And it has been held, * that the assignee took no right of action for breach of contract to employ the bankrupt in a certain way for certain wages; but this has been overruled.(u) It may sometimes be difficult to draw the line between the rights of this kind which the assignees take, and those which they cannot; but the general rule would seem to be, that the right to damages passes from * the bankrupt to his assignees only where the right springs from damage actually done to property, or is distinctly connected with property, (v) And even here it is obvious that cases might occur which would not come under this rule. Thus, the bankrupt's claim against a man who beat his horse and injured him, or who had poisoned his cattle, would not, on general principles, pass to the assignee. All rights of this kind, which do not pass to the assignee, must, under the general rule, remain with the bankrupt; and we should say, therefore, that if he had, before bankruptcy, commenced an action for assault and battery, or any other action, the right of which did not pass, and he became bankrupt pending the suit, he could continue to carry on the suit for his own benefit But if the claim had been reduced to a judgment before the bankruptcy, there would be strong reason for saying that this judgment passed to the assignees, because it was now merely a settled and vested claim for money, (x) If this judgment had been satisfied, the money in his hands would, of course, go with the rest of his assets.

S. 141; Brewer v. Dew, 11 M. & W. 625; Chippendale v. Tomlinson, 1 Cooko, 106; Clarkson v. Parker, 7 Dowl. 87; Splidt v. Bowles, 10 East, 279; Kymer v. Larkin, 2 Moore & P. 183; Rouen v. Great Western Railway Co I Q. B. 51. So it is held, that a covenant to renew a lease in favor of one who subsequently becomes bankrupt, will not be enforced in equity in favor of his assignees. Drake v. The Mayor of Exon, 1 Ch. Ca. 71,2 Freem. 183; Moyses v. Little, 2 Vern. 194, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr.53, pl. 1; Brooke v. Hewitt, 3 Ves. 253; Willingham v. Joyce, id. 168; Buckland v. Hall, 8 id. 92; Vandenanker v. Desborough, 2 Vern. 96. So with an agreement for a lease for the personal accommodation of the bankrupt. Flood v. Finlay, 2 Ball & B. 9.

(u) Beckham v. Drake, 8 M. & W. 846, 9 id. 79. Judgment reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, 11 id. 315. The facta briefly were, that A agreed, in writing, with B and C, on behalf of themselves and D, as partners in trade, to serve them, B and C, and the survivor of them, for seven years, as their foreman, and not to engage in trade on his own account during that period without their consent; and 8 and C agreed to pay him wages after the rate of £3 3s. per week, so long as he should serve them faithfully. The Court of Exchequer held, by Parke, B., that, as the contract related to the employment of the personal skill and labor of the bankrupt, and the damages for the breach of it being compounded partly of the personal inconvenience to himself, and partly of the consequential loss to his personal estate, the right of action did not pass to his assignees. On error, brought to the Exchequer Chamber, it was held, Den man, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, that the right of action for the dismissal of A without reasonable cause, passed to his assignees in bankruptcy, as being part of his personal estate, whereof a profit might be made. It will be seen that the difference of opinion was not so much upon the principle as upon the application of the principle to the facts before the court. Lord Denman said "It was further argued, that as this contract related to the person of the bankrupt, the right of action will not pass. There is no doubt that a right of action for an iujury to the body or feelings of a trader, arising from a tort independent of contract, does not pass to his assignees, er gr. for an assault and battery, or for slander, or for the seduction of a child or servant; and the same may be said of some personal injuries arising out of breaches of contracts, such as contracts to cure or to marry; and if, in the case last supposed, a consequential damage to the personal estate follows from the injury to the person, that may be so dependent upon and inseparable from the personal injury, which is the primary cause of action, that no right to maintain a separate action, in respect of such consequential damage, will pass to the assignees of a bankrupt. In all those cases, the primary cause of action, if of a nature, properly speaking, personal, and the right to maintain it, would die with the bankrupt. In the present case, although the contract was for the personal skill and labor of the bankrupt, the breach of that contract does not appear to cause him any other injury than the diminution of his personal estate. In the cases referred to, the injury (if any) to the personal estate, is a consequence of an injury to the person; in this case, the injury to the person (if any) is a consequence of the injury to the personal estate."

(v) See the language of Lord Denman in Drake v. Beckham, 11 M. & W. 315, above quoted.

The choses in action of the wife pass to the assignee, under the conditions we have already stated; but he acquires no interest in any property, real or personal, which is secured to her separate use by the intervention of trustees; or without trustees, by operation of law or in conformity with law. For here the husband could not interfere, nor give his creditors or his assignees a right to interfere, (y)l '

*The United States bankrupt law exempts wearing apparel; but it was held, under a similar exemption in the statute of 1841, that articles of jewelry were not exempt, (yy) It was held, in the District Court in New York, that such articles, if they belonged to the wife before marriage, or were given to her after marriage, and were not unsuitable in their value to her condition, might be retained by her. (z) In Massachusetts, Judge Story put all these things on the footing of a trust, and withheld them from the assignee only where the husband could be regarded as the trustee of the wife. On this ground, he ordered a watch given to her by her husband after marriage; to be surrendered to his assignees; but permitted her to retain a mourning ring given her by her friend. So it was held, that watches given to children by a friend did not pass to the assignee of the father; nor would they if they were given by the father himself in good faith, and were suitable in kind and value to the condition and wants of the children. But if they were more than this, it would be or at least operate as a fraud upon the creditors, to take them from the estate, (zz)