•257 j by said company for sending the same," has been held not to be reasonable, and not to exonerate the company from liability beyond such a sum paid for transmission, True v. International Tel. Co. 60 Me. 9; as for an unaccounted-for mistake in the message delivered, Bartlett v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 62 Me. 209; or an unaccounted-for failure to deliver, West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Fontaine, 58 Ga. 433. See West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1. But a regulation in a telegraph blank used in sending night dispatches at half price, exempting from liability for errors in transmission or delivery, "from whatever cause occurring," was held unreasonable, so far as it was attempted to exempt for negligence or fraud. Hibbard v. West Un. Tel. Co. 33 Wis. 558. - In West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429, it was decided that a person, with knowledge of the rules and regulations, who writes a message on paper other than a blank containing them, is as much bound as if he had written the message on a blank

They may, undoubtedly, make all reasonable rules for the conduct of their affairs. (n) This reasonableness we consider, on principle, as a matter of law; but practically, it is usually given to the jury under the direction of the court.

By these rules they may require prepayment. They may protect themselves from liability for accidental injury. They may limit their liability in some respects and exclude some grounds of liability. But we should hold decidedly that they could not protect themselves from liability for the gross negligence or incompetence of their servants, or an imperfection or inadequacy of their instruments which could easily and certainly be, and therefore certainly should be, remedied. (o) On this point, as well as on the j further question * how far a knowledge of the rules brought home to the sender, constitutes or implies a contract and the defendant become liable in case of error or accident in the transmission or conveyance. By writing the message under it, and signing and delivering the same for transmission, the party accepted the proposition, and it became an agreement binding upon the defendant only according to the terms and conditions specified in its proposition." It was held also that the plaintiff could not control the effect of the contract by showing that he had neglected to read the printed conditions. See also West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 626, and post, note (p).

(n)McAndrew v. Elect. Tel. Co. 88 L. & Eq. R. 180; Camp v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 1 Met. (Ky.) 164; Wann v. West Un. Tel. Co. 37 Mo. 472; Gildersleeve v. U. S. Tel. Co. 20 Md. 232; Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co. 13 Allen, 226. A rule that the company would not be answerable for damages unless the claim was presented within sixty days after the message was sent, was held reasonable, and obligatory on the sender who had notice of it, in Wolf v. Western Union Tel. Co. 62 Penn. St. 83. This power is expressly conferred by statute in England, Canada, and many of the States of this Union.

(o) Sweatland v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co. 27 la. 433. In this case Dillon, C. J., says: " The arguments suggested furnish no reason why a company should be allowed to make general printed conditions which should have the effect to relieve it from liability for the improper or negligent conduct of its servants. Telegraph companies, like railroad companies, owe important duties to the public. Generally there are no competing lines, and if so the business is necessarily in the hands of a few. These companies must act in good faith toward the public, and cannot by general conditions demand unreasonable concessions from those proposing to send messages. It is not necessary to discuss what might lawfully be done by a special contract; but I deny that companies can adopt general printed rules exactly as a condition for sending messages that the sender shall exonerate or release the company from damages caused by defective instruments, or by want of proper skill in the operators, or by their failure to use due care." Gildersleeve v. U. S. Tel. Co. 20 Md. 232; Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co. 13 Allen, 226; Birney v. N. Y. & Pr. Wash. Tel. Co. 18 Md. 341.

j between him and the company, we think principles would be applied analogous to those already considered in reference to rules and notices of railway corporations. (p) 1

There is, however, one rule, which is very generally adopted, and has no analogue elsewhere. It is, that if a sender wishes his message repeated and returned to him, it shall be done for half the first price; and if a sender does not have his message thus returned to him, the company will not be responsible for any inaccuracy. This rule is certainly very reasonable. (q) 2 It is a

(p) See ante,p.*283. As to the effect of notices limiting the liability of the company, it was held in Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co. 1 Lansing, 125, that the same rule applied to them as to common carriers, and that their liability would not be limited by the notice, even if brought to the knowledge of the sender. In this case the conditions were printed upon the blank on which the message was written, but did not purport to constitute any agreement between the company and the sender. The same general rule is laid down in Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co. 45 Barb. 274; 48 N. Y. 182, though in that case the conditions were held to have been adopted by the sender as part of the contract. See also Sweatland v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co. supra; and Wolf v. Western Union Tel. Co. 62 Penn. St. 83. But in Maryland, where the statute provides that "dispatches are to be received and transmitted under such rules and regulations as may be established by the companies," a different rule has been adopted. In U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 20 Md. 232, it is said: "The appellant having adopted rules and regulations as authorized by law, the appellee was bound to know that the engagements of the company were controlled by them, and did himself in law engraft them in his contract, and is bound by them. This would be the case whether the dispatch offered for transmission be expressly declared to be subject to the terms and conditions prescribed or not Those dealing with the company must be supposed to know its rules and regulations, and their contract must be taken to have reference to them unless otherwise provided by special contract To the same effect is Birney v. N. Y. & Wash. Tel. Co. 18 Md. 341. In Camp v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 1 Met (Ky.) 164, and MacAndrew v. Electric Tel. Co. 17 C. B. 3, the sender of the message was held bound by a reasonable regulation of the company of which he had notice. But the company cannot relieve themselves from liability for the negligence or default of their operators or servants, by any rule or notice. Sweatland v. Illinois, etc Tel. Co. 27 la. 482.