If there is no market value for which the goods can be sold, it is impossible to lay down a narrower principle than that sellers in such a position are " entitled to the full amount of the damage which they have really sustained by a breach of the contract."13 It does not necessarily follow that because there is no available market in which the goods can be sold at the time, that they have no pecuniary value. In some cases, however, this may be true, and in such a case damages are the entire contract price without deduction.14

494; Foos v. Sabin, 84 111. 664; Tufts v. Bennett, 163 Mass. 396, 40 N. E. 172.

12 In Barry v. Cavanagh, 127 Mass. 394, the purchaser failed to take paving stones at a specific place in Boston, Dover street bridge. The court said, speaking of the stone: "Now, if, when they were brought to Dover street bridge, where there was no market for them, it would cost all they would sell for at a market to carry them to the market, they were valueless there, and they would be entitled to recover the contract price in order to be made whole. If they (the stones) could be conveyed to a market for a part of what they would sell for, they were worth at the bridge the market price less the cost of getting them to the market, and the true rule would be the difference between what they were so worth and the contract price. Stated otherwise, if they were salable where they lay, to be delivered elsewhere at a price larger than the cost of delivery there, the excess of such price above the cost of delivery was the market value, which should have been deducted from the contract price, in order to get at the damages." See also Chicago v. Greer, 9 Wall. 726, 19 L. Ed. 769; Kirchman v. Tuffle Bros. Co., 92 Ark. Ill, 122 S. W. 239; McCormick v. Hamilton, 23 Gratt. 561. Also if the market is controlled by the buyer, and perhaps if for any cause the local market is subject to such peculiar conditions as not fully to reflect the value of the goods, the market value at the nearest available market may be used to determine the seller's damage. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Chapman, 74 Fed. Rep. 444, 42 U. S. App. 21, 20 C. C. A. 603.

13 Dunkirk Colliery Co. t>. Lever, 9 Ch. D. 20, 26.

14 Allen v. Jarvis, 20 Conn. 38; Barry v. Cavanagh, 127 Mass. 394. See also Chicago v. Greer, 9 Wall. 726, 19 L. Ed. 769. If the seller was under a duty to deliver, and to put on