By the common law, one who has no title to a chattel can give no title, except by a sale in market overt, which is not known ley v. Watling, 7 A. & E. 39, 2 Nev. & P. 178; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 268; Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. 157; Ry-berg v. Snell, 2 Wash. C. C. 294. In Renteria v. Ruding, 1 Mo. & M. 511, Lord Tenterden said that a bill of lading, in which the word " assigns " did not appear, was nevertheless " an indorsable instrument," and assignable by such indorsement.

(c) Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 403; Howard v. Shepherd, 9 C. B. 297; Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310; Line-ker v. Ayeshford, 1 Cal. 75. See also in this country. An exception exists in the case of negotiable notes made payable to bearer, or payable to order and indorsed in blank, so as to be transferable by delivery.(g) We consider that this exception extends to all negotiable instruments which are transferable by mere delivery by any party holding them; and that by delivery thereof, a good title passes "to any person honestly acquiring them;" (h) because the property passes with the possession. Only, as has been said, when suspicion is cast upon his ownership, as by showing that the paper got into circulation by force or fraud, need he account for it, even by showing that he had paid a good consideration for it. (i) It becomes, then, important to determine what are negotiable instruments. If, for example, the bond of a railroad * company, payable to bearer, is a negotiable instrument, then a purchaser in good faith holds it not only free from the equitable defences which the company might have made against the first holder, but also against the claims of an owner who may have lost it, or from whom it was stolen. We regard both the English and American authorities as making all instruments negotiable which are payable to bearer, and also those which are by custom transferable by delivery, within which definition the common bonds of railroad companies would fall. Of the coupons attached, which have no seal, this would seem to be the rule. But usage must have great influence in determining this question. Our note will show the state of the authorities on this subject. (j)1

Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 314; Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. 474; Tindal v. Taylor, 4 E. & B. 219.

(d) See Jenkyns v. Usborne, 13 Law J. (n. s.) C. P. 196; Brandt v. Bowlby, 2 B. & Ad. 932.

(e) Stone v. Swift, 4 Pick. 389. But see Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. 283.

(f') Buffington v. Curtis, 15 Mass. 528; Allen v. Williams, 12 Pick. 297.

(ff) Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382. See also Gaston v. Am. Exchange Bank, 2 Stewart, 98.

1 Unlike the case of a negotiable instrument, one who has not title to a bill of lading, as a thief or finder, cannot transfer any right to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, even though the bill of lading was indorsed in blank. Gurney v. Behrend, 3 E. & B. 622, 633; Pease v. Gloahec, L. R. 1 P. C. 219, 228; Shaw v. Railroad Co. 101 U. S. 557; Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. 130 U. S. 416, 423; Tison v. Howard, 57 Ga. 410; Stollenwerck v. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224; Dows v. Perrin, 16 N. Y. 325; Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 462.

2 A warehouse receipt is negotiable only to the same extent and for the same purposes as a bill of lading or carrier's receipt; its indorsement or delivery does not transfer the contract itself, but only the property represented by it, and becomes mere evidence of title. Hale v. Milwaukee Dock Co , 29 Wis. 482. - K.

(g) Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452.

(ft) So said by Abbott, C. J., in Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. &. C. 45. In Clark v. Shee, Cowper 197, Lord Mansfield puts notes and money on precisely the same footing. "When," says he. "money or notes are paid bond fide, and upon a valuable consideration, they never shall be brought back by the true owner; but where they come mala fide into a person's hands, they are in the nature of specific property; and if their identity can be traced and ascertained, the party has a right to recover. See also James v. Chalmers, 2 Seld. 209; Seeley v. Engell, 17 Barb. 530; Lemon v. Temple, 7 Ind. 556; Shelton v. Sherfey, 3 Greene (Ia.),

108; Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Gratt. 477. But he must be a lawful holder, and is not if he took it usuriously from an agent. He cannot retain it against an insolvent principal. Keutgen v. Parks, 2 Sandf. 60.

(i) Berry v. Alderman. 24 E. L. & E. 318; s. c. 14 C. B. 95; Fitch v. Jones, 32 E. L. & E. 134; s. c 5 E. & B. 238. McKesson v. Stanberry, 3 Ohio (N S ), 156; Catlin v. Hansen, 1 Duer, 309; McCaskill v. Ballard, 8 Rich. I.. 470; Perrin v. Noyes, 39 Mr 384; Bissell v. Morgan, 11 Cush. 198. See p. ante.

(j) See Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45, and compare it with Glyn v. Baker, 13 East, 509. See also Wookey v. Pole,

1 The scrip of a foreign government, issued by it on negotiating a loan, and for which a bond is to be given after all instalments have been duly paid, is, by the custom of all the stock-markets of Europe, a negotiable instrument, and passes by mere delivery to a bond fide holder for value. English law follows this custom Goodwin v Robarts, l App. < 'as. 476 - Boyd v. Kennedy, 9 Vroom, 146, decided that corporation coupon bonds lawfully issued, containing words of negotiability, are negotiable like commercial paper. To the same effect are Vermilye v Adams Ex. Co., 21 Wall. 138; Marion Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278; Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S.

If the owner of a note or bill not negotiable, or if tiable and indorsed in blank, or if it be payable to bearer, then the promisor or indorser may be held liable to an innocent holder for consideration. It follows, therefore, that the promisor or indorser should not be liable to the loser without sufficient indemnity to him against the possible demand of such innocent purchaser. (l) But courts of law find it difficult to require such indemnity, or to judge of its sufficiency; and therefore, generally at least, they turn the loser over to courts of equity, in which the defendant may be properly secured by adequate indemnity; and there the action will be maintained. (m) Hence if a note or bill, transferable by delivery, be lost to the owner at the time of its maturity, this loss is, in general, a defence against a suit at law. (n) But in some of our States, statutes permit recovery (o) if the plaintiff gives indemnity, and in others, the courts so direct. (p) But, if it is physically destroyed, it may be recovered at law, - where, if only lost, courts would have denied relief. (q) negotiable * specially indorsed to him, lose it, he may, on sufficient proof of its tenor and of his loss, sustain an action at law, because no finder can give good title to any holder by a bond fide sale of such paper to him. (k) But if the paper be nego4 B. & Ald. 1; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516, where a draft by a merchant on his banker was held negotiable. This case distinctly confirms the case of Miller v. Race. In Jackson v. Y. & C. R. R. Co. 48 Me. 147, it was held that unless there was some statutory provision to that effect an action could not be maintained upon interest coupons, not containing negotiable words by an assignee. Goodenow, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, citing and supporting the text above. Since that time the same question has been passed upon by the Supreme Courts of the United States and of Pennsylvania, both of which fully sustain the negotiability of such instruments. Knox Co. Com. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Beaver Co. v. Armstrong, 44 Penn. St. 63. See also Redfield on Railways, 595, § 239, and 2 Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 748. See Lick barrow v. Mason, 5 T. R. 683, respecting bills of lading, before cited. Zwinger v. Samuda, 7 Taunt. 265; Lucas v. Dor-rien, 7 Taunt. 278; Lang v. Smith, 7 Bing. 284; in which case it was held that certain bordereaux and coupons, entitling the bearer to certain portions of the public debt of Naples, were not negotiable, the jury finding that they did not usually pass from hand to hand like money. Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. & Ad. 321, and Taylor v. Trueman, 1 Mo. & M. 453, were decided on the construction of Stat. 6 Geo. IV. c. 94. But an instrument for the payment of money under seal is not negotiable, although it appear to be so upon its face; at least where any writing is necessary in order to transfer it. Clark v. Farmers' Man Co. 15 Wend. 256; Parke, Baron, in Hibblewhite v. McMor-ine, 6 M. & W. 200. In Fisher v. The Morris Canal and Banking Company, decided in the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1855, it was held that railroad bonds are negotiable, and this case was fully concurred in by the Court of Appeals. Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 159, is generally regarded as having settled the same point in New York, in reference to State bonds. But the Court of Appeals in the Schuyler case, held that certificates of stock in a corporation are not negotiable; or at least, that he who takes an assignment of a certificate, without any transfer in the corporation's books, acquires only the title of assignor. Mechanics Bank v. New York and New Haven Railroad Co., 3 Kern. 599. So in Ide v. Conn. & Pass. Riv. R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 297, it was held that a railway bond payable to bearer is a negotiable instrument and may be declared upon and described in an action of assumpsit as a " bond." The result would seem to be that all corporation bonds and government stocks which pass by delivery or indorsement with delivery are negotiable, but that certificates of stocks in a corporation are not. See Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. (8 Smith) 114.