(q) The reasonableness of this regulation has been repeatedly sustained. In the early case of MacAndrew v. Electric Tel. Co. 17 C. B. 3, the plaintiff had sent a dispatch by the defendants' line ordering one of his vessels to sail to Hull, but the message received directed her to sail to Southampton. It appeared that the error arose from a similarity in the telegraphic symbols for the. two places. The regulations of the company relieved it from liability for unrepealed

1 Tyler v. West Un. Tel. Co. 60 Ill. 421.

2 In Redpath v. West Un. Tel. Co. 112 Mass. 71, Chapman, C. J., in speaking of thee regulation respecting the repetition of a message, said: "It seems to us that one who elects to save the small sum charged for a more extended liability cannot reasonably claim the benefit of it in a business where careful operators are so liable to make mistakes; and that this principle applies to every stage of dealing with the message." Grinnell v. West Un. Tel. Co. 113 Mass. 299, decided that where a message is sent under such a regulation, it is immaterial that repetition would not disclose the error. But in Tyler v. West Un. Tel. Co. 60 Ill. 421, Breese, J., said that "such a contract, forced, as we have shown it is, upon the sender, is, in our opinion, unjust, unconscionable, without consideration, and utterly void." "Modern telegraphy is not now an infant art. ... In its infancy, it scarcely ever failed to perform its office. Thirty years have witnessed vast improvements in the art, - a higher knowledge of the subtle agent called into use, more finished instruments, and almost perfect skill in those that use them, - so that, setting aside atmospheric causes which have not yet been provided against it may be asserted as an init be repeated; but if they send it without repetition, they undertake at least to use ordinary care and * skill. It might be that the sender by his refusal takes upon himself the responsibility for injuries caused by common accidents or mistakes, or such as occur from time to time in the best conducted offices. But that he still leaves with the company their responsibility for gross non-observance of duty. (rr) l k wise precaution on the part of the * company ; they show their good sense thus to secure accuracy by giving up half of the price of the message; and it would be a wise precaution, by the sender of an important message, to secure accuracy or guard against the effect of inaccuracy in this way. Nevertheless, the sender is not bound to use these means; and then the question occurs, How far does his neglect or refusal to do so protect the company from the effect of inaccuracy? Our notes will show the adjudication on this subject. A reasonable conclusion, not unsupported by authority, would seem to be, that the company does not thereby protect itself against the gross negligence or ignorance of its operators. (r)1 They may refuse to send a message at all unless messages. Chief Justice Jervis said: "All that we are called on to say is whether this part which is the subject matter of defence is or is not reasonable, that is to say, that the company will not be responsible for unrepeated messages. So far from that being, as has been contended, an unreasonable, qualification it seems to me that it is highly just and reasonable that the company should require a message to be checked and corrected in order to ascertain whether they are correctly representing what is intrusted to them by repeating the message so that the person who sends it may see whether they are correct in the message they have sent It seems to be perfectly reasonable that it should be so. So in Camp v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 1 Met. (Ky.) 164, the court say: "There is nothing unreasonable in this condition. It gives the party sending the message the option to send it in such a manner as to hold the company responsible, or to send it for a less price at his own risk. If the message be unimportant he may be willing to risk it without paying the additional charge. But if it be important, and he wishes to have it sent correctly, he ought to be willing to pay the cost of repeating the message. This regulation, considering the accidents to which the business is liable, is obviously just and reasonable. It does not exempt the company from responsibility, but only fixes the price of that responsibility, and allows the person who sends the message either to transmit it at his own risk at the usual price, or by paying in addition thereto half the usual price to have it repeated, and thus render the company liable for any mistake that may occur. See also Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co. 13 Allen, 226; Sweatland v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co. 27 Iowa, 488; Wann v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 87 Mo. 472; Gildersleeve v. U. S. Tel. Co. 29 Md. 282; West Un. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 625.

(r) In Birney v. N. Y. & Wash. Pr. Tel. Co. 18 Md. 841, the company were held liable notwithstanding this regulation, it appearing that the message had been mislaid by the operator without any attempt being made to transmit it. - So in Bryant v. Am. Tel. Co. 1 Daly, 575; and Graham v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 10 Am. Law Reg. n. s. 319, where the damage complained of resulted from negligent delay in the delivery of messages after their transmission to the receiving office. - So in contestable truth, that given a line of wire properly established, the most perfect instruments, and skilled operators who exercise their skill with proper care, a message started at Chicago for New York is as sure to reach its destination exactly in the words and figures in which it was started as the lightning is sure to strike the object which attracts it. Intelligent and skilful operators all admit this. There is no reason, the atmosphere being right, and all else right, why a message correctly started should not be correctly transmitted along the line to the end of the line, no matter how many hundred miles asunder may be the point of its departure and the point of its reception. If this be so, then the efforts made by the courts to excuse those who undertake this business should not be imitated or encouraged." See Candee v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 34 Wis. 471; Passmore v. West. Un. Tel. Co. 78 Penn. St. 238.

1 As in West Un. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 85 Ind. 429, where an operator was ignorant of the name of the shire town of a neighboring county, one of the stations on the line of the company.

The company stands as to all its officers and all whom it employs, in the relation of master and servant; and their responsibility for the acts or omissions of those in their employment, must be determined by the rules and principles already considered in treating of master and servant.

It may be asked, To whom do the company give credit for the price of sending the message? Certainly to the sender in the first place. He may send the message or not as he pleases; but if he sends it he is liable for the payment. But the receiver may take it or not as he pleases. If he refuses he cannot be liable for the pay. If he takes an unpaid message, he must pay for it. And after he has received and opened the envelope in which it is usual to deliver the message, or if he has read a message delivered to him without covering, it is too late for him to refuse to receive it and pay for it.