In general, if any part of the entire consideration for a promise, or any part of an entire promise, be illegal, whether by statute or at common law, the whole contract is void. (p) Indeed the courts go far in refusing to found any rights upon wrong-doing. Thus, no action can be maintained for property held for an illegal purpose, as for making counterfeit coin. (q)

No contract to violate a law of a State, - as, for example, to sell liquors contrary to a statute, - can be enforced within that State. (r) There must, however, be an illegal intent of some s. c. 2 Nev. & P. 224. Here the declaration stated that the defendant wished the plaintiff to hire of her a house, and furniture for the same, at the rent of, etc, and thereupon, in consideration that the plaintiff would take possession of the said house partly furnished, and would, if complete furniture were sent into the said house by the defendant in a reasonable time, become tenant to the defendant of the said house, with all the said furniture, at the aforesaid rent, and pay the same quarterly from a certain day, namely, etc, the defendant promised the plaintiff to send into the said house, within a reasonable time after the plaintiff's taking possession, all the furniture necessary, etc. Held, that the defendant's agreement to send in furniture was an inseparable part of a contract for an interest in lands, and therefore came within Stat. 29 Car. II., which, in such case, requires the agreement, or a memorandum thereof, to be in writing. See also Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. It. 203; Lord Lexington v. Clarke, 2 Vent. 223; Thomas 1?. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664; Wood v. Benson, 2 Tyr. 93; May field v. Wadsley, 2 B. & C. 357; Foquet v. Moore, 16 E. L. & E. 466; S. C. 7 Exch. 870; Irvine v. Stone, 6 Cush. 508; Noyes's Ex'r v. Humphreys, 11 Gratt. 636; Collins v. Merrell, 2 Met. (Ky.) 163.

(0) Irvine v. Stone, 6 Cush. 508; Wood v. Benson, 2 Tyr. 93; Band v. Mather, 11 Cush. 1.

(p) Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347; Benyon v. Nettlefold, 2 E. L. & E. 113; Donallen v. Lennox, 6 Dana, 91; Brown v. Langford, 3 Bibb, 500; Hinesburg v. Sumner, 9 Vt. 23; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Woodruff v. Hinman, 11 Vt. 592; Buck v. Albee, 26 Vt. 184; Deering v. Chapman,22 Me. 488; Filson v. Himes,

5 Barr, 452; Dedham Bank v. Chickering, 4 Pick. 314; Perkins v. Cummings, 2 Gray, 258; Coulter v. Robertson, 14 Sm.

& M. 18; Gamble v. Grimes, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 392; Carleton v. Bailey, 7 Foster, (N. H), 230; Hoover v. Pierce, 27 Miss. 13. See also Howden v. Simpson, 10 A. & E. 815; Hall v. Dyson, 10 E. L. & E. 424; 8. C. 17 Q. B. 785; Sherman v. Barnard, 19 Barb, 291; Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431.

(q) Discs of German silver were seized on their way to a place in which the appearance of Mexican silver dollars was to have been given them, and no action could be maintained for their recovery. Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. l. See also Bloss v. Bloomer, 23 Barb. 604, where a promise to make and sell forged trade-marks was held void, and Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall 342.

(r) Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184. See also Wooton v. Miller. 7 Sm. & M. 380. See, however, as qualifying the rule, when the contract is not made within that State, McConihe v. McMann, 1 Williams, 95; Backman v. Wright, id. 187; Smith v. Godfrey, 8 Foster, (N. H.), 379; kind; mere knowledge that an illegal use may, or even will, be made of the thing, seems not to be enough. (s) A distinction must be taken between the cases in which the consideration is illegal in part, and those in which the promise founded on the consideration is illegal in part. If any part of a consideration is illegal, the whole consideration is void; because public policy will not permit a party to enforce a promise which he has obtained by an illegal act or an illegal promise, although he may have connected with this act or promise another which is legal. But if one gives a good and valid consideration, and thereupon another promises to do two things, one legal and the other illegal, he shall be held to do that which is legal, (u)1 unless the two are so mingled and bound together that they cannot be separated; in which case the whole promise is void.

A distinction has been taken between the partial illegality of a consideration when against a statute, and when against common law. There are cases which sustain this distinction, (v) but we think it rests upon no sound principle; and it has been held, on good grounds, that the violation of a merely local or municipal law, avoids a contract as effectually as if the law were of universal application. (w) A statute has no more power in avoiding a contract partially opposed to it than the common law, (x) unless it contain an express provision that all * such agree- ments shall be wholly void,(y) and then the contract is entirely void; as for example, a promissory note even in the hands of an innocent indorsee. (z) But, while the law is sufficiently distinct where the whole consideration or the whole promise is illegal, questions still remain, where the illegality is but partial, which can only be determined by further adjudication. Where the consideration is altogether illegal, it is insufficient to sustain a promise, and the agreement is wholly void. This is so equally, whether the law which is violated be statute law or common law. It has been held in England, (a) that where a statute provided a penalty for an act, without prohibiting the act in express terms, there the penalty was the only legal consequence of a violation of the law, and a contract which implied or required such violation was nevertheless valid. But Lord Holt (b) denied the doctrine; and Sir James Mansfield established a better rule of law,(c) holding that where a statute provides a penalty for an act, this is a prohibition of the act. We apprehend that this has always been the prevailing, if not the uncontradicted rule of law on this subject in this country. (d) This rule is said not to

Sortwell v. Hughes, 1 Curtis, C. C. 244; Read v. Taft, 3 R. I. 175. See also Ken-uett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, as to illegal contracts.

(s) Kreiss v. Seligman, 8 Barb. 439; Kerwin v. Doran, 29 Mo. App. 397; Dela-vina v. Hill, 65 N. H. 94.

(u) Thus, in the Bishop of Chester v. John Freland, Ley, 79, Mutton, J., lays down the rule that when a good thing and a void thing are put together in the same grant, the common law makes such construction that the grant shall be good for that which is good and void for that which is void. This principle is also distinctly recognized in Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, 236. See also Norton v. Simmes, Hob. 14. And in the case of Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 Comst. 37, Bronson, J., said: "It is undoubtedly true that where a deed or other contract contains distinct undertakings, some of which are legal and some illegal, the former will be in certain cases upheld, though the latter are void." And the principle was fully recognized in Bank of Australasia v. Bank of Australia, 6 E. F. Moore, 152. See also Chase's Ex'r v. Burkholder, 18 Penn. St. 50.

(v) Norton v. Simmes, Hob. 14; Ma-leverer v. Redshaw, 1 Mod. 35. Twisden, J.; Com. Dig. Covenant (F.); Bac. Abr. Conditions (K.); Hacket v. Tilly, 11 Mod. 93; Butler v. Wigge, 1 Wms. Saund. 66 a, n. (1); 1 Pow. on Cont. 199; Lee v. Coleshill, Cro. E. 529; Pearson v. Humes, Carter, 230; Mosdell v. Middleton, 1 Vent. 237; Van Dyck v. Van Beuren, 1 Johns. 362.

(w) Beman v. Tugnot, 5 Sandf. 153: Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 80.

1 As if two classes of items, one legal and the other illegal, are embraced in the same account, recovery may be had upon the lawful items. Goodwin v. Clark, 65 Me. 280. But where shares of stock were surrendered for new shares, a part of which were to be used in bribing certain persons and the rest returned to the person surrendering, the agreement to return the remainder was held void, as well as the portion relating to bribery. Tobey v. Robinson, 99 Ill. 222. So where a note was given for vags of fertilizer, some of which were not branded as required by law, it was held that the contract was entire and the whole promise failed. Allen" v. Pearce, 84 Ga. 606.

(x) The merit of exploding this venerable error of supposing a distinction between contracts void by statute and contracts void by common law, belongs to the Hon. Theron Metcalf, of Massachusetts, who, with his well-known acuteness and accuracy, has pointed out the origin of the error, and shown its fallacy. 23 Am. Jur. 2. And it may now be considered as fully established that, although a contract contain some provisions or promises which are void by statute, yet, if it also embrace other agreements which would be valid, if standing alone, they may still be enforced. See Monys v. Leake, 8 T. R. 411; Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, 231; Doe v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 359; Greenwood v. Bishop of Loudon, 5 Taunt. 727; Newman v. Newman, 4 M. & Sel. 66; Wigg v. Shuttleworth, 13 East, 87; Gas-kell v. King, 11 East, 165; Howe. Synge, 15 id. 440; Tinckler v. Prentice, 4 Taunt. 549; Fuller v. Abbott, 4 id. 105; Shackell v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 646; Jones v. Waite, 5 id. 841. The case of Jarvis v. Peck, 1 Hoff. Ch. 479; s. c. 10 Paige, Ch. 119, so far as it may be considered as having recognized any distinction of this kind, is not in our opinion sound law.

(y) Thus, where the statute declares a certain contract to be " void to all intents and purposes whatever," it has been held, that if such a contract also contain stipulations not within the intent of the statute, the latter will be considered void by force of the statute. See Crosley v. Arkwright, 2 T. R. 603; Dann v. Dollman, 5 id. 641. (z) Bridge v. Hubbard, 15 Mass. 96; Hay v. Ayling, 3 El. & E. 416, n.; s. c. 16 Q. B. 423.

(a) Comyns v. Boyer, Cro. E. 485; and see Gremare v. Le Clerk Bois Valon, 2 Camp. 144.

(b) Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 252; s. c. Skin. 322. Holt, C. J., here said: " Every contract made for or about any matter or tiling which is prohibited or made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute itself does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty on the offender, because a penalty implies a prohibition, though there are no prohibitory words in the statute."

(c) Drury v. Defontaine, l Taunt 186.

(d) This principle is sustained by numerous adjudged eases. Wheeler v. Rus-sell, 17 Mass. 258; Coombs v. Emery, 14 Me. 404; Springfield Hank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322; Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass. 39; Seidenbender v. Charles, 4 s. & R. 159; Mitchell v. Smith. 1 Binn. L18; Sharp v. Teese, 4 Halst. 352; De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Binn. 107; s. c. 3 M. & Scott, 516; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. & W.

apply, however, where the * penalty is for some other purpose than to make the act illegal, as to raise a revenue, etc. We think this distinction very difficult. (e)