As it is the purpose of the bankrupt law to give to the creditors all they could take by attachment or levy, so it gives them nothing more. In all the States, some specified property of certain kinds, real and personal, is exempt from attachment; and, besides what the 14th section of the national law exempts, it farther provides that all other property is exempted which is exempted from levy and sale, upon execution by the laws of the State in which the bankrupt has his domicil when the proceedings begin. The only limitation is that the amount shall not exceed "that allowed by such State exemption laws in force in the year 1871."1

It seems that the assignee cannot set apart for the bankrupt, under the State laws, what is specifically exempted by the national statute; as the amount exempted by State laws is exclusive of the $500 to be set apart under the national law.(q) It would seem, that a person may lose the benefit of the exemption, by his own laches; thus, it was held under the insolvent law of Massachusetts, that if a debtor, who had a larger quantity of any kind of provisions than the law exempted from attachment, set apart no portion thereof for the use of his family before it was about to be attached, and made no claim to any portion of it when the officer was about to attach the whole, he could not maintain an action against the officer who took the whole, (r)

(n) Johnson, C. J., in Burton v. Lock-ert, 4 Eng. 411.

(o) Hill v. Smith, 12 M. & W. 618; Thorpe v Thorpe, 3 B. & Ad. 580; Colson v. Welsh, 1 Esp. 379. See also Porter v. Vorley, 9 Bing. 93; s. o. 2 Moore & S. 141.

(q) Ex parte Cobb, 1 Bank. Reg. 414; Ex parte Ruth, East. D. Penns. 1 Intern. R. Rec. 166.

(r) Clapp v. Thomas, Massachusetts, 5 Allen, 158.

1 The assignee may set apart as "necessaries" for the bankrupt a sum of money. Re Bay, 2 Lowell, 180.

* It has been said, that all rights of action pass to the assignee; but there is one broad exception to this. No rights of action for mere personal injury pass. (s) None, for example, for assault and battery, and none for slander, (t)

(s) So held under the insolvent law of Massachusetts, in Stone v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 7 Gray, 539. See also Ex parte Vine, 8 Ch. D. 364.

(t) Rogers v. Spence, 13 M. & W. 571. This was an action of trespass for breaking and entering the dwelling-house and garden of the plaintiff, and making a great noise and disturbance therein, damaging the doors, etc, of the house, and the trees, etc, of the garden, and seizing certain goods of plaintiff, and exposing them to sale on the premises without his leave, whereby the plaintiff and his family were greatly disturbed and annoyed in the peaceable possession of the dwelling-house and garden, and the plaintiff was prevented From carrying on his lawful business. The defendant pleaded in bar, that the plaintiff became bankrupt after the action brought, and that an assignee had been appointed, who accepted, etc., and that thereby, under the statute, the cause of action became rested in the assignee. Demurrer to the plea, and judgment for the plaintiff. See 11 M. & W. 791. Held, on error brought, that the plea was bad. Lord Denman said, ably defining the doctrine on this subject: "As the object of the law is manifestly to benefit creditors, by making all the pecuniary means and property of the bankrupt available to their payment, it has, in furtherance of this object, been construed largely, so as to pass not only what in strictness may be called the property and debts of the bankrupt, but also those rights of action to which he was entitled, for the purpose of recovering in specie real or personal property, or damages in respect of that which has been unlawfully damnified in value, withheld, or taken from him; but causes of action not falling within this description, but arising out of a wrong personal to the bankrupt, for which he would be entitled to remedy whether his property were diminished or impaired, or not, are' clearly not within the letter, and have never been held to be within the spirit, of the enactment, even in cases where injuries of this kind may have been accompanied or followed by loss of property; and to this class we think the action of trespass quare clausum fregit, and that of trespass to the goods of the bankrupt must be considered to belong. These rights of action are given in respect of the immediate and present violation of the possession of the bankrupt, independently of his rights of property; they are an extension of that protection which the law throws around the person, and substantial damages may be recovered in respect of such rights, though no loss or diminution in value of property may have occurred; and even when such an incident has accompanied or followed a wrong of this description, the primary personal injury to the bankrupt being the principal and essential cause of action, still remains in him, and does not vest in the assignee, either as his property or his debts." s. c. on appeal, 12 Clark & F. 700. In Howard v. Crowther, 8 M. ft W. 601, which was a case for the seduction of the sister and servant of plaintiff, Lord Abinger, C. B., said. "Has it ever been contended that the assignees of a bankrupt can recover for his wife's adultery, or for an assault ? How can they represent his wounded feelings? Nothing is more clear than that a right of action for an injury to the property of the bankrupt will pass to his assignees; but it is otherwise as to an injury to his personal comfort. Assignees of a bankrupt are not to make a profit of a man's wounded feelings." Alder son, B., said: "The service, for the loss of which this action is brought, is of more value to one person than another, and the loss of it is, therefore, only a personal injury." Bird v. Hempstead, 3 Day, 272; Stanlv v. Duhurst, 2 Root, 52; Nichols v. Bellows, 22 Vt. 581. As early as the case of Benson v. Flower, Sir W. Jones, 215, it was held, that no action for slander passed to the assignee. Clark v. Calvert, 8 Taunt. 742, 3 Moore, 96; Shoemaker v Keeley, 1 Yeates, 245, 2 Dall. 213; Smith v. Milles, 1 T. R. 475; Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. Bl. 308. The distinction seems to rest upon the solution of the questions, - Have the assignees lost anything? What are they entitled to? The bankrupt's property. If, then, that property has been converted or injured, they may bring an action; but they cannot be said to have a property in the personal feelings, or even reputation, of the bankrupt. In Wright v. Fairfield, 2 B. ft Ad. 727, the right of assignees to sue on contracts, and for injuries affectinq the bankrupt's property, was declared. Hancock v. Coffyn, 8 Bing. 358, 1 Moore & S. 521; Bennett v. Allcott, 2 T. R. 166; Porter v. Vorley, 9 Bing. 93, 2 Moore ft