C. J, said: "How can that be said to be a contract, or memorandum of a contract, which does not state who are the contracting parties? By this note it does not at all appear to whom the goods were sold. It would prove a sale to any other person as well as to the plaintiff; there cannot be a contract without two parties, and it is customary in the course of business to state the name of the purchaser as well as of the seller in every bill of parcels. This note does not appear to me to amount to any memorandum in writing of a bargain." And see, to the same effect, Wheeler v. Collier, Moody & M. 123; Jacob v. Kirk, 2 Moody & R. 221; Sherburne v. Shaw, 1 N. H. 157; Webster v. Ela. 5 N. H. 540; Nichols v Johnson, 10 Conn. 192. - It must contain a full and complete description of the subject-matter of the contract. Kay v. Curd, 6 B. Mon. 100. In Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192, "B's right in C's estate " was held a sufficient description. And see the cases cited in the beginning of this note. - If a price has been agreed upon, that must be stated in the memorandum. Elmore v. Kingscote, 5 B. & C. 583; Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376; Blagden v. Bradbear, 12 Ves. 466; Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414; Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685; Adams v. M'Millan, 7 Port. 73; Waul v. Kirk-man, 27 Miss. 823. But where a contract is entered into without any agreement as to price, the memorandum is sufficient, without any specification of price. Hoadly v. M'Laine, 10 Bing. 482. So an order for goods " on moderate terms," is a sufficient memorandum within the statute of frauds. Ashcroft v. Morrin, 4 Man. & G. 450.

1 Godwin v. Francis, L. R. 5 C. P. 295. A telegram to " come on at once, at salary of two thousand, conditional only upon satisfactory discharge of business," constitutes an insufficient memorandum within the statute, as it neither fixes the time nor names employment. Palmer v. Marquette, etc. Mill Co. 32 Mich. 274.

2 It must contain the final terms of the contract as agreed. Oakman v. Rogers, 120 Mass. 214; Winn v. Bull,7 Ch. D. 29; Rossiter v. Miller, L. R. 3 H. L. 1124. The memorandum must also contain all the material terms of the contract, Gardner v. Hazel-ton, 121 Mass. 494; Gwathney v. Cason, 74 N. C. 5; Linn Boyd Co. v. Terrill, 13 the parties rely.(w) But much question has been made whether the consideration is, in this respect, an essential part of the agreement (x) By the early decisions of the English courts, since abundantly confirmed, it was settled in that country that the consideration must be expressed. (y) Or, in other words, that * an agreement in writing, signed by the parties, did not satisfy the requirements of the statute, if it set forth all

(w) Salmon Falls M. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446; Farwell v. Mather, 10 Allen, 322; Clark v. Chamberlin, 112 Mass. 19; Johnson v. Buck, 6 Vroom, 338; Ridg-way v. Ingram, 50 Ind. 145. See ante, p. * 4, n.

(x) Ex parte Minet, 14 Yes. 189; Ex parte Gardom, 15 id. 286; Morris v. Sta-cey, Holt, N. P. 153.

(y) Wain v. Warlters, 5 East, 10. In this case the defendant was sought to be charged upon the following undertaking: Messrs. Wain & Co., I will engage to pay you by halfpast four this day, fifty-six pounds and expenses on bill that amount on Hall. (Signed) Jno. Warlters." It was objected by the defendant, that though the promise, which was to pay the debt of another, was in writing, as required by the statute of frauds, yet that it did not express the consideration of the defendant's promise, which was also required by the statute to be in writing; and that this omission could not be supplied by parol evidence; and that for want of such consideration appearing upon the face of the written memorandum, it stood simply as an engagement to pay the debt of another without any consideration, and was therefore nudum pactum and void. And the court were of this opinion. Lord Ellenborough said • " In all cases where by long habitual construc-tion the words of a statute have not received a peculiar interpretation, such as they will allow of, I am always inclined to give to them their natural ordinary signification. The clause in question in the statute of frauds has the word agreement. And the question is, whether that word is to be understood in the loose, incorrect sense, in which it may sometimes be used, as synonymous to promise or undertaking, or in its more proper and correct sense, as signifying a mutual contract on consideration between two or more parties 1 The latter appears to me to be the legal construction of the word, the promises of the parties, but did not state the consideration for them. In this country, it was doubted whether the consideration was in fact an essential part of the agreement; and in some States the judicial decisions have not only denied this, but the statutes have expressly declared the statement of the consideration unnecessary, (z) And if an action be brought on such agreement, * the consideration may be proved by extrinsic evidence. In other States, however, the English rule has prevailed;1 but to which we are bound to give its proper effect; the more so when it is considered by whom that statute is said to have been drawn, by Lord Hale, one of the greatest judges who ever sat in Westminster Hall, who was as competent to express as he was able to conceive the provisions best calculated for carrying into effect the purposes of that law. The person to be charged for the debt of another is to be charged in the form of the proceeding against him, upon his special promise; but without a legal consideration to sustain it, that promise would be nudum pactum as to him. The statute never meant to enforce any promise which was before invalid, merely because it was put in writing. The obligatory part is indeed the promise, which will account for the word promise being used in the first part of the clause, but still, in order to charge the party making it, the statute proceeds to require that the agreement, by which must be understood the agreement in respect of which the promise was made, must be reduced into writing. And indeed it seems necessary for effectuating the object of the statute, that the consideration should be set down in writing as well as the promise; for otherwise the consideration might be illegal, or the promise might have been made upon a condition precedent, which the party charged may not afterwards be able to prove, the omission of which would materially vary the promise, by turning that into an absolute promise which was only a conditional one; and then it would rest altogether on the conscience of the witness to assign another consideration in the one case, or to drop the condition in the other, and thus to introduce the very frauds and perjuries which it was the object of the act to exclude, by requiring that the agreement should be reduced into writing, by which the consideration as well as the promise would be rendered certain." This decision has been sustained in all the subsequent cases in England. See Stadt v. Lill, 9 East, 348; Lyon v. Lamb, Fell on Guaranties, App. No. 3; Jenkins v. Reynolds, 3 Brod. & B. 14; Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Ald. 595; Morley v. Boothby, 3 Bing. 107; Cole v. Dyer, 1 Cromp. & J. 461; James v. Williams, 3 Nev. & M. 196; Clancy v. Piggott, 4 id. 496; Raikes v. Todd, 8 A. £ E. 846; Sweet v Lee, 3 Man. & G. 452; Bain bridge v Wade, 16 Q. B. 89; Powers v. Fowler, 4 Ellis & B. 571, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 225. It will be seen that the above decisions depend upon the technical meaning attached to the word "agreement." Therefore, in cases arising under the seventeenth section, which does not contain the word " agreement," it has been held, that the consideration need not be expressed. Egerton v. Mathews, 6 East, 307. And Bee per Alderson, B., in Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W. 118.