(s) Thus, where, A being insolvent, a verbal agreement was entered into between several of his creditors and B, whereby B agreed to pay the creditors 10s. in the pound in satisfaction of their debts, which they agreed to accept, and to assign their debts to B, - it wan held, that this agreement was not within the statute of frauds, not being a collateral promise to pay the debt of another, but an original contract to purchase the debts. Anstey v. Marden, 4 B. & P. 124.

(t) This rule is very clearly stated and fully illustrated by Shaw, C. J., in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met. 396. He there says: "The terms original and collateral promise, though not used in the statute, are convenient enough to distinguish between the cases, where the direct and leading object of the promise is, to become the surety or guarantor of another's debt, and those where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of another, yet the leading object of the undertaker is* to subserve or promote some interest or purpose of his own. The former, whether made before or after, or at the same time with the promise of the principal, is not valid, unless manifested by evidence in writing; the latter, if made on good consideration, is unaffected by the statute, because, although the effect of it is to release or suspend the debt of another, yet that is not the leading object on the part of the promisor." And see Alger v. Scoville, 1 Gray, 391; Dyer v. Gibson, 16 Wis. 557; Mountstephen v. Lakeman, L. R. 5 Q. B. 613; 7Q. B. 196; 7 H. L. 24; Ames v. Foster, 106 Mass. 400; Wills v. Brown, 118 Mass. 137. See Brightman v. Hicks, 108 Mass. 246; Stewart v. Campbell, 58 Me. 439; Cowdin v. Gottgetreu, 55 N. Y. 650; Eshleman v. Harnish, 76 Pa. 97; Moshier v. Kitchell, 87 111. 18; Pettit v. Braden, 55 Ind. 201; Bloom v. Mc-Grath, 53 Miss. 249; Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 452.

(u) The leading case upon this point is Williams v. Leper, .3 Burr. 1886. There one Taylor, a tenant to the plaintiff, being in arrear for rent, and insolvent, conveyed all his effects for the benefit of his creditors. They employed the defendant, as a broker, to sell the effects; and accordingly he advertised a sale. On the morning of the sale, the plaintiff came to distrain the goods in the house; whereupon the defendant promised to pay the arrear of rent if he would desist from distraining; and he did thereupon desist. Upon these facts the court held, that the defendant's promise was not within the statute. To the same effect is Houlditch v. Milne, 3 Esp. 86. There the plaintiff had in his possession certain carriages belonging to one Copey, upon which he had a lien for repairs. The defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would relinquish his lien, and give up the carriages to him, promised to pay the plaintiff the amount due him. And Lord Eldon held the case to be out of the statute, on the principle established by Williams v. Leper. And see further Bar-rell v Trussell, 4 Taunt. 117; Slinger-land v. Morse, 7 Johns. 463; Hindman v. Langford, 3 Strobh 207; Blount v. Hawkins, 19 Ala. 100; Allen v Thompson, 10 N. H. 32, cited ante, vol. ii. p * 9, note (t); Randle v. Harris, 6 Yerg. 508, cited ante, vol. ii. p. *10, note (v). Borchse-nius v. Canutson, 100 111. 82; Power v. Rankin, 114 111 52: Parker v. Dillingham, 129 Ind. 542; Wooten v. Wilcox, 87 Ga. 474; Fears v. Story, 134 Mass. 47; Prime v Koehler, 77 N. Y. 91; Weisel v. Spence, 59 Wis. 301.

(v) Thus, in Johnson v. Gilbert, 4.Hill, 178, the defendant being indebted to one Sherwood in the sum of twenty-five dollars, the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, paid that debt, in consideration whereof the defendant transferred to the plaintiff the note of one Eastman, payable to himself. The defendant also indorsed upon the note a guaranty that it would be paid; and upon this guaranty, the action from A to B, is not within the statute, (w) Nor a promise to pay over as directed money remitted or collected, and belonging to the party directing, (x) But a parol promise to accept an order from a debtor in favor of his creditor, there being no privity between the creditor and the promisor, is within the statute, (xx) A request to one to work for the benefit of another, and a promise to pay, form an original and not a collateral promise, (xy)

1 Thus a written guaranty, not stating a consideration, as required by the Wisconsin statute, placed upon the note of a third person by the defendant, which note was in this form given to pay the latter's debt to the plaintiff, is a promise by the debtor to pay his own debt in a particular manner, and not within the statute of frauds. Eagle, etc Co. v. Shattuck, 53 Wis. 455. A verbal acceptance of an order is valid and enforceable only where the drawee has funds of the drawer in his hands, so that by payment of the order he satisfies his own debt. Walton v. Mandeville, 56 la. 597. See also Darst v. Bates, 95 111. 493. If the holder of a promissory note sells it for a valuable consideration, promising, orally, that the note is good and will be paid at maturity, the promise was held not to be within the statute, in Milks v. Rich, 80 N. Y. 269. - E.

So where one, being interested in the property of another, enters into a written contract with a builder, for a valuable consideration, to finish certain work upon that property, by a specified time, there being at the same time a subsisting contract between the builder and owner of the property for doing the game work for a price to be paid by the owner, the last contract will not be regarded as a special promise for the debt of another. And if the builder, having failed to perform his latter agreement by the time specified, offers to prove an oral waiver of the time, and variation of the terms, he will not be prevented on the ground of the statute of frauds, (y)1

If a mechanic, employed by a contractor is about to quit work from fear that he will not be paid, and the owner asks him to go was brought. It was held, that the case was not within the statute of frauds. Bronson, J , said: "The statute of frauds has nothing to do with the case. That only applies where the person making the promise stands in the relation of a surety or some third person, who is the principal debtor. This was not an undertaking by the defendant to pay the debt of Eastman, but it was an agreement to pay his own debt in a particular way. The plaintiff had, upon request, paid a debt of twenty-five dollars which the defendant owed to Sherwood, and had thus made himself a creditor of the defendant to that amount If the matter had not been otherwise arranged, the plaintiff might have sued the defendant, and recovered as for so much money paid for him on request But the plaintiff agreed to accept payment in a different way, to wit, by the transfer of Eastman's note for the woodwork of a wagon, with the defendant's undertaking that the note should be paid. The defendant, instead of promising that he would pay himself, agreed that Eastman should pay. He might do that, whether Eastman was his debtor or not; and the fact that Eastman was a debtor, does not change the character of the defendant's undertaking, and make it a case of suretyship within the statute of frauds/' The same point was decided by the New York Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Cur-tiss, 2 Comst. 225; and Durham v. Man-row, id. 533. It is to be observed, also, that cases of this description are out of the statute, upon the principle established by Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438; and Hargreaves v. Parsons, 13 M. & W. 561. See supra, note (p).