge was proved upon the defendants. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his action, and could recover damages for the loss both of the sheep purchased and of the other sheep receiving the infection, and all other damages necessarily and naturally flowing from the act of the defendants' agent. Semble, the liability of the defendants would have been the same if S. had been ignorant of the state of the flock; the knowledge of Hunt when he bought the diseased sheep being constructively the knowledge of his partners, and his assignment of his interests to the defendants, before the sale to the plaintiff, making no difference, as to their responsibility. See also Johnston v. Southwestern Railroad Bank, 3 Strob. Eq. 263; Mitchell v. Mims, 8 Tex. 6; Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172; Sweetland v. Ill. etc. Tel. Co. 27 Ia. 433; Fawcett v. Bigley, 59 Pa. 411.

(i) Irving v. Motley, 7 Bing. 543; Doe v. Martin, 4 T. R. 39, 66; Edwards v. Footner, 1 Camp. 530. Where an attorney's clerk had simulated the court seal upon a writ, by taking an impression from the seal upon another writ, the writ and all proceedings thereon were set aside, and the attorney, although personally blameless, was compelled to pay the costs. Dunkley v. Farris, 11 C. B. 457, 285; Hunter v. Hudson River, etc. Co., 20 Barb. 493.

(k) Peto v. Hague, 5 Esp. 135; Huck-man v. Fernie, 3 M. & W. 505. - In Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 392, Bay-ley, B., said: " What is said by a servant is not evidence against the master, unless he has some authority given him to make the representation." It is not meant, as the case shows, that there must be an express authority to make that particular representation; but the authority may be implied as incident to a general authority. Sharp v. New York, 40 Barb. 256.

1 A principal is liable for the false and fraudulent representations of his agent made in the course of the agent's performance of his agency, as he is for other torts of his agent under similar circumstances, by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Borwick v. English Joint Stock Banking Co. L. R. 2 Ex. 259; MacKay v. Commercial Bank, L. R. 5 P. C. 394; Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 486; City Nat. Bank v. Dun, 51 Fed. Rep. 160; Wolfe v. Pugh, 101 Ind. 293; Rhoda v. Annis, 75 Me. 17; Lamm v. Port Deposit, etc. Assoc. 49 Md. 233; Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353. See also Jewett v. Carter, 132 Mass. 335; Eilenberger v. Protective Mutual Ins. Co. 89 Pa. 464; Tagg v. Tennessee Nat. Bank, 9 Heisk. 479; Law v. Grant, 37 Wis. 548. A contrary decision is Kennedy v McKay, 43 N. J. L. 288. And see Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238.

In British Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood, etc. Ry. Co. 18 Q. B. D. 714, the secretary of the defendant company answered questions which were put to him as secretary, as to the validity of certain debenture stock. He was held out by the defendants as the proper person to answer such questions. The answers he gave were false and fraudulently made for his own benefit. The defendants did not benefit by his false statements. It was held by the Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division) that the defendants were not liable because the secretary was acting for his own benefit This decision seems to be at variance with the prinrecover back any money he may have paid the principal, by reason of his confidence in such misrepresentation.(I) And it has been held, that if an agent, permitted by his principal to hold himself out as owner of land, sells it for the agent's own interest, the sale binds the principal. (//) The declarations of an agent are not admitted as evidence against his principal, unless they are a part of the res gestae. (lm)