Europe, whose language, however, does not appear to me to justify any such interpretation when properly considered, and is perfectly compatible with the ordinary rule, that the interest must be or ought to be according to the law of the place where the contract is to be performed, and the money is to be paid. It may not be without use to review some of the more important authorities thus cited, although it must necessarily involve the repetition of some which have been already cited." Confl. of Laws, § 298. Then after twenty pages of the examination of authorities, he comes to the conclusion that the decision of the court of Louisiana is not supported by the reasoning or principles of foreign jurists, and is directly opposed by the English case of Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, and the American case of Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet 65. Such is not our view of those cases. The first is wholly different in its facts. A bill of exchange was sued, drawn in France upon the drawer in England; and all that the case finds, so far as the present question is concerned, is, that Lord Mansfield says: "The law of the place" (meaning France) "can never be the rule, where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by which it is to be governed." The case of Andrews v. Pond only decides, that if the interest allowable at the place of payment be larger than that where the note is made or the bill drawn, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest No doubt of this; but the case does not say that if the interest where the note is made be the highest, the parties may not stipulate for that; and this alone is the question. We consider Depau v. Humphreys as fully sustained by Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33, and Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627. The former was an action of assumpsit on two promissory notes given by Horatio Gates & Co. of Montreal, to the defendants, payable in Albany, N. Y., and by the defendants indorsed to the plaintiffs. It appeared

1 Stickney v. Jordan, 58 Me. 106; Freese v. Brownell, 6 Vroom, 285; Kilgore v. Dempsey, 25 Ohio St 413. A note made in Michigan as collateral security for a debt then past due in that State, and expressed to be at a rate of interest valid in Michigan, but usurious in New York, will he upheld in the latter State, and the place of payment of such a note is immaterial. West T. & Coal Co. v. Kilderhouse, 87 N. Y. 430.

But if no interest be * expressed, then the interest will that the notes were made at Montreal, where the makers resided, and that the indorsers and the plaintiffs resided in Vermont. The lawful rate of interest in Montreal was six per cent, and in New York seven per cent., per annum. Redfieldt J., in delivering the opinion of the court, after an examination of all the authorities, says: "From all which I consider the following rules in regard to interest on contracts made in one country, to be executed in another, to be well settled: 1. If a contract be entered into in one place to be performed in another, and the rate of interest differ in the two countries, the parties may stipulate for the rate of interest of either country, and thus by their own express contract determine with reference to the law of which country that incident of the contract shall be decided. 2. If the contract so entered into stipulate for interest generally, it shall be the rate of interest of the place of payment, unless it appear the parties intended to contract with reference to the law of the other place. 3. If the contract be so entered into for money, payable at a place on a day certain, and no interest be stipulated, and payment be delayed, interest, by way of damages, shall be allowed, according to the law of the place of payment, where the money may be supposed to have been required by the creditor for use, and where he might be supposed to have borrowed money to supply the deficiency thus occurring, and to have paid the rate of interest of that country." Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627, was a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage, given by the defendant, a resident of New York, on lands in that State, to the complainant, who resided in England, to secure the payment of £800 sterling. The money was borrowed by Robertson when in England, upon an agreement for interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, payable annually. According to the agreement, Robertson, upon his return to this country, executed the bond and mortgage, and transmitted them to the complainant, who then deposited the £800 with Robertson's bankers in London. The defendant contended, that as the original agreement for the loan was made in England, and the money was received there, the contract for the payment of more than five per cent. per annum rendered the bond and mortgage usurious and void. Walworth, C, after disposing of a preliminary point which arose in the case, said: "The other point in this case presents a very nice question arising out of the conflict of laws in this State and England relative to the legal rate of interest. It is an established principle, that the construction and validity of contracts which are purely personal depend upon the laws of the place where the contract is made, unless it was made in reference to the laws of some other place or country, where such contract, in the contemplation of the parties thereto, was to be carried into effect or performed. 2 Kent's Com. 457; Story, Confl. Laws, § 272. On the other hand, it appears to be equally well settled by the laws of every State or country, that the transfer of lands or other hereditable property, or the creation of any interest in, or lien or incumbrance thereon, must be made according to the lex situs, or the local law of the place where the property is situated. And it has been decided, that the lex foci rei situs must also be resorted to for the purpose of determining what is, or is not, to be considered as real or heritable property, so as to have locality within the intent and meaning of this latter principle. . . . Upon a full examination of all the cases to be found upon the subject, either in this country or in England, none of which, however, appear to have decided the precise question which arises in this cause, I have arrived at the conclusion, that this mortgage executed here, and upon property in this State, being valid by the lex situs, which is also the law of the domicil of the mortgagor, it is the duty of this court to give full effect to the security, without reference to the usury laws of England, which neither party intended to evade or violate by the execution of a mortgage upon the lands here. If no rate of interest was specified in the contract, it might perhaps be necessary to inquire where the money was legally payable when it became due, for the purpose of ascertaining what interest the mortgagee was entitled to receive. Quince v. Callender, 1 Des. 160; Scofield v. Day, 20 Johns. 102. But if a contract for the loan of money is made here, and upon a mortgage of lands in this State, which would be valid if the money was payable to the creditor here, it cannot be a violation of the English usury laws, although the money is made payable to the creditor in that country, and at a rate of interest which is greater than is allowed by the laws of England. This question was very fully and ably be measured by the law of the place where the note is payable. (hh)1