"Any influence brought to bear upon a person, entering into an agreement, or consenting to a disposal of property, which, having regard to the age and capacity of the party, the nature of the transaction, and all the circumstances of the case, appears to have been such as to preclude the exercise of free and deliberate judgment, is considered by courts of equity to be undue influence, and is a ground for setting aside the act procured by its employment." 7
1 "We should have no difficulty in finding cases which illustrate a growing doctrine of 'duress.'" 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. 535, 536, citing Bracton, 16b. (Twiss's translation, Vol. I, pp. 131, 133); and Bracton's Note Book, pl. 182, 200, 229, 243, 750, 1126, 1643, 1913. See also Ames, Lect. Legal Hist. 113.
216b, Twiss's translation, 133.
3 2 Inst. 483. See also Co. Iitt. 253b.
4 See Shepp. Touch. 61; 1 Bl. Comm. 131.
5 This is not included by Blackstone, and its sufficiency is doubted by Preston in his edition of Shepp. Touch., p. 61.
61 Bl. Comm. 131.
7 Pollock, Contracts (8th Eng. ed.), 640; Wald's Pollock (3d ed.), 732. See Attorney General v. Sothon, 2 Vern. 497; Woodman v. Skute, Free, in Ch. 266; Woodhouse v. Shepley, 2 Atkins. 535; Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. 750, 779; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. Div. 145;